THIRD INTERNATIONAL METROPOLIS CONFERENCE

Zichron Yaacov, Israel
November 30-December 3, 1998

Papers From:

Political Participation Across Immigrant and Ethnoracial Communities: Comparing World Cities

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General Information

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THE INTERNATIONAL METROPOLIS PROJECT

Introduction

The International Metropolis Project is a set of co-ordinated activities carried out by a membership of research and policy organizations who share a vision of strengthened immigration policy by means of applied academic research. The Metropolis partnership, now from twenty countries and a number of international research and policy organizations representing a wide range of policy and academic interests, is sustained by the attractions of its core idea. It is the promise of more effective policy making, more socially meaningful research practices, and the excitement of international collaboration towards common goals that bring people to the Metropolis table to turn a vision into a concrete project. The underlying idea is that the members of Metropolis will work collaboratively on issues of immigration and integration, always with the goal of strengthening policy and thereby allowing societies to better manage the challenges and opportunities that immigration presents, especially to their cities. Ideally, this work would involve teams made up of both researchers and policy-makers.

Metropolis is an evolving project and has witnessed considerable growth since it beginnings in 1995. Members are now from:

- **North America**: Canada, United States
- **South America:** Argentina
- **Europe:** Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom
- **Middle East**: Israel
- **Africa:** South Africa
- **Australasia**: Australia, New Zealand, Japan
- **International Organizations**: European Commission, UNESCO, Migration Policy Group, Quartiers en Crise, International Centre for Migration Policy Development, International Organization for Migration

The Underlying Idea: Research Enriching Policy

The idea of using academic research to stimulate and strengthen policy making now enjoys considerable currency. Metropolis is an attempt to advance the role that research plays in policy-making on an international scale. There are many ways that one can try to link policy with academic research. What might be considered the traditional way is to follow a broadly consumer transaction model. Often, we conceive of the role of research in the policy development process as a very simple transfer of knowledge from a supplier, the researcher, to a consumer, the policy analyst or decision maker. One might envision Metropolis along these familiar lines. Metropolis provides many fora for conveying the research products from the supplier to the consumer, including the Internet, conferences and seminars, and publications of various sorts. However, to regard Metropolis as functioning only in this way would be to sell short its partnership structure. The researchers and policy makers are not simply suppliers and consumers, but are partners with a shared objective: stronger policy in the field of immigration.

The Metropolis approach to the relations between academic research and policy is to encourage joint initiatives to:

- identify and articulate issues and problems for policy and research work
- develop appropriate data;
- conduct international comparative research directly related to the policy issues identified as priorities for the Metropolis partnership;
- exchange and analyze experiences amongst the partnership regarding the effects of immigration, especially within our cities, and the effects of government and non-government interventions, especially those designed to facilitate immigrant integration;
- develop conclusions, especially with regard to best policy practices; and
- exchange and analyze information about effective practices where these have been identified and explained on the basis of rigorous empirical research.

Metropolis encourages these joint initiatives by fostering the growing international network of researchers and policy makers, by convening events that provide opportunities for its members to hold informed discussions, to discover where potential for collaboration exists, and to plan accordingly. There is no question that a partnership arrangement is more demanding than a mere supplier-consumer relation; there is also no question that its potential is far richer. Metropolis has organized its activities on the premise that one reason for the relatively low level of exchange that often has existed between the academic and the policy communities is that neither organizational culture was attuned to work with the other. Consequently, Metropolis has conceived of itself as a project wherein opportunities would be provided for intensive face to face collaboration on active policy issues. The means for doing so have been conferences and seminars, organizational meetings, international comparative research projects, and the establishment of an internet website.

Brief Recent History

The first International Metropolis Conference took place in Milan in November, 1996. This initial event presented commissioned research and consolidated interest in the partnership. Importantly, it also provided many fora for academics and decision-makers from approximately twenty countries to speak with one another about substantive issues of interest to them, about their current research and policy work and what it was indicating about migration phenomena, and about what were the issues that the project ought to regard as priorities for the next few years.

The participants agreed that there was fruit to be harvested from this venture and it established five areas of long-term priority:

- Immigrant labour market and economic participation issues
- Immigrant spatial concentration and its social and economic determinants and consequences
- Immigrant Mobility
- Promoting Societal Cohesion
- Cities and the nexus between integration and immigration policies

Three of these were chosen as topics for special attention in preparation for the second annual conference, which took place in Copenhagen in September, 1997. They were Social Cohesion and Tolerance, Spatial Concentration and Mobility, and Economic Integration and Labour Markets. Theme papers on these topics were written for the conference and many presentations on migration issues as they affect specific cities were presented.

Following the second annual conference, the Metropolis International Steering Committee agreed that the work between the policy and research communities could be intensified by structural adjustments to the annual conference and to the activities of the Metropolis Project. An ideal was adopted whereby Metropolis would become a permanent conference, all of whose participants would meet together once during the year. In other words, the partners saw that the great potential of Metropolis would only be realized by increasing the level of its activity and the intensity of its research-policy exchanges.

To begin to implement this ideal of collaboration and partnership, the Metropolis International Steering Committee decided to introduce changes to the format of the annual conference and to create additional activities. The conference will be restructured to make possible a larger number of highly focussed workshops that would provide an opportunity for intense discussions with results of concrete value to specific policy communities. The initiative for the workshops will come from the partners. In a similar vein, between annual conferences Metropolis partners will begin hosting small scale, highly focussed events that will encourage intense and productive discussions of benefit to policy making. The inter-conference events, three or four per year, will be reflected in the annual conferences, either through formal reports of their results, through conference workshops that follow directions set at the preceding Metropolis event or that set directions for subsequent Metropolis events, as well as by making reports of the event available, both in hard copy and on this website. Both the workshops and the additional events will be about subject matters that fall within the scope of the five priorities identified in Milan.

These changes have been manifest in the three inter-conference seminars that have taken place to date, the beginnings of international comparative research, and in the annual conference in Israel. The first of these seminars took place in Gothenburg, Sweden on the topic of ethnically divided cities; the second was held in Lisbon, Portugal on immigrant integration to the labour market, and the third was held in Montreal on the barriers to employment for immigrants. Comparative research has begun, for example, between Metropolis affiliated researchers in Canada and with the Research Programme on Transnational Communities at Oxford University. The Third International Metropolis conference was held in Zichron Yaacov, Israel. The primary themes of its plenary sessions concerned the management of multi-ethnic societies and cities. Fourteen workshops on a variety of narrowly focussed topics were held, in some cases as continuations of the discussions at the previously mentioned seminars, or as inaugural events for international comparative research. Furthermore, special excursions to Israeli towns that have witnessed rapid population growth brought about by immigration provided a real-life setting for mini-seminars on managing immigration in an urban context. The Fourth Annual International Metropolis conference will take place December 8 - 11, 1999 in Washington D.C. Additional information about each of these events is available elsewhere in this website.

Project Management and Funding

Metropolis brings value to policy making and research by creating an international network of organizations all of whom want to improve immigration policy by bringing high quality scholarly research to bear on the social issues at stake. Comparative research will be the most likely sort to make an immediate contribution to policy formulation, particularly research that demonstrates which practices have been effective and which have not, and in which social settings. The transferability of information about effective practices between societies is always a challenge for comparative policy research, and Metropolis will deal with it through intense collaboration on methodological solutions as overseen by the Research Board of the International Steering Committee.

The International Steering Committee, in recognition of the fact that the evolving state of the Metropolis Project requires a new management structure for its effective operation, has recently re-vamped its organization. The new management structure includes a Steering Committee on which are represented all contributing partners, a Management Board of major contributors, either of services or financial support, a Research Board which represent both the policy and research communities, and a Conference Committee who will conduct the planning for the annual conferences. Supporting each of these functions is the International Secretariat whose capacity has recently expanded from the addition of a European arm, currently located at the ISMU Foundation in Milan, Italy, to the team at Citizenship and Immigration Canada in Ottawa. To date, all activities have been funded by their hosts and, for the time being, this will remain the case for both the annual conference and for the inter-conference events.

How to Contact the International Metropolis Project

Extensive information on the Canadian Metropolis Project is available at canada.metropolis.net.

For other information, you can contact the International Secretariat at:

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TOP

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Index

Multiculturalism Program Seminar Series 3 pages

International Metropolis Project Description 5 pages

Introduction 2 pages
(Myer Siemiatycki)

Political Participation of Immigrants in European Cities 9 pages
(Rinus Penninx)

The Political Participation of Ethnic Minorities in Birmingham 24 pages
(Muhammad Anwar)

Social Integration in a Multiculturalist City:
Immigrants from the Former Soviet Union in Haifa 24 pages
(Gustavo Mesch)

Ethno-Racial Politics in London 19 pages
(Zig Layton-Henry)

Ethnoracial Politics in Miami: "City of the Future" or "City on the Edge?" 36 pages
(Shelia L. Croucher)

Ottawa-Carleton: An EthniCity in the Making? 37 pages
(John Biles)

Multiculturalism and Governance: An Australian Perspective 30 pages
(Susan Thompson and Kevin Dunn)

Jews, Arabs, Russians and Foreigners in an Israeli City:
Ethnic Divisions and the Restructuring Economy of Tel-Aviv 29 pages
(Gila Menahem)

The Situation of Foreign Residents in Tokyo 7 pages
(Yoshikuni Higashi)

Immigration and Urban Politics in Toronto 28 pages
(Myer Siemiatycki)

Zurich: Political Participation and Exclusion of Immigrants in a Direct Democracy 37 pages
(Hans Mahnig and Andreas Wimmer)

TOTAL 290 pages

Multiculturalism Program Seminar Series

Since the inception of the world's first government sanctioned Multiculturalism Policy in 1971, the Government of Canada has been interested in ensuring that its policies reflect and accommodate ethnic, racial, linguistic and religious diversity. These policies have evolved over time to meet the changing needs of Canadians and to address the opportunities and the challenges posed by our diversity. This evolution has been guided by three fundamental goals:

> Identity: fostering a society that recognizes, respects and reflects a diversity of cultures such that people of all backgrounds feel a sense of belonging and attachment to Canada.
>
> Civic Participation: developing, among Canada's diverse people, active citizens with both the opportunity and the capacity to participate in shaping the future of their communities and their country.
>
> Social Justice: building a society that ensures fair and equitable treatment and that respects the dignity of and accommodates people of all origins.

Most disciplines in the social sciences and humanities and some of the hard sciences address diversity issues directly or tangentially, thus producing an incredible quantity of information. Considerable research has been done on each of the three goals described above from a variety of disciplinary backgrounds in both English and French. This research constantly expands to cover issues that develop as diversity in Canada increases and matures. One of the primary challenges of the Multiculturalism Program is to draw on this research to help develop and implement inclusive federal policies and programs.

To assist in framing research questions on these issues, the Strategic Policy and Research Unit of the Multiculturalism Program initiated a series of research seminars. The objective of each of these seminars is to bring a variety of policy makers, researchers, and NGOs together to consider the state of the art research in one of the targeted areas, the issues developing within that area, and the research gaps which need to be addressed. The dynamic nature of these seminars and subsequent interactions among participants are designed to establish long lasting networks.

Civic Participation

The Civic Participation seminar was the first of these planned seminars. It was held in October 1997 in conjunction with the biennial conference of the Canadian Ethnic Studies Association and the Second National Metropolis Conference, thus capitalizing on the considerable expertise which resides within both networks.

The resulting background papers, keynote address, and discussions have helped contribute to the discourse surrounding civic participation in Canada. They can be found on the Metropolis website at http://www.canada.metropolis.net/events/civic/index_e.html

At the same time, the networks resulting from this seminar have endured and are poised to have a long standing effect on research and policy formation around the issue of immigrant and ethnocultural civic participation in Canada.

The most fully fledged of the networks which have resulted from this seminar is the Citizenship Education Research Network (CERN). CERN has met several times, has charted out research gaps and has begun to fill them. It has also developed, with the support of the Multiculturalism Program and the Metropolis Project Team, an active niche on the Metropolis Website (http://www.canada.metropolis.net/cern-pub/index.html).

A second working group on political participation has also yielded some significant networking. Researchers met in Ottawa in May 1998 to discuss a comparative project on political participation of ethnocultural minorities and immigrants in Vancouver, Calgary, Edmonton, Toronto, Ottawa, and Montreal. It has also resulted in a workshop involving academics from eleven cities around the world at the Third International Metropolis Conference held in Israel in December 1998. These are the papers produced from that Workshop. An edited volume is in the works. In addition, there are plans to widen the network at the Fourth National Metropolis Conference to be held in Toronto in March 2000. To participate in these sessions, please contact Myer Siemiatycki at msiemiat@acs.ryerson.ca

A planned working group on voluntary participation has developed less quickly than the others. However, with the release of data on voluntarism by Statistics Canada, it is hoped that a network of researchers will coalesce. To this end, a workshop has been planned in conjunction with the Fourth International Metropolis Conference to be held in Washington D.C. (Dec. 7-11, 1999). For more information, please contact Fernando Mata at fernando_mata@pch.gc.ca

Social Justice

The second seminar, with a focus on social justice, was held in Ottawa in May 1999 in conjunction with UBC's Centre for Policy Studies in Higher Education and Training. Like its predecessor on civic participation, this seminar pulled together researchers, NGOs, and policy makers to consider ongoing research, gaps, and future directions for research in the area of social justice.

Two background literature reviews were commissioned, one in each official language, to lay the groundwork and to help familiarize both linguistic research communities with the work of the other. In addition, four background papers were commissioned on human rights, hate crime and bias activity, education, and reconciliation. Proceedings will be available in the Spring of 2000. To view the literature reviews please check the Metropolis website at http://www.canada.metropolis.net/events/index_e.html For preliminary copies of the background papers, please contact John Biles at john_biles@pch.gc.ca

An ongoing working group on social justice is expected to flow from this seminar. Follow-up workshops at the Fourth International Metropolis Conference on reconciliation and hate crime and bias activity have been organized. We look forward to working with these network in the future. For more information on the hate crime session, please contact Julian Roberts at jroberts@uottawa.ca or for more information on the reconciliation session please contact Jeff Bullard at jeff_bullard@pch.gc.ca

Identity

The Identity Seminar, the third of our seminars will take place in Halifax in the early fall 2000. Literature reviews in both official languages have already been commissioned to assist in the development of the seminar. If you are interested in more information on this session, please contact John Biles at john_biles@pch.gc.ca

Conclusion

We would like to thank Myer Siemiatycki for the incredible amount of work he has, and continues to put into organizing the session which led to these papers, and to his ongoing work in producing the edited volume and other follow ups to this session. There is much that these papers can offer in the current debate in Canada and around the world on representation of diversity within electoral processes. They are particularly timely in Canada with the contemporary debates around the proposed changes to the *Elections Act* and to the amalgamation of municipalities.

INTRODUCTION

The papers in this collection constitute local variations on a global theme. Taken together they serve as powerful reminders that urban communities increasingly contain a rich diversity of the world's population, that the policies of local governments will significantly define the terms of lived globalization, and perhaps most importantly that human agency – the decisions and actions of common, unheralded masses of people – are still capable of changing the world we live in.

Cities the world over have been transformed by our "Age of Migration" (Castles and Miller 1993). Globalization is typically identified as a series of economic, corporate, technological and communications dynamics of integration. These forces of "globalization from above" are often portrayed as impersonal, inevitable characteristics redefining the way we live. Immigration constitutes "globalization from below": the transnational project humans undertake themselves to change their lives. And cities – by far! – continue to be the preferred re-settlement location of immigrants everywhere. Indeed, increasingly, to write perceptively about cities is to reflect on their demographic diversity derived from global migration. Thus Saskia Sassen describes the world's urban spaces as inscribed with "a multiplicity of other cultures and identities, notably through immigration" (Sassen1994: 122); Leonie Sandercock observes "[t]he result is postmodern cities and regions of extraordinary cultural diversity and the attendant problems of living together in one society for ethnic groups with diverse cultures and social practices" (Sandercock 1998: 15); Iris Marion Young states quite simply that "city life is a being together of strangers" (Young 1990: 240); and Sharon Zukin re-defines the primary urban challenge to be "whether cities can again create an inclusive public culture" (Zukin 1995: 44).

The papers in this collection explore how the political culture of ten urban areas around the world have been transformed by global migration. These papers were originally presented at workshops during the Third International Metropolis Conference held in Israel, in December 1998. The workshop was titled "Political Participation Across Immigrant and Ethnoracial Communities: Comparing World Cities". This reflected our interest in exploring immigrant civic engagement as a dynamic interplay of local institutions and active newcomer communities. The collection begins with a theoretical overview of immigration and urban political participation and then proceeds alphabetically to examine the experience of migration and urban citizenship in ten cities: Birmingham, Haifa, London, Miami, Ottawa, Sydney, Tel Aviv, Tokyo, Toronto and Zurich. Together these papers explore the politics of belonging in cities being re-made by immigration.

The researchers participating in this workshop were a conference organizer's dream: enthusiastic, papers-in-hand and perceptive. The workshop co-organizers were John Biles and Myer Siemiatycki. In sequence, the papers in this collection are by: Rinus Penninx, University of Amsterdam; Muhammad Anwar, University of Warwick; Gustavo Mesch & Marina Shaginian, University of Haifa; Zig Layton-Henry, University of Warwick; Sheila Croucher, Miami University; John Biles, Department of Canadian Heritage; Susan Thompson & Kevin Dunn, University of New South Wales; Gila Menachem, Tel Aviv University; Yoshikuni Higashi, National Institute for Research Advancement, Japan; Myer Siemiatycki, Ryerson Polytechnic University; Hans Mehnig & Andreas Wimmer, Swiss Forum For Migration Studies.

Myer Siemiatycki, Ryerson Polytechnic University, Toronto.

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Keynote lecture for the Seminar ‘Mobilisation for Integration - Politics, Practice, Research’ organized by the Summer University of Southern Stockholm, June 14-16, 1999 in Botkyrka, Sweden.

by Prof. dr. Rinus Penninx
Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies
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Political participation and integration of immigrants in European cities

theoretical considerations and a framework for analysis

1. Introduction.[1]

International migration has become one of the major characteristics of the second half of the 20th century. In most Westeuropean countries immigration was welcomed until the early 1970s, but became one of the most contested phenomena from mid-1970s on. These migration movements - welcomed or grudgingly accepted - have changed drastically the receiving societies, and particularly the large cities in Western Europe that have been the factual attraction poles for immigrants. Local governments in these cities have to learn how to deal with the drastic changes in the composition of the population, with new cultural and religious diversity, with new demands of recent arrived immigrants and of their children. How to make the institutions of the existing society work equally and satisfactorily for these newcomers and how to let them or make them participate actively in that society?

There is quite some discussion on these topics and questions in contemporary Europe, but also quite some confusion. Different terms are used in different (national) contexts and - the other way around - the same term is given quite divergent interpretations. If we really want to communicate and learn from each other we should first of all be aware of this danger of confusion. And secondly I propose to spend some time on such questions like: what is the problem? What frame of reference do we use in thinking about it? What concepts and terms do we use and which are the key questions to be answered? In this introductory lecture I will try to answer these questions, thereby attempting to create a common language for discussion. Part of that theoretical exercise is to look more closely to the role that is, or may be attributed to organisations of immigrants when it comes to political participation and integration.

2. Globalisation, migration and cities

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[1] Parts of the theoretical framework presented in this lecture have been developed in the framework of the UNESCO-sponsored international research programme called ‘Multicultural Policies and Modes of Citizenship in European Cities (MPMC)’. This programme aims to study systematically and comparatively the issue of political participation of immigrants in local politics, based on more than 15 cities in Europe. The data of the first phase of that programme, the City Templates, are available on the UNESCO website.

Let me try first to identify some of the major developments in recent times that are essential to understand what kind of problems we have in general, and larger European cities in particular.

One of the dominant features in the postwar era has been and still is the phenomenon of globalization and internationalization. This development is manifested in a number of areas. The financial world was one of the first to emancipate from national borders and authorities and to go worldwide. Following the free movement of capital, economic activities and products are now also much less restricted by national boundaries than they used to be. The development of technology in information, communication and transport has evidently contributed to this new economic and financial world order. And in its wake it has assisted internationalization in cultural and political matters. The coming into existence of the European Union is a manifestation of the latter. These developments in itself have brought more external influences and diversity particularly to larger cities that are the local spaces of internationalization.

Two specific consequences of this general process do have in practice a great influence on larger cities. The first is that this globalization in all those domains has inevitably consequences for the movement of human beings: a growing number of people linked to the internationalization move across borders. There is a substantial migration *directly linked* to multinational companies. In general one might say that the labour market of the highly skilled has become increasingly international. This kind of migration - which often is temporary - is generally not seen as problematic, although it contributes clearly to growing diversity.

However, these are not the only people who move. A far greater number of people move as an *indirect* consequence of globalization: the increased reach of communication and transport, the higher density of networks globally and thus the increase of intermediary structures that facilitate migration, have significantly contributed to the growth of immigration of workers and refugees and their family members. Until 1974 their arrival was welcomed and even stimulated by recruitment because of the demand for their labour, but after the restructuring of European economy in the seventies they kept coming unasked for. It is particularly this category of newcomers that is perceived as problematic in the eyes of the societies of settlement.

Since both kinds of these newcomers tend to concentrate heavily in larger urban areas, they have become the directly visible face of globalization. They have rapidly changed the composition of the population of these cities. In Amsterdam for example, immigrants and their descendants form more than 42 % of the total population; in primary schools in Amsterdam more than half of the pupils are of non-Dutch origin. And such changes took place within a relatively short period of time.

A second consequence of globalization that is relevant for our discussions, is the shift in political structures and responsibilities. On the one hand the national states have lost much of their former autonomy to external forces. Their influence on financial markets, on economic processes and especially on development in employment opportunities clearly diminished. The gradual emergence of larger political units, such as the European Union, further restrict autonomous policies of nations. On the other hand large cities, where internationalization manifests itself most clearly, have to devise and implement policies that are geared to these new circumstances, and thus confront these same national states with claims to decentralize policies to lower levels. The new distribution of tasks and responsibilities between these layers of government are increasingly complex and give rise to tensions. In our field for example, migration and admission policies are mainly national and European Union policies, but the concrete consequences have to be dealt with by local governments, particularly large cities that are attraction poles of immigrants (see: Doomernik et al. 1997).

What does all this mean in practice for large cities? First of all, these cities are confronted with great and fast changes. General changes as a consequence of globalization that create new diversity within the settled, native population; and at the same time specific changes embodied in the arrival of large numbers of newcomers that contribute to more diversity. Let me be clear about the message I want to convey: I do not want to suggest that there was homogeneity and uniformity before: most larger cities always had diversity of all kinds that they had to cope with, such as class divisions and religious, cultural and language minorities. Particularly in larger cities heterogeneity has in general been the rule and thus the often made distinction between the 'native culture' and that of newcomers is illusionary, and false. The difference is that what I would call 'the old diversity' has been accomodated more or less and is reflected in political structures and processes of decision making: 'we are used to it'. The crucial question for cities seems to be whether they are able to accomodate the new diversity, both the general and the specific one. How to create and enhance unity, loyalty and social cohesion? How to rearrange structures and institutions within these cities in such a way that they are able to reflect the new composition of the population and its diversity. How to enable and stimulate newcomers to find a fair and accepted place and participate in the new social and political environment and develop thereby their loyalty to it and contribute to it. How to find a new balance of a political community that shares basic values and interest that are necessary for any political unity to survive, while at the same time taking into account and respecting diversity and reap the potential fruits of this diversity.

Cities and municipalities do have a special reponsibility here, apart from that of national authorities. I remind you here that the word citizen is derived from 'city'; the local political community of the city is from the point of view of the individual the place where the important things happen that affect his life, his position and his future. Let us start from this original meaning and call all inhabitants of the city citizens, irrespective of their formal legal status.

3. Cities, immigrants and participation.

Let us now focus a little bit more on immigrants and their participation on the local level of cities and start with some empirical observations.

In most European cities ethnic minorities and people of post-war immigrant origins have become essentially permanent residents. And if not all migrants will stay, the phenomenon of migration will, as I have suggested earlier.

Such immigrants have legitimate needs, demands, rights and duties with respect to their 'host societies'. They also contribute to that society through their labour, taxes, commercial services, participation in schools and neighbourhoods, and by enriching cultural landscapes. In practice, however, in every country of Europe immigrants and ethnic minorities have suffered disproportionately from a variety of forms of exclusion. Often they are formally excluded from the political decision making system, but there are also numerous other modes of exclusion that affect them. These include in the socio-economic domain such matters as restricted access to the labour market (including public sector employment); limited opportunities for self-employment and small business formation; denial or differential provision of social welfare resources (including programmes for financial assistance, training, health, housing, insurance, and old age pensions). In the cultural and religious domain immigrants and ethnic minorities have limited possibilities to satisfy their ethnic, cultural and religious needs and recognition of identities related to these are often problematic. Such mechanisms of exclusion together have resulted for large numbers of immigrants both in the worst socio-economic circumstances of all of Europe's inhabitants and in ambiguious or even non-acceptance of the ethno-cultural and religious diversity that immigrants have brought with them.

To be sure, numerous initiatives have been taken and policies implemented by national and local authorities to address these conditions. Yet all too often immigrant and ethnic minority groups have had little say in the public decisions, policies and resources which effect them. Therefore, such decisions, policies and resources often do not meet the needs, or are not sufficiently used by immigrant and ethnic minority groups. Thus far such measures have not been able to change their situation significantly.

The lack of immigrant and ethnic minority participation in policy-making is significantly conditioned by the fact that many do not have the legal status of citizenship. However, even in those states where some form of citizenship applies, other social and political factors prevent their full public participation. This often results in political marginalization and sometimes even total exclusion of these residents. Evidently, such a situation challenges basic liberal democratic values, core institutional procedures, and even fundamental questions of morality. Formulated in plain language: such a situation is politically inconsequent and morally unjust. It is also unwise, because it cretaes tensions and neglects the positive contribution of the newcomers to their environment.

Not participating and not being fully accepted in the various societal domains prevents the full development of citizenship by immigrants and ethnic minorities. If citizenship is taken as full participation in the public domain and the exclusion from citizenship is seen as the exclusion from participation in this domain, the concept of citizenship is not only relevant in the political-juridical sphere, but also in other spheres. Let me try to develop this essential idea a litle bit further, in order to develop a common framework of thinking and clarity in concepts and terms, as I promised in the beginning.

4. Citizenship: a framework of thinking and concepts.

Firstly, I propose that we will start from a broad concept of citizenship as a central concept for our discussions. This concept, however, is used in many different meanings. It is applied at different levels of analysis in various disciplines, from philosophers, political theorists to law practioners and administrators.

Recently political theorists have contributed significantly to our thinking on citizenship, particularly when they have tried to answer the question how basic democratic values can and should be combined with cultural and religous diversity on the one hand and socio-economic equality on the other (Bauböck 1994; Bauböck et al. 1996; Brubaker 1989 and 1992; Hammar 1990; Kymlicka 1995; Soysal 1994; Young 1990).

I propose to bring in the most important elements of these discussions in a rather practical way: let us distinguish three different aspects of citizenship. The first is the **juridical/political aspect**: it refers to the basic question whether and in how far immigrants and ethnic minorities do have differential formal rights and duties from natives in relation to opportunities for political participation. This aspects also includes the question whether newcomers may (easily or not) acquire national citizenship and thus gain access to the formal political system; it evidently also includes the granting (or not) of political rights to non-nationals and the juridical status as aliens as far as this has consequences for political participation.

The second is the **socio-economic aspect** of citizenship: this pertains to social and economic rights of residents, irrespective of national citizenship; these include industrial rights and rights related to institutionalized facilities in the socio-economic sphere. Do they have (equal) rights to accept work and to use institutional facilities to find it? Do they have the same rights as indigenous workers? Do they have access to work related benefits, like unemployment benefits and insurance, and to the state-provided social security facilities, like social housing, social assistance and welfare and care facilities, et cetera.

The third aspect pertains to the domain of **cultural and religious rights** of immigrants and minorities: do they have equal rights to organize and manifest themselves as ethnic or religious groups? Are they recognized, accepted and treated like other comparable groups and do they enjoy the same or comparable facilities?

What is crucial in discussing these three domains is that we do not look only at the formal rules and regulations, but also - and I would say first and foremost - at the **practice of it**. Rules may in the formal sense be equal and comparable, but practice may be unequal, simply because newcomers may not be informed, may lack the necessary means and networks to realize their wishes, or because they are not able to mobilize enough political weight to enforce equal practice.

The advantage of making such a distinction between these three different aspects of citizenship is that it may become clear later how participation in one domain may influence participation in other domains and under what conditions. It is often assumed that, once equality is acquired at the formal political and juridical level, this will automatically lead to a practice of equality in other domains. This is not always the case, maybe even not the rule. The position of ethnic minorities in the U.K. or for that matter of the second generation North Africans in France who have acquired formal citizenship, shows that being a citizen in the formal sense does not warrant the practice of equality neither within the formal political system, nor in the socio-economic and cultural domain. It certainly strengthens their starting position, but is no guarantee. On the other hand, aliens in other countries lacking access to the formal political structure may acquire certain social rights and cultural and religious rights. For example, muslim immigrants in the U.K., although having full national UK-citizenship, do have significant less religious rights than alien immigrants in the Netherlands have acquired (see: Rath et al. 1996).

If we use the concept of citizenship as defined above as the central focus of our discussions, I propose to add a second important distinction, namely that we look at the practice of citizenship and participation from two different perspectives. These two perspectives are simply based on the assumption that you need two partners to tango: the immigrants and the receiving society.

The first perspective than is the **'top-down-approach'**. Here the institutional framework of the society of settlement is taken as a starting point and we ask the question in how far that institutional framework is open for participation by immigrants and ethnic minorities, or is opened and activated in the course of time. In this approach the terms of inclusion/exclusion and 'opportunity structure' are key-concepts pertaining to openness of the existing system. As far as measures are taken to stimulate participation, among others by adapting that existing system, **activation** seems to be the appropriate term in two senses: activation of the existing system and of immigrants.

The second is the **'bottom-up-approach'**. Here the central focus is on the initiatives taken by immigrants, ethnic minorities and their organizations to stand up for their (political, social and cultural) interests irrespective of institutional structures, alone or in coalition with other actors. The basic concept here is **mobilization**.
The analytical distinction top-down and bottom-up, and activation and mobilization makes it possible to look at the possible mismatch and at the interaction between the two.

Focussing on local situations and the role of immigrants and local authorities in such situations one can thus identify on the one hand *channels of mobilization* for immigrants and ethnic minorities for each of the domains of citizenship mentioned above. In the cultural sphere one can think for example of mobilization through religious or cultural organizations of immigrants and their efforts to establish places of worship, religious courses or courses in immigrant languages, through parents' participation in the educational system of their children to introduce such elements in the school system, et cetera. In the socio-economic domain immigrants may mobilize themselves also in many ways: as interest organizations defending or trying to gain social rights; by taking initiatives as enterpreneurs or self help groups.

In the political-juridical domain immigrants may mobilize themselves, depending on the opportunity structure, as pressure groups outside or within existing political parties, by establishing 'immigrant parties' or action groups, or to call for consultative bodies.

On the other hand one can identify the opportunity structure for such action, or the *channels of activation*. Throughout Europe -- especially at the level of cities -- a range of parallel institutions and policies have been created to function as liaisons between local authorities and immigrants and ethnic minorities. These include a rich spectrum of consultative bodies such as Contact and Co-ordination Groups, Parliaments or Forums of Migrant Workers or Ethnic Minorities, Advisory Councils, et cetera. Their composition varies greatly.

Such activating participatory institutions and policies have been established or have developed very differentially in terms of structure, intent, and relation to regional and national policy; their degrees and

[3] These issues and the needs surrounding such participatory structures

evidence of success and failure have differed considerably as well[3].

Having positioned the problem and defined the crucial concepts and approaches, we are now able to formulate the key questions for discussion and exchange during our conference. They can be summarized as follows:

(1) How can local authorities activate immigrants and ethnic minorities to participate in political decision making in general, and in relation to their position in particular? Important subquestions can be derived from this general question:
  - In how far can and do immigrants and ethnic minorities make use of existing general structures to participate?
  - If general structures are not accessible or insufficient, which special frameworks for immigrants and ethnic minorities (consultative bodies, forums, ombudsmen) can be used effectively?
  - What participatory efforts are most effective in relation to the three different domains of citizenship: the political/juridical, socio-economic and the cultural/religious domain?

(2) How can and do immigrants and ethnic minority mobilize to improve their position and to influence policies relating to that position?
  - What forms of mobilization are effective? Which coalitions with other actors are effective?

(3) How do activation policies of authorities and mobilization of immigrants and ethnic minorities interact and under what conditions do they reinforce each other?
  Which activation and mobilization efforts have worked out satisfactory for both parties and which have failed?

5. Multicultural society, integration policies and immigrant organisations

Until now we have formulated a number of crucial empirical questions for studying the practice of participation of immigrants, taking citizenship as a key concept. In doing so, we have taken the individual immigrant as a (potential) citizen as a starting point and have distinguished three aspect of citizenship. Taking a different perspective, namely that of the dominant receiving society or city, and raising the level of abstraction somewhat, we should ask the question in how far the opportunity structure of the receiving society and its policies relating to immigrants allow immigrants to participate. The aspects of citizenship described above then become domains of policy: what kind of policies do large cities have in the juridical/political, the socio-economic and the cultural/religious domain? And very importantly: are immigrant organisations, as collective representatives of individual citizens, recognized as relevant partners in participation and integration policies?

Asking these questions and trying to develop a typology of different kinds op 'integration policies' we have come once more into the realm of political theory and philosophy. The answers to these questions are inevitably related to explicit or implicit assumptions, preferences and convictions relating to the nature of society in general and the multicultural society in particular. I will try to give a brief overview of the diffrent positions that are taken towards the multicultural society and the consequences of these positions in terms of the content of integration policies, the reach of citizenship of immigrants and the role attributed to organisations of immigrants.

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have been importantly highlighted by institutions on the European level as well. In cities throughout Europe, for instance, many of these kinds of participatory frameworks and policies have been structured in line with the recommendations made by the Standing Conference on Local and Regional Authorities of Europe (CLRAE) in its 1991 Frankfurt Declaration entitled 'Towards a New Municipal Policy for Multicultural Integration in Europe' and by the Council of Europe in its Final Report on 'Community and Ethnic Relations in Europe' (1991).

Today a broad consensus exists among political theorists that both the full (and forced) assimilation of immigrants as the (complete or partial) exclusion of them from the society of settlement are morally unacceptable policy answers to immigration. Immigrants and their descendants should not be excluded from the political community; they should enjoy citizen rights. Such rights forbid (forced) assimilation. Social rights of the welfare state also imply minimally to strive for equal starting positions in the socio-economic domain.

Indeed, in democratic constitutional states these extremes are declined, but in between these two extremes there are still lots of possibilities and questions. What means equal rights exactly in a multicultural society? How to interpret the freedom of religion in case of new religions brought by immigrants? Is recognition of political and social rights of immigrants enough to guarantee cultural and religious equivalence? Or should separate 'cultural rights' be introduced? Political philosophers have tried to answer such questions in recent decades. I distinguish five different conceptions of the multicultural society:

1. Liberal nationalism. Liberal nationalism declines assimilation, because it contradicts individual basic rights. But as long as these basic rights are not violated, in this vision it is perfectly legitimate that the state endorses the survival of the national culture of the dominant ethnic group (Taylor 1995; Walzer 1995a). In this vision there is in principle some space for recognition of the multicultural character of a society, but that space is at the same time mainly confined to the private domain in the narrow sense of the word. Ethno-cultural and/or religious identity are regarded as individual choices, of the private domain, and thus outside the realm of government policy. Integration policies inspired by this vision aim primarily at the political-juridical and socio-economic equality on the individual level, to be attained preferably by general (not group-specific) policies. Organisations of immigrants are regarded as part of the private domain: the state has no responsability for such organisations and does not recognize them as legitimate representatives of immigrants. Immigrants are encouraged to become members of national organisations.

2. Liberal neutrality. Proponents of liberal neutrality argue that the multicultural society does not form an essential problem for liberal democracy. In their view the liberal democracy has been the product of a comparable (historical) situation, namely the religious pluralism following the Reformation. The solution for that kind of diversity, a strict separation of church and state, can be used as a model for the present ethno-cultural diversity: they plead for a strict 'separation of state and ethnicity'. According to that principle the state does not recognize any form of ethnic or cultural identity, but addresses individuals only in their capacity of citizens (Kymlicka 1995: 3-4; Walzer 1995a). This vision emphasizes more than liberal nationalism the right of groups to retain their culture and identity within the private domain, but at the same time the state has no role or responsability for that. Like in the liberal nationalist vision integration policies inspired by this vision aim primarily at the political-juridical and socio-economic equality on the individual level, to be attained preferably by general (not group-specific) policies. Organisations of immigrants are allowed to act on behalf of individuals, but are not recognized as legitimate representatives of immigrants nor endorsed. Immigrants are approached as individuals and citizens by the state.

3. Liberal multiculturalism. Political theorists like Kymlicka (1995) and Raz (1994) argue that the foregoing position of liberal neutrality is impossible: states cannot implement 'culturally neutral' policies. The existing fabric of the public sphere works in many respects systematically in favour of the dominant ethnic culture, they assert. Ethnic minorities thus have unequal opportunities to live according to their culture and to reproduce it. Starting from the principle of equality of opportunities it is therefore legitimate for authorities to implement policies that strive for a certain equality in the cultural domain. In this vision the multicultural society is not only a phenomenon that should be accepted in the private domain, but that also demands changes and adaptations in the public domain. The recognition of possible inequality in the cultural sphere allows thus for compensation policies in this domain. Such conceptions open the way to (temporary) group-specific policies. It also opens possibilities for recognition of organisations of immigrants. These organisations are often called to help and implement governmental policies, to realize a multicultural society and to endorse the emancipation of their groups in that society. They may (temporarily, partially and selectively) be financially endorsed to exert such instrumental functions.

4. Cultural pluralism. Proponents of cultural pluralism take the significance of the cultural and identity differences much further. They argue that the cultural and identity experience cannot be regarded as 'goods' that can be distributed equally, but that they are constituent elements of individuals. The cultural identity determines their appreciation of the world: what is justice and injustice, what is important and unimportant, what normal and deviant is part of that appreciation. The dominant group, however, has the power to define their perspective and ideas as 'universal', which makes the perspective of minorities deviant. One can therefore only speak of equivalence, when different minority perspectives acquire an equal place in the public debate. To reach such a situation far reaching forms of group representation and political influence have to be created in the various domains of society. The rights bound up with citizenship should be differentiated according to the different groups (Seidmann 1995; Young 1990). A multicultural society in this vision means the acceptance of diversity as norm, also in the public sphere. In term of policies the consequence is that integration does not only mean juridical/political and socio-economic equality on the individual level, but first and foremost (group-related) ethno-cultural and religious equivalence. This latter dimension is central in integration policy and creating and protecting the opportunities to experience and develop the culture of the own group is regarded as a legitimate task of the state. Organisations of the different groups do fulfill crucial functions in this ethno-cultural domain as well as in other domains. They should therefore be recognized and endorsed in their own right by government policy without direct steering or mingling in by governmental authorities.

5. Communitarian pluralism. The foregoing cultural pluralism variant has also an somewhat older counterpart, that I will call communitarian pluralism. The pillarized Dutch society as it existed from the beginning of the 19th century until the 1960s can be seen as an example. The basic principle is that of souvereignty within the own group: this model does not aim at interaction of all different groups on the basis of equality in the public domain, but much more at the right to live as much as possible according to the norms and values of the group and within the own (subnational) community (Margalit and Halbertal 1994). Interaction between different groups is seen as threatening. The public domain is as small as possible and there is a strong parallellism of institutions within the different segments of the plural society. Organisations are in this vision essential, as in cultural pluralism vision, but their function is more inward oriented.

By looking more closely at different visions of the multicultural society, at the corresponding kind and comprehensiveness of integration policies that these visons lead to and at the role that is attributed to immigrants as individual citizens and/or to organisations of immigrants we have in fact developed an instrument to typologize policies of authorities.

I hope that these foregoing theoretical considerations will help you in your work fo stimulating and organizing the participation of immigrants and their organisations in local affairs.

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Rinus Penninx

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The Political Participation of Ethnic Minorities in Birmingham

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The Political Participation of Ethnic Minorities in Birmingham

1. Introduction

Over the centuries, Britain has received and absorbed large numbers of people from other countries and many Britons went abroad to the Colonies as rulers, administrators, soldiers, and business people to represent the British Empire. But it is only in the last fifty years that Britain has received in significant numbers from the former colonies workers and their families whose colour differs from that of the indigenous white population. The main sources of this immigration are the New Commonwealth countries of the Indian sub-continent and the West Indies. The estimated present-day number of ethnic minorities[1] is about 6.5 percent of the total population. Of these, over 60 percent are now British born. Thus more than half of the population is not 'immigrant', but native born British. Most of those who arrived as immigrants have now become full British citizens.

Unlike some other west European countries, ethnic minorities in Britain have a right to vote and stand for elections both as British citizens and as Commonwealth citizens. In this paper I examine how far they have exercised this right and participated in the electoral process in Birmingham.

Ethnic minorities have settled in industrial urban areas where there were job opportunities (Anwar 1979). This means that the ethnic minority population is not distributed throughout the country in the same way as white population. For example, the 1991 Census shows that the majority of the ethnic minorities are to be found in the South East (56.4%), especially in the Greater London area (44.8%). This compares with 29.9 percent of white population in the South East. A significant proportion of ethnic minorities (21%) live in the Midlands, which includes Birmingham. It is clear that the concentrations of ethnic minorities make them statistically significant in the political process in the areas of their settlement. It in turn makes their organisation and mobilisation easier for direct political action and electoral participation.

It is relevant to point out at the outset that in addition to electoral politics, there are also pressure group activities in which ethnic minorities participate. This happens at individual as well as group levels. Sometimes they get involved in direct political action, such as the 1980s disturbances in some inner-city areas of Britain (Scarman 1981, Gifford 1986). They also often protest against unfair treatment and campaign against racism and racist organisations. They also take action in terms of marches and petitions against racial attacks, racist murders, racial harassment and deportations. One recent example is the murder of Stephen Lawrence, a black teenager, by white young people and the intense campaign by his parents and others to seek justice. This has resulted in the setting up of an official inquiry which is currently taking evidence from relevant individuals and organisations. Like other events of this nature, the Stephen Lawrence case has received a very wide media coverage. Sometimes individual politicians and political parties are lobbied about these issues and political activists also make statements on these events and provide support. This way, ethnic minorities regularly take political action and exercise political influence.

It is worth mentioning here that ethnic minorities in Britain are equal citizens with whites in theory, but in practice, many face racial inequality, face ongoing hostility and widespread direct and indirect racial and religious discrimination. In particular, it appears the British born and educated ethnic minorities are also facing racial discrimination (Anwar 1998a). These broad conclusions equally apply to ethnic minorities in Birmingham.

2. Demographic and Economic Characteristics

Birmingham has a long history of receiving immigrants. In particular during the nineteenth century the Irish workers formed an important part of the workforce in manufacturing industry. After the Second World War, like other industrial cities in Britain, Birmingham faced labour shortages due to expanding industrial sector. Irish migration continued, and estimates indicate a net Irish inflow of around 350,000 between 1946 and 1959 (Jackson, 1963) and many of them settled in Birmingham. Also after the war many Commonwealth citizens, who had free entry into Britain under the Commonwealth rules until 1962, came to Birmingham. They were initially welcomed by the public as allies, who had defended their nation (Cabinet Papers, 1950). However, as the numbers increased, the pressure for immigration control grew, which resulted in the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 and restricted entry (Layton-Henry, 1992). After this, the issue of immigration of non-whites and now ethnic minorities has been both in the political and public domain one way or another.

The issue of non-white immigration also led to the formation of several active anti-immigrant organisations in the 1960s. Of the first two such organisations to oppose immigration was one in Birmingham: the Birmingham Immigration Control Association. Since the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962, several major pieces of immigration legislation and many changes to immigration rules have been introduced. However, I have argued elsewhere (Anwar, 1986) that the 1962 Act had a decisive effect on the pattern of migration which also applies to Birmingham. It turned a movement of workers, many of whom were probably only interested in staying temporarily, into a permanent immigration of families, and the voucher system introduced in the 1962 Act initially reinforced kinship and friendship bonds and therefore helped the pattern of settlement. Successive immigration legislation and rules have forced legally settled people to bring their dependants to Britain. This sometimes is not easy and the dependants of migrants in Birmingham and other areas face a lot of difficulties in getting entry to this country. Although the large scale immigration of New Commonwealth workers to Birmingham stopped almost 36 years ago, the topic of immigration and the presence of ethnic minorities in Birmingham and other areas of Britain still provokes unnecessary political and public reactions. On the whole, the British public's reaction to non-white immigration was more vigorous than it had been to the previous waves of immigration of white people. Ethnic minorities have suffered and are still suffering as a result of negative attitudes of some white people.

In 1961 it was estimated that there were almost 40,000 coloured people[2] in the West Midlands conurbation, which includes Birmingham, out of an estimated coloured population of 336,500 (Rose et al, 1969). The 1991 Census shows that 21.5 percent of the Birmingham population of 961,041 is categorised as of ethnic minority origin. Table 1 shows the number and percentage of whites and various ethnic groups in the city. However, in 1998, based on different sources, I estimate that the ethnic minority population is over 25 percent of the total population of Birmingham.

Table 1: Ethnic Groups in Birmingham

Ethnic Group	Number	Percentage
White	754274	78.5

Pakistani	66085	6.9
Indian	51075	5.3
Bangladeshi	12739	1.3
Black-Caribbean	44770	4.7
Black-African	2803	0.3
Black-Other	8803	0.9
Chinese	3315	0.3
Other Asian	5653	0.6
Other Other	11524	1.2
Total	961041	100.0

Source: 1991 Census

The process of concentration of ethnic minorities in Birmingham started in the 1960s and has continued since. Overall 57 percent of ethnic minority population was found in 7 of Birmingham's 39 local wards. These are Handsworth, Soho, Small Heath, Sparkbrook, Sparkhill, Sandwell and Aston. The 1991 Census shows that almost 90 percent of Pakistanis, the largest ethnic minority group, live in the ten inner-city wards. The pattern of ethnic minority settlement shows that they are highly concentrated in the inner-city area of Birmingham and therefore face the common problems of the inner-city. In fact Birmingham was the most deprived local authority area outside London, according to the Department of the Environment's *Index of Local Conditions* (1994). Only four districts in the country, all in run-down inner London (Newham, Southwark, Hackney and Islington), were worse off. In addition to inner-city problems, ethnic minorities also face racial disadvantage and racial discrimination in all walks of life.

The migration of Asians was initially predominantly male, but the ratio of men to women has changed over time. For example, in 1961 it was estimated that 82 percent of the Pakistani population in Britain was male, and the situation in Birmingham was similar. However, the 1991 Census showed that for all ethnic minorities there were 1001 males per 1000 females. For white people, there were 935 males per 1000 females. The Census also revealed that for some age groups there were more ethnic minority males than females. The same applied to white people e.g. the percentage of females 65+ was more than males because women on average live longer.

One feature of the ethnic minorities in Birmingham and nationally is that they are much younger compared with the white population. Ethnic minorities have fewer older people aged 65+ (3.22%) compared with almost 17 percent of whites in this category. There are also significant differences between ethnic groups. For example, Black-Caribbeans (5.65%) and Indians (4.06%) have relatively more aged 65+ compared with Pakistanis (1.75%) and Bangladeshis (1.20%). A similar pattern was found in Birmingham. Looking at the other end, the 1991 Census showed that nearly half of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi population was aged 0-17 compared with 20.7 percent whites in this age group. On the whole, it is estimated that almost 40 percent of pupils in Birmingham school are of ethnic minority origins compared with their estimated total population of 25 percent. This vast difference in terms of age has clear implications for the issues which are relevant to the education of a relatively large number of ethnic minority children in the areas of their concentrations.

The Asian groups have the largest households. In particular, Bangladeshi and Pakistani households in Birmingham contained an average of more than five people in 1991, which was almost double the size of households of Black (2.5) and white (2.3) groups. Asians also have more dependent children, which illustrates the larger household sizes. One other characteristic which is relevant to mention is that Asian households are more likely to be three generation households compared with white and Black households.

Most of the first generation ethnic minorities were economic migrants, because they were encouraged to come to Britain to work. Therefore, their position in the labour market to a major extent determines their position in society. The type of work available to them does not merely govern their incomes, it also helps to determine in what areas they settle, where their children go to school, their participation in politics and how far they interact with white people, and their overall status. In the 1960s, ethnic minority workers had no difficulty in finding work in Birmingham, mainly in manufacturing industry, in particular, in metal goods, vehicle manufacturing and engineering works. However, more recently, Birmingham's economy has undergone substantial changes, and this has disproportionately affected ethnic minorities.

The 1991 Census showed that while economic activity differences between males of various ethnic groups were marginal, the differences between females of different ethnic groups were quite striking as shown in Table 2.

Table 2: Economic Activity by Ethnic Groups in Birmingham, 1991 (Percentages)

Ethnic Group	Males (16+)		Females (16+)	
	Economically* Active	Economically Inactive	Economically Active	Economically Inactive
White	71.4	28.6	47.8	52.2
Pakistani	71.7	28.3	22.0	78.0
Indian	76.3	23.7	52.4	47.6
Bangladeshi	64.9	35.1	21.0	79.0
Black Caribbean	77.5	22.5	66.1	33.9

*Note: Full and part-time workers, self-employed, those on government schemes, unemployed seeking work or waiting to start a job.

Source: 1991 Census.

Table 2 shows that the economic activity rate among Black-Caribbean women is very high when compared with other ethnic groups, and 78 percent of Pakistani and 79 percent of Bangladeshi women were classed as economically inactive. On the other hand, Indian women have a fairly high economic activity rate among Asian groups, even higher than white women. Proportionately more white women work part-time in Birmingham compared to women of other ethnic groups.

It is relevant to see very briefly what type of jobs ethnic minorities were doing in Birmingham in 1991. Birmingham lost 86,000 jobs in manufacturing between 1978 and 1984. In 1971 manufacturing jobs represented 49 percent of the total jobs in Birmingham. However, this percentage came down to 34 percent in 1984, and even after that, this trend has continued. This has led to disproportionate high unemployment among ethnic minorities, who heavily worked in the manufacturing industry. Table 3 shows the unemployment rates for different ethnic groups in Birmingham.

Table 3: Unemployment by Ethnic Groups in Birmingham, 1991 (Percentages)

Ethnic Group	Male	Female
White	15	8
Afro-Caribbean	27	16
Indian	18	17
Pakistani	35	45
Bangladeshi	42	44

Source: 1991 Census

It is clear from Table 3 that the unemployment rate for Pakistani and Bangladeshi men in Birmingham is very high. There are also vast differences between white females and Pakistani and Bangladeshi females who were unemployed. Partly as a result of a large number of redundancies, the number of self-employed ethnic minorities is increasing and particularly for Asians and Chinese it is higher than whites in Birmingham. However, one reason for a higher unemployment rate for Pakistanis and Bangladeshis is that they are almost absent in the large employers in Birmingham. For example, Birmingham City Council, the largest employer in the area with a workforce of over 50,000, had Pakistani origin employees estimated at less than one percent compared with their estimated population of nine percent. This pattern also applied to a number of other large employers in the city.

On the whole, it appears that in Birmingham 72 percent of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis aged 16-60/65 were with no earned income compared to 30 percent of whites, 45 percent of Indians and 42 percent of Afro-Caribbeans (Anwar, 1996). Their situation in the labour market and lack of earned income for a large number of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis affect their position in education, in housing, in politics and other fields.

3. Participation in Politics

The participation of ethnic minorities in the British political system gives them the opportunity to express their views on the policies of the political parties but also to articulate their needs as British citizens, particularly at a local authority level. Their participation in politics is also crucial for achieving equality of opportunity in the political system but also through it in other fields. It was for these reasons that I first monitored the participation of Asians in Rochdale in a parliamentary by-election in 1972 (Anwar, 1973). Since that time I have monitored all the general elections and some local elections to see what progress has been made in relation to the political participation of ethnic minorities at local and national levels. Birmingham was included in several of these studies and, in particular, I have been monitoring the participation of Muslims in detail in Birmingham politics for the last few years.

I have mentioned above that the location, the concentration and the number of ethnic minorities in certain areas, including Birmingham, make them statistically important in the electoral process. However, we need to find out whether they actively take part in the electoral process through registration on the Electoral Register, if they are on the register, whether they come out to vote, what their voting patterns are and their representation as elected members both as local Councillors and Members of Parliament (MPs). Also how ethnic minorities compare with white people living in the same areas.

a) Registration

Registration on the Electoral Register is the first step towards participation in local, general and European elections as well as in any referendum. However, the Electoral Register normally provides an incomplete picture of all those eligible because it is published four months after it is compiled and is invariably 16 months out of date when it is replaced by a new register. Sometimes dead people are on the register and those who have moved house are not at their new address. As a result the Electoral Register is at any time no more than 94 per cent accurate as a record of all those who are eligible to register.

Since 1974 several studies have shown that non-registration among ethnic minorities is significantly higher than white people (Anwar and Kohler 1975, Anwar 1980, Todd and Butcher 1982, Anwar, 1984; Anwar 1994). In 1974, a sample survey in which Birmingham was included showed that ethnic minorities were five times as likely not to have registered to vote as were whites. Only 6 per cent of whites were not registered compared with 24 per cent of ethnic minorities (Anwar and Kohler, 1975). Another survey in 1979 which also included fieldwork in Birmingham showed that 23 per cent of ethnic minorities were not registered compared with 7 per cent of whites (Anwar, 1980). A more recent survey in five local authority areas found that non-registration among Black respondents was still very high and the registration for Asians and whites was fairly similar as shown in Table 4.

Table 4: Registration by Ethnic Group, 1998 (Percentages)

Ethnic Group	Registered	Not Registered
White	82	18
Black Caribbean	74	26
Black African	75	25
Black Other	55	45
Indian	76	24
Pakistani	83	17
Bangladeshi	87	13
Chinese	89	11
Other ethnic groups	52	48

Source: Anwar, 1998b

The trend of higher non-registration among Black people is still continuing and also one fifth of Asians are not registered. However, the 18 per cent non-registration among white people is not surprising because they live in inner-city areas as do the ethnic minorities in the sample where non-registration levels are normally higher. Therefore, they were excluded from the electoral process. But many other factors contribute to this situation.

Sometimes people have the doubt about their residence status. Other reasons included the language difficulty some ethnic minorities face and the fear of racial harassment and racial attacks from the extreme right-wing groups who could identify Chinese, South Asians and others from their names on the Electoral Register. It appears that higher levels of non-registration among ethnic minorities, particularly young people, are also because of the general alienation of some groups with the political system. Sometimes the high levels of non-registration could simply be due to the policies of the registration offices, including Birmingham, which have not changed their methods to meet the needs of their multi-racial electorates. As a result there are always area variations in terms of registration levels.

b) Turn-out

Birmingham has been included in several surveys in the last 24 years, for the analysis of turn-out by different ethnic groups. However, it is difficult to calculate turn-out for all ethnic groups by the fact that Afro-Caribbeans and some other ethnic minority groups with Anglicised names are not easily identifiable from the marked Electoral Register. One way to overcome this difficulty is to compare Asians with non-Asian either by observing voters as they come out of polling stations at elections or by checking the marked register after a particular election. There is always a small margin of error in identifying the name and the ethnic group of some electors as some Asians also have Anglicised names. Another method of assessing turn-out rates is through a survey of electors when electors could be asked to recall whether they voted at any particular election and the results could be compared with the turn-out recorded by polling clerks. I have used all these methods to examine patterns of turn-out of Asians vs non-Asians in several local and national surveys.

A survey in 1974 showed that the Asian turn-out was 58 per cent compared with 55 per cent for non-Asians. At the 1979 General Election 18 parliamentary constituencies out of 19 monitored showed that the Asian turn-out was higher compared with non-Asian voters. In Birmingham Sparkbrook the Asian turn-out was 82 per cent compared with 66 per cent turn-out of non-Asians (Anwar 1980). More recent surveys in Birmingham confirm this trend.

At the 1990 local elections as part of a wider research project all participation of ethnic minorities we checked the marked registers in two local election wards in Birmingham: Small Heath and

Sparkbrook. We found that the Asian turn-out was higher than the overall turn-out in these wards as shown in Table 5.

Table 5: Asian Turn-out in Birmingham (Percentages)

Ward	Asian Turn-out %	Total Turn-out %
Small Heath	52	41
Sparkbrook	44	37

Source: Anwar, 1994

This trend of higher turn-out was also confirmed by my research at the 1997 General Election. The turn-out rates in three parliamentary constituencies in Birmingham presented in Table 6 show that the Asian turn-out was higher than non-Asians.

Table 6: Asian vs Non-Asian Turn-out in Birmingham, 1997 General Election (Percentages)

Parliamentary Constituency	Asian Turn-out	Non-Asian Turn-out
Birmingham Edgbaston	62	58
Birmingham Ladywood	68	56
Birmingham Sparkbrook and Small Heath	60	52

Source: Adapted from Anwar, 1998b

The trend shown in Tables 5 and 6 was also confirmed by the voting intentions of respondents for the 1997 General Election and for the 1998 local elections (Anwar 1998b).

c) Voting Patterns

It was during the October 1974 General Election campaign that the ethnic minority vote as a whole but particularly in some inner-city areas, including Birmingham, became important for candidates, especially in marginal constituencies. In seven parliamentary constituencies, including one in Birmingham, where a survey was undertaken at the 1974 General Election the support for the Labour Party amongst ethnic minorities ranged between 64 per cent to 83 per cent. The support for the Conservative Party amongst ethnic minorities ranged between 3 per cent in Birmingham Sparkbrook to 25 per cent in Bradford West. It must be pointed out that the majority of the constituencies were Labour held at the time of the survey. In addition Liberals in Rochdale constituency received 50 per cent of ethnic minority support from Asian voters (Anwar, 1975). Almost ten years later at the 1983 General Election a survey in 25 parliamentary constituencies showed that overall 70 per cent of ethnic minorities voted Labour (Anwar, 1984). This trend was confirmed by a national exist poll conducted by the Harris Research Centre for ITN. It showed that 57 per cent of ethnic minorities had voted Labour, but 24 per cent had voted Conservative and 16 per cent for Alliance candidates.[3] There were differences between Asian and Afro-Caribbean groups. The support for the Labour Party among Asians was decreasing but solid support for Labour among Afro-Caribbean voters remained high (Anwar, 1986). At the 1987 General Election an exit poll confirmed this pattern, showing that 61 per cent of Asians had voted for Labour, compared with 20 per cent for Conservatives and 17 per cent for the Alliance. An NOP survey before the 1992 General Election showed that 55 per cent of Asians intended to vote for the Labour Party while 18 per cent of the respondents were still undecided, the others were intending to vote for the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. This survey also showed that 58 per cent of Afro-Caribbeans intended to vote for the Labour Party at the 1992 General Election (Amin and Richardson, 1992). The overall conclusion from these surveys was that the majority of ethnic minorities still voted for the Labour Party but a significant minority particularly Asians also voted for the Conservatives and for the Liberal Democrats. However, there were area variations.

I undertook a project to study the participation of ethnic minorities in the 1997 General Election in five parliamentary constituencies. Three of these constituencies were in Birmingham. On polling day our researchers outside the selected polling stations, asked voters to record on ‘duplicate’ ballot papers the way they voted in the polling stations. Out of a total sample of 3,323 voters, 65 per cent voted for the Labour Party, 27 per cent for the Conservative Party and four per cent for

Liberal Democrats, and also, four per cent for other parties, at the 1997 General Election. Table 7 gives the details for different ethnic groups.

Table 7: Voting Patterns by Ethnic Group: 1997 General Election Survey (Percentages)

Ethnic Group	Labour	Conservative	Liberal Democrats	Others
White	61	27	7	5
Black Caribbean	94	2	4	0
Black African	96	1	3	0
Black other	88	2	4	0
Indian	72	18	4	4
Pakistani	55	39	1	4
Bangladeshi	83	13	1	3
Other	67	24	3	4

Source: Anwar, 1998b

Due to local factors, a significant minority of ethnic minorities, particularly Asians (40%) had also voted for other political parties while the majority had voted for the Labour Party. There were, however, area variations and in some areas a majority of certain Asian groups had voted for the Conservative Party (e.g. Pakistanis in Bradford West constituency (61%) and Birmingham Edgbaston constituency (60%)). It is worth pointing out that ethnic minorities, generally, perceived the Labour Party as more sympathetic to ethnic minorities and 'support the working class'. This view is confirmed by my research in Birmingham. However, many ethnic minorities feel that their representation is still very low at national and local levels.

d) Ethnic Minority Representation

A recent survey showed that are overwhelming majority of ethnic minorities and whites (both 97%) felt that ethnic minorities should be encouraged to participate in the British political process (Anwar, 1998b). Although there were ethnic differences about the reasons for encouraging ethnic minorities to participate in politics, the general messages seem to be that it would provide equal opportunity, more elected representatives from ethnic minorities are needed and it would be good for integration.

The participation of ethnic minorities in the political process is affected by the policies and initiatives taken by the political parties. These include special arrangements to attract ethnic minority support, their manifesto commitments at elections and the number of ethnic minority candidates.

The first ethnic minority candidate put forward by a major political party since 1945 was an Asian who contested Willesden West constituency for the Liberal Party in 1950. Although many ethnic minority candidates were put forward by the main political parties between 1950 and 1983 no such candidate was elected to the House of Commons. It was at the 1987 General Election when out of the 27 ethnic minority candidates for the main political parties, four were elected, all for the Labour Party. This number increased to six at the 1992 General Election (one Conservative and five Labour). At the 1997 General Election the number of ethnic minority origin candidates who contested for the three main political parties was 40 (almost doubled compared with 23 in 1992). Table 8 shows the details of the ethnic origin and the party affiliation of the ethnic minority candidates.

Table 8: Ethnic Minority Candidates Representing Main Political Parties, 1997

Party	No. of Ethnic Minority candidates	Asian	Black	Other
Labour	13	8	4	-
Conservative	9	8	1	-
Liberal Democrat	18	10	5	3
	40	26	11	3

Source: Anwar, 1998b.

There were also several other ethnic minority origin candidates who contested for minor and nationalist parties, and or as independent candidates. Altogether nine ethnic minority origin candidates were elected as MPs. They all belong to the Labour Party. Five of them are categorised as of Asian origin and four are Black.

Out of the 40 ethnic minority origin candidates in 1997 only one had contested in Birmingham for Liberal Democrats and was unsuccessful. So far no ethnic minority candidate in Birmingham has ever been elected to the House of Commons, although several have tried in the last ten years, but no body has been given a safe or winnable parliamentary seat. The Labour Party candidate in 1992, for Birmingham Small Heath, an area of Pakistani concentration had a controversial selection, where a white candidate competed with several Asian candidates for the ticket. This pattern of controversy was repeated for the selection of the Labour Party candidate for the newly merged parliamentary constituency of Birmingham Sparkbrook and Small Heath in 1997 where the sitting white MP for Small Heath constituency, was challenged by several Asian candidates. Once again he was selected and eventually elected.

It is worth pointing out that although the ethnic minority population of Birmingham is estimated at over 25 per cent of the total population there is no representation of ethnic minorities from Birmingham at national level. All 11 MPs representing Birmingham constituencies are white. This situation has resulted in a lot of dissatisfaction among ethnic minorities, particularly with the Labour Party.

A complaint against the Labour Party was also made to the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE), in which some Asian members in Birmingham accused the party of possible discrimination taking place in the membership and selection process (Anwar, 1998a). It was reported in that, as a result, some discussions took place in 1996 between the legal director of the CRE and Labour Party officials. Second generation ethnic minorities are also in the forefront of the campaign to increase the representation of ethnic minorities at both national and local levels. In this context the Black Sections movement in the Labour Party in the 1980s was also quite active in Birmingham, and was led mainly by the second generation ethnic minorities. The struggle to get ethnic minority origin representation from Birmingham in the House of Commons is likely to continue, particularly because of the fact that at least two parliamentary constituencies have more than half of their population of ethnic minority origin. Some other constituencies also have a significant presence of ethnic minorities.

At local level the representation of ethnic minorities in the elected Birmingham City Councillors has made a slow progress.[4] The first ethnic minority origin councillor elected to Birmingham City Council was Dr D. Prem, who served between 1945 and 1950. After this there was a big gap and two councillors of ethnic minority origin were elected in 1979. In 1982 their number increased to five and ten years later in 1992 the number of ethnic minority origin councillors reached 18. In 1998 there are 20 councillors of ethnic minority origin out of 117 elected officials of Birmingham City Council. Nineteen ethnic minority origin councillors belong to the Labour Party and one is elected as Independent. They all represent the inner-city wards with high ethnic minority concentrations.

Table 9: Representation of Political Parties on Birmingham City Council, 1998

Political Party	Number of White Councillors	Number of Ethnic Minority Origin Councillors
Labour	64	19
Conservative	17	-
Liberal Democrat	16	-
Independent	-	1
Total	97	20

It is clear from Table 9 that while the number of ethnic minority origin councillors representing the Labour Party reflects broadly their number in population this is not the case for the other political parties. However, overall ethnic minorities are still under-represented on the City Council. A close analysis of the City Council committees make up shows that despite their numbers ethnic minority origin councillors are generally playing a marginal role in the Labour Party ruling group. Therefore, they are not sharing power in an effective way. Ethnic minorities are also under-represented on other public bodies in the City.

4. Community Consultation and Race Equality Strategy

Birmingham City Strategy Report 1992/93 acknowledges that 'increasing poverty and inequality, highlighted by their geographical distribution, could lead to increased social polarisation in the City'. This document also recognises that Birmingham is a multicultural city and has historically attracted many immigrants, who have brought with them a range of ideas, skills, cultures and social outlooks. The city is a rich mix of different groups. It gains considerable strengths from this diversity, and from citizens' strong sense of local and community identity (City Strategy Report, 1992/93). It appears that the City Council in the early 1990s adopted a policy of consolidating consultation with ethnic minority umbrella groups of almost 700 ethnic minority organisations in the city. These are called Community Forums and there are nine such forums representing various ethnic communities in the city, and their representatives sit on a city wide Standing Consultative Forum (SCF). The forums receive some grant to appoint development officers to work with their respective communities. The forums' activities were monitored until recently by the City's Race Relations Unit and at present by the newly established Equalities Division. However, the new Head of Equalities Division is currently reviewing the City's relationship with ethnic minority umbrella groups and wants to change the old arrangement and it appears from various press reports that there is a strong resistance to his plans among ethnic minority groups.

Under Section 71 of the Race Relations Act 1976 local authorities have obligations to tackle racial disadvantage and discrimination and promote equality of opportunity and good relations between persons of different racial groups (Anwar, 1991). It took Birmingham City Council several years to agree a comprehensive race equality policy. It kept changing its committee structure which dealt with race equality issues and for this it was criticised by the CRE and others.

Finally, the City Council adopted its 'Race Equality Strategy' in 1993 which brought together all Departmental Race Equality Strategies. The Council's race equality objective was 'to ensure that increased prosperity benefits all citizens, to promote social justice and equality of opportunity, and to ensure that the contribution of all is valued and respected (Birmingham City Council, 1995). The Race Relations Unit was responsible to promote and monitor council's policy to ensure equality of access and equality of provision for all citizens regardless of their race or ethnic background.

The structure and process of achieving equal opportunities has been changed once again and in 1997 under the newly established Equalities Committee an Equalities Division was set up, which replaced the Race Relations Unit. This Division has more recently introduced Equality Action Planning for 1998/99 in Service departments. However, it is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of this new strategy. It is relevant to mention that the City Council has not succeeded in an effective way to provide equal opportunities for ethnic minorities in employment, and its services have significantly failed to meet the needs of its multi-ethnic population. Ethnic minorities make up 17 per cent of the Councils workforce but very few are in senior positions and many ethnic groups are seriously under-represented as mentioned above.

It is also relevant to point out that in addition to anti-discrimination law enforcement in Britain the Voluntary Sector makes an important contribution to eliminating racial disadvantage and discrimination and in the promotion of equality of opportunity and good relations between different ethnic and racial groups. In particular in this context the role of 110 Racial Equality Councils (RECs), in Britain, partly funded by the CRE under Section 44 of the Race Relations Act, is crucial at local level. The RECs work mainly includes: community services, public education, campaigning on relevant issues, community development and policy development in the field of race relations. However, Birmingham with almost one quarter of its population of ethnic minority origin has been without a REC for ten years. The reasons and politics of this are complex. However, it is relevant to mention that recently in 1998, a new organisation 'Race Equality Partnership' has been established to fill the REC's gap, and the City Council is an active partner in it along with Health Authorities and other relevant organisations in Birmingham. The effectiveness of this new organisation will be monitored in future.

5. Conclusions and the Way Forward

It is clear that the number and concentration of ethnic minorities in Birmingham has maximised their importance in the political process. Their participation in general and local elections has recently increased. This is an encouraging indication of the extent to which they are becoming integrated into the mainstream of political life in the city. However, my research shows that they still face a greater disadvantage, for example, in terms of electoral registration and representation. However, ethnic minorities in Birmingham also take part in political action through a large number of ethnic minority organisations. Also some of the political action and voluntary activities of ethnic minority organisations provide the necessary contacts with the establishment and give them training for the formal political process.

The political participation of ethnic minorities in Birmingham must be seen in a wider context of British society in which racial disadvantage and racial discrimination are a daily reality for far too many ethnic minorities. Similarly political parties, as part of society, are not free of prejudice and discrimination on the part of their members against the ethnic minorities. This can be conscious or unconscious. Therefore, the political parties need to educate their members and to stamp out any racial prejudice and discrimination within the parties. They ought also to set an example to others by promoting racial equality and good race relations. This would encourage ethnic minorities to join the political parties and become integrated into the political process without any fear of harassment and less favourable treatment because of their ethnic origin.

Birmingham City Council need to take appropriate measures to improve the registration levels of ethnic minorities and thus provide them an opportunity to participate in the political process. In this context ethnic monitoring of electoral registration should help. At the same time ethnic minority staff should be employed by the registration office and relevant literature should be translated in community languages by the City Council. The Council, the political parties, along with the Central Government, are in a unique position and have responsibility for tackling inner-city problems, eliminating racial disadvantage and discrimination and improving race relations. However, the response of all these on the major issues disproportionately affecting ethnic minorities has been not very encouraging.

Ethnic minorities must join the political parties in greater numbers, become candidates and get elected. The political parties should also welcome members of ethnic minorities and help them to become active in the decision making process. This will help not only to achieve equal opportunities within the political parties but also outside them. However, the representation of ethnic minorities in Birmingham at national level has not yet been achieved and at local level it is not satisfactory. Therefore, a lot more needs to be done by all political parties to reflect the multi-ethnic composition of the city. This also applies to the appointments made to the House of Lords and to other public appointments where ethnic minorities are significantly under-represented. Political parties in Birmingham cannot rely on ethnic minority support without giving something in return.

Birmingham City Council and other employers and service providers in the area need to check that their policies and practices are not discriminatory or are not discouraging for ethnic minorities. Where ethnic minorities are under-represented in the work force, like Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, in the Birmingham City Council, employers are allowed to take positive action measures under the Race Relations Act 1976 (S.37 and S.38) to improve their employment situation. The very serious unemployment situation of ethnic minorities in Birmingham needs urgent attention of employers, particularly large employers. Overall immediate and long term appropriate corrective measures are needed by the relevant authorities to tackle racial disadvantage and racial discrimination ethnic minorities face in Birmingham and other areas of Britain. I believe that the increased participation in the political process and the positive policies of political parties in this connection should also help the integration of ethnic minorities as full citizens of Britain. Therefore, equality of opportunity in the political process is crucial to achieve equality in other fields, in terms of policy and practice, and this means their effective representation and involvement. We have a long way to go to achieve this.

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Notes

[1] The term 'ethnic minority' is used in the paper for those people living in Britain whose origin is mainly from the New Commonwealth countries and their colour differs from that of white population.

[2] The term 'coloured' was commonly used in the early period in the official documents and also by some researchers. I prefer to use 'non-white' and 'ethnic minority' as described in Note 1.

3. The Alliance in the 1980s included the Liberal Party and the newly formed party SDP. However, now the two parties have merged to form the Liberal Democrats.

[4] I estimate that in England and Wales there are almost 500 ethnic minority origin councillors out of a total of over 23,000 local councillors.

Social Integration in a Multiculturalist City: Immigrants from the former Soviet Union in Haifa

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Social Integration in a Multiculturalist City: Immigrants from the former Soviet Union in Haifa

Abstract

Since the beginning of the immigration wave from the countries of the former Soviet Union an increasing number of immigrants have chosen to live in Haifa, thereby causing a dramatic demographic change of the city and some of its traditional neighborhoods. The purpose of this paper was to identify the residential characteristics of this group, the patterns of social integration in the host society, patterns of political mobilization and participation, and potential conflicts with other communities that share their space with the new immigrants.

The conceptual framework that guided this study is that the social and political integration of the immigrants in Haifa represent a case study in social integration of minority groups in multicultural societies. Therefore, policy making is the result of tensions between the goals of the local government, the aspirations of the immigrant community to conserve their culture and,the interaction with other religious and national communities with which they share space.

The concept of multicultural societies is being used in a wide variety of contexts, and sometimes it is difficult to follow the meaning of the concept. The sociologist John Rex argues that multiculturalism in the modern world involves the acceptance of a single culture and a single set of individual rights governing the public domain, alongside with a variety of folk cultures in the private domestic and communal domains (Rex,1997). The public domain includes the world of law, politics, and economics. It also includes education, but in this area, as will be shown tensions exist between the minorities and society. Moral education, primary socialization, and the inculcation of religious belief belong to the private domain. In an impersonal society this structure offers individuals valuable means of finding a home and a source of identity. As communities based on social classes formed in the past, minorities at any time may challenge and change the existing order.

The new social order of the multicultural society is an emergent one, which will result from the dialogue and the conflict between the institutions of the host society and the organizations of the immigrant community.

The Public Domain

The main institutions that constitute the public domain are law, politics, and economy. Law determines the rights of any individual and the way in which each is incorporated into society. In the multicultural society all individuals are equally incorporated and they enjoy equality before the law. The sphere of politics of the multicultural society means that each individual and group is deemed to have the same right to exercise political power through assembling in advocacy organizations and the universal exercise of the vote. This by no means excludes conflict, but no individual or group should find the rules governing such conflict disadvantageous.

Economy refers to the institution of the market. This involves the bargaining and competition, and the sole sanction that one individual may use against another is the threat to go to another supplier. As Rex explains, to say that these institutions (law, politics and economy) are needed in the multicultural society is not to say that such a society will always be totally harmonious and peaceful. The pursuit of directly political goals involves conflict, and markets break down, and giving way to collective bargaining and political conflict. In a multicultural society is assumed that no individual has more or less rights than another, or a lesser of a greater capacity to operate in this world of conflict because of his or her ethnic grouping. Any suggestion that individuals should receive differential treatment in the public domain would mean that groups are differentially incorporated. It would mean that while the majority of residents receive their needs through universalistic institutions, the needs of minorities are provided through an office for minority affairs.

The Private Domain:

The private domain consists of the family and the community, and it presents a sociological problem. For the host society, the world of the family and the community is an integrated structural part of the whole network of social relations that constitute that society. It is also a functional subsystem of the whole and its culture is continuous with that of the main society. Among ethnic minorities, the situation is wholly different. For them, the family and the community are part of different social system and different culture. Because kinship is seriously harmed by the fact of migration, the networks within which family life occurs come to depend more on artificial structures such as associations. Associations are structures through which the wider community life is expressed.

According to Rex, immigrant associations have four functions: they help individuals to overcome social isolation; they help their members to deal with moral and social problems; they serve as a trade union defending the interests of the group; and it is through the associations values and beliefs are affirmed and political ideologies are perpetuated. Of particular importance is the role of associations in the affirmation of values and beliefs, as they offer individuals beliefs about themselves, namely identity options or ideas about who he or she is.

The multicultural society must find a place for both diversity and equality of opportunity. Emphasis on the first without allowing for the second could lead to segregationism, inequality, and differential incorporation. Emphasis on the second could lead to an authoritarian form of assimilation. In this paper we apply Rex framework to the analysis of the patterns of social and political integration of the immigrant community of citizens of the former Soviet Union in Haifa. First we describe the demographic profile and their residential concentration. Second, we describe potential tensions that this residential distribution creates when the immigrant community and other communities in the city struggle to accommodate in space. Third, we describe patterns of social and political integration of the immigrant community in the city context. Finally, we discuss our findings and suggest directions for future research.

Patterns of Residential Distribution of the Immigrant Community

Haifa is the third largest city of Israel with a population of 255,300 residents (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1997). It is a culturally diverse city where an urban Arab population shares space with an ultra-orthodox Jewish religious population, new immigrants from the former Soviet Union and, an old traditional Israeli population. The Israeli Arab population represents 11.28 percent of the population (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1997).

Since the early 1970s, the Haifa region like that of many other port cities, has experienced a structural shift in its historically heavy-industrial, port related economic base. Haifa has suffered from a "poor business climate" syndrome. A major symptom of decline has been the decrease in the manufacturing base. Part of this decline has been the outcome of the closure of traditional plants, but most is due to the out-migration of modernized manufacturing plants into the neighboring peripheral urban industrial parks of the Galilee. Four manufacturing industries are still significant in Haifa. The most important ones are chemical and oil products and electrical and electronic equipment. The other two are paper and its products and food and beverages. The first dominates the local economy. Electrical and electronic equipment has been the fastest growing high-tech industry of greater Haifa. The spatial consequences of these shifts in manufacturing has been a transformation of the old industrial zone of Haifa Bay into a prosperous suburban commercial strip, causing severe negative effects in the historic CBD of Haifa.

The economic decline of Haifa has had serious demographic consequences. Foremost has been the out-migration of Jews, primarily young couples. Between 1990 and 1994, for example, 35,500 left, 46 percent of them aged 20-44 years and 22 percent aged 0-14 years, the latter probably being the children of the former(Kipnis, 1998).

Patterns of Residential Settlement

A relative large percent of the new immigrants are residentially concentrated in the Hadar Hacarmel area. Before the arrival of the immigrants, Hadar Hacarmel was characterized as an inner city area rapidly declining on every urban indicator. Between 1972 and 1983 the population declined by 17 percent, average income and average education were below the city average,the rate of the elderly population in the area was higher that the proportion generally in the city, the rate of minorities and ultra-orthodox religious groups in the total population was increasing, housing density was higher than in other areas of the city, and the proportion of homeowners was lower. More than 55 percent of the households were of 1-2 persons, and only a third of the households reported having children of school age. In a survey of the population conducted in 1988, 48 percent of the sample expressed their willingness to leave the area for more prestigious places. On average, the respondents expressing willingness to leave where young, highly educated, and married without children. Those expressing their willingness to stay were on average older, less educated, belonged to ultra-orthodox religious groups, or were of arab nationality(Kipnis,1988).

In fact, not only was Hadar Hacarmel declining before the arrival of the new immigrants, it was losing its attraction as a residential area for residents of other parts of the city. A survey of residents of other areas of Haifa found that young residents perceived Hadar Hacarmel as a low status area, with a poor reputation in terms of physical appearance and social composition (Leshem, 1992). The arrival of immigrants caused a dramatic change in the area.

Demographic Profile of the Immigrant Population

The current wave of immigration of citizens of the former republics of the Soviet Union started in 1989. Since then, 53,000 immigrants have established their homes in the city and they represent 20 percent of the total population.

[Insert Table 1 About Here]

As shown in Table 1, the demographic profile of the city has changed. While in 1990 the immigrants and the Arab population each represented almost 10 percent of the population, in 1996 the non-immigrant Jewish population decreased from 80 percent to 70 percent of the city population and the immigrant population almost doubled from 10 percent to 20 percent of the city population. The Israeli-Arab population slightly increased, from 9.68 percent to 11.30 percent.

[Insert Table 2 about Here]

As for age composition of the immigrant population, they represented a younger and highly educated group. Almost 80 percent of them have more than 13 years of schooling. As Table 2 shows, half of the immigrant population is in the 30-59 age group. Compared with Haifa's total population, the immigrants have a lower percentage of children but a higher percentage of individuals in the 30-44 age range than the city. The older population does not differ from the population of the city. The proportion of individuals older than 60 years is the same in the immigrant population as is in the city, namely almost 22 percent.

The spatial distribution of the immigrant population in the city is uneven. The percentage of immigrants is higher in some areas than others.

[Insert Table 3 about here]

Table 3 presents the distribution of the immigrant population according to the different districts of the city. In three quarters the percentage of immigrants is higher than the city average. While the immigrant population represent 20 percent of the city population, they represent almost 41 percent of the population of Hadar Hacarmel, 31 percent of the population of Western

Carmel, and 28 percent of the population of Neve Shaanan. Of particular importance is the residential segregation of the immigrants in the Hadar Hacarmel, where they share space with the Israeli-Arab community and the ultra-orthodox religious community.

The demographic change in the city had an impact on the housing stock, in particular during the first year after the immigrants arrival. A large number of dwellings that were uninhabited were occupied by new immigrants. Increase in demand for housing raised the purchase price of apartments and monthly rents. While in 1988 the price of a two-bedroom apartment was $22-27,000 three years latter in 1991, the price for the same apartment was $70-85,000. The increase in rents was from $250 to $300 dollars a month for a two-bedroom apartment.

The new immigrants become a new community in the area and potential conflicts with other communities can be identified. Residential insertion of immigrants in a declining and low income area is problematic. Studies have shown that attitudes toward immigrants in Israel differ according to socioeconomic and employment status. People of low income status tend to have a more negative view of the Soviet immigration than those of middle and high income status in the sense that they perceive the immigration as affecting their ability to secure better jobs, housing, and quality of life. Low income people believe that the immigration should be limited and is likely to cause conflict because of scarcity of resources. The unemployed are more likely than the employed to view immigration as a threat to their ability to improve their standard of living (Isralowitz and Abu Saad, 1992).

Before the arrival of new immigrants, the Israeli-Arabs and ultra-orthodox Jews had begun a process of movement into Hadar Hacarmel. The arrival of the immigrants was not welcomed by these communities. The increase in the prices for purchase or for rent, made it difficult for them to expand their communities. In addition, a process of accommodation between these communities in terms of uses of public space was needed, and changes here became notable. A small park that was a meeting place for prostitutes and clients, became a place for social gathering in the evenings of new immigrants.

As can be expected, the residential satisfaction of new immigrants is not high. Only 40 percent express satisfaction with their housing and neighborhood. There is dissatisfaction with the physical aspect of the buildings, the noise, the pollution, and the lack of children's playgrounds(Amir and Carmon, 1993). The composition of the population and the proportion of children among them created dramatic changes in school enrollment. Schools that were in danger of closure as a result of low enrollment were revitalized.

Residential Concentration and Its Consequences

One of the main features of the settlement of immigrants in Haifa is the high residential concentration. A large number of immigrants reside and immigrants' businesses are located in a relative small area. The immigrant community is spatially located, within a few blocks, and is easily recognized. The function of the immigrant community is to reduce the strain of the newcomer status. It does this by supplying immigrant services and by providing consumer services in the immigrants' native language.

An important sociological issue is the extent to whcih the new immigrants have developed an "ethnic" or "immigrant" community. Are the terms ethnic and immigrant interchangeable? Ethnic identities usually evolve in immigrant communities, and for this reason some scholars often use the terms ethnic and immigrant interchangeably. However, many sociologists today recognize immigrants and ethnic groups as separate social categories

(Pedraza-Bailey, 1990). Ethnic identity is currently being examined from a social constructionist perspective. This perspective conceptualizes culture as "the socially produced structures of meaning" and ethnicity as emerging through interactions. Ethnicity is shaped both by agency and structure. To be a member of an ethnic group the individual must choose to be a member. Of course, ethnic identity is more voluntary for some than for others. Discriminatory processes are involuntary processes that shape ethnicity. The concept of ethnicity as a constructed identity illuminates the differences between new immigrants and veteran immigrants. Veteran immigrants did not sustain close ties with the homeland culture, while new immigrants are able to travel back and forth and to be exposed to their culture through electronic communication.

However, a distinction should be made regarding the roles of the ethnic and immigrant communities. The immigrant community is spatially concentrated and offers immigrant services and consumer services in the immigrants' language. The function of the ethnic community is to celebrate and defend its cultural identity. These functions can be filled by organizations that are dispersed through the city and state. Participation in ethnic organizations is on a less frequent basis than is participation in an immigrant association. Ethnic members meet for social events on a monthly or annual basis. In some cases no face-to-face interaction takes place; instead members maintain contact with the organization through the newsletter. Ethnic services are provided by non-profit organizations rather than businesses. This type of community more closely resembles a network of organizations than a neighborhood. According to a developmental immigrant-into-ethnic-group model, these two types of communities, spatially defined immigrant consumer services and dispersed ethnic organizational networks represent two ends of the continuum(Erdmans, 1995).

Patterns of Social Integration.

After arriving in the new country new immigrants require some time to make their first arrangements in the host society. When this wave of new immigrants reached Israel it encountered two aspects of policy that shaped the institutional arrangement its integration process. First, the national policy of absorption had been changed. Until the late 1980s policy was bureaucratic integration. The Ministry of Immigration and Absorption usually provided housing, lessons in Hebrew, and job referrals for new immigrants. During the late 1980s that policy changed to direct absorption. The shift was from governmental responsibility for initial immigrant integration to one of direct absorption in which the government paid the costs of initial adjustment and the immigrant had to find housing and jobs during his/her first months in the country through informal networks.

The second policy aspect was privatization of municipal services. Municipal Local government is increasingly seeking to privatize services such as garbage collection and social services. In this context the allocation of certain services to help in the integration of new immigrants became possible.

In January 1995 a public non governmental organization (NGO) was set up whose goal was to provide housing, employment and educational services to the immigrant population. The NGO has a board of directors, headed by a former immigrant, representatives of different immigrant organizations, and representatives of local government. Only 40 percent of the operating budget comes from the local government.

In general, the very existence of such structure creates tensions between the immigrant population and the host society. The role of the immigrant NGO in respect to social integration and ethnic identity has been questioned in several ways, and the NGO have been seen both as helping immigrants to assimilate through providing a community for them within the host society, and as creating an anti-assimilationist or separatist environment (Josephides, 1987). The very existence of the organization regulates the relationship between the immigrant community and the local government. The existence of the organization means that the needs of the immigrants are recognized; but it also means that the immigrant community's needs are coming increasingly into conflict with the local government. The welfare and educational needs of the immigrant community are not only well known by the local government, they are being made explicit and they require funding.

Education in a Multicultural Society:

The educational system has three clear functions: selects individuals on the basis of their achievements for training in various occupational roles; imparts important skills necessary for survival and for work in industry; and it conveys moral values. It is this third function which brings it into conflict with the private domain.

The first tension to arise between immigrants and local government has to do with the educational system. The current system is such that school enrollment depends on area of residence. As a result the children of immigrants are enrolled in schools that are close to their area of residence. Immigrants tend to live in low income and low socioeconomic status areas. As a result their children are sent to what are perceived as poor schools. This tension has lead to ethnic based-mobilization. In the next municipal elections a separate list of candidates is running in two large cities of Israel; Haifa and Jerusalem. The main objective of these "Russian" list is to force the local government to open the enrollment procedure in a way that will allow to the parents to choose the school in which to enroll their children regardless of place of residence.

The significance of school quality for "Russian" Jewish immigrants must be understood against the background of the situation in former the USSR where higher education, particularly in natural sciences or technology, was very often the only way of upward socioeconomic mobility for Jews. In the USSR Jews made an effort to enroll their children in good schools, which provided deep knowledge of physics, mathematics, and foreign languages.

Immigrants from the countries of the former Soviet Union were unwilling to accept the socioeconomic niche that is usually set aside for new immigrants, or to accept the myth that immigrants are uneducated, low skilled individuals, who needed re-socialization in the modern values of the host society. Although "Russian" immigrants behaved exactly as was expected, namely found housing in dilapidated and low status districts of the big cities and accepted low skilled jobs, their attitude to education did not change.

In addition, because of language difficulties in Israel a majority of immigrant parents were unable to supervise their children's educational process, or help them with learning difficulties. All these factors made the problem of children's enrollment in good schools very severe. The emergence of an informal "Russian" educational system, which offers immigrant children afternoon classes, may be considered a partial solution to this problem.

Two main different systems of "Russian" education were established by immigrants from former USSR in Haifa, under the name of "enrichment" program. One of them, called Shiton (School for Arts and Sciences) functions under the umbrella of an association of immigrant teachers. The other system, Mofet, is a school for extended studies of mathematics and physics. These schools have many branches in northern Israel, and especially in Haifa and its suburbs. Both schools hold classes two afternoons a week, and an agreement exists with the local government that owns the schools to open the facilities during those hours. The main difference between the two system is their target population. The goal of Mofet is to establish a system of specialized schools of physics and mathematics, by working with gifted children and providing solid grounding in the sciences, which will allow them to enter the Israel Institute for Technology (Technion) and natural sciences faculties of Israeli Universities. Recently Mofet opened classes in the morning hours, thereby challenging the public school system. The goal of Shiton is different, aiming to support the public school system offering to children afternoon classes in the arts (with emphasis on world art history), language classes in Russian, English, and Hebrew, and science classes in mathematics and physics. Unlike Mofet, Shiton does not work only with gifted children, and does not aspire to prepare advantaged students, for higher education at universities. It rather helps children who drop out of school because language, cultural, or other problems, giving them a fresh opportunity enrollment in out-school educational and cultural activity.

In both Shiton and Mofet the teaching is by immigrant teachers, often in Russian. Thus, the system of immigrant education has become an important provider of minority culture. Tensions exist between the public school system and the immigrants' educational system. In Haifa the official school is the agent of public domain. The immigrant community, on the other hand, tries to control education in respect to language and the transmission of the community's culture.

Patterns of Local Political Participation

Local government is highly sensitive to the needs and importance of creating a working relationship with the Russian immigrants in Haifa. Naturally one good reason is that they represent 20 percent of the population in any election. But there are more fundamental reasons. Haifa has suffered from a decline in population, and even negative population growth. The Russian immigrants represent one of the few sources of population growth for the city, and their contribution has been most important in the revitalization of inner city schools and other municipal services. The local government is very sensitive to their needs and invests efforts in keeping this population.

One obvious avenue of political participation by the immigrant community is in the elections to the city council. In the forthcoming elections two lists representing the Russian immigrant community will be on the ballot. One list is sponsored by Yisrael Be'aliyah the nationwide party of immigrants from the former Soviet Union. In the city council elections this list has made an agreement with the current mayor of the Labor party supporting its re-election. The "Yisrael Be'alyiah" list, while claiming to represent all new immigrants in Israel circulates its publications in Russian and has a platform that appeals mainly to the immigrants from the former Soviet Union. Its goal is the election of a number of council members to implement local policies targeted at the housing, employment, and educational needs of the immigrant population.

In the field of housing, a major concern is elderly immigrants. A high percentage of the latter rent their apartments and are struggling to pay their monthly rental. The "Yisrael Be'aliyah" is seeking support for cheap collective housing for the elderly. They are asking the local government to allocate funds to renovate buildings that will then be leased to the elderly at a subsidized monthly rent. In the field of employment there are two broad goals. One is to increase the training courses offered to immigrants. These courses provide skills and knowledge of Israeli requirements in self-employment, entrepreneurship, and computer related jobs. The second is a strategy of self-job creation.

The local government is being asked to increase the allocation of funds for social welfare and, educational and cultural activities. These activities are important because they meet the social needs of single parents and dysfunctional families, as well as of the poor and the elderly; they will be conducted for pay by immigrants. Such allocation of funds will therefore not only provide the immigrant community with social services, I will also create jobs.

A second avenue of political incorporation of the new immigrants in the city is through the activities of the NGO for the Absorption of Immigrants(Ha'amuta Leklitat Aliyah)known as the Amuta. It was created as a public institution in January 1995. Its main goals are to coordinate and concentrate in one organization employment, housing, social welfare, education, and advocacy activities aimed at the integration of new immigrants in Haifa. On its board are represented the city government and immigrant organizations. The Chairperson of the board is active in the immigrant community and Yisrael Be'aliyah. The city government provides 40 percent of the budget, and other funding is from the national government and philanthropic organizations. The Amuta was conceived as a tool of empowerment of the immigrant community. The number of employees who themselves are immigrants is rising and the goal is that immigrant integration will be conducted by former immigrants.

At the apex of the Amuta structure is an executive director who coordinates the activities of several sections. The employment section is responsible for finding jobs vacancies in the market and for matching job-seeking immigrants with available positions. The housing section is responsible for allocating available housing to newly arriving immigrants. The cultural and educational section is responsible for initiating cultural activities and language learning among the new immigrants. One of the most important is the advocacy section. This provides legal conselling to new immigrants and is always ready to take legal action in cases of discrimination against new immigrants.

The Amuta is highly formal organization and is very active in the direct provision of services to the newly arrived population. The political relevance of the Amuta lies in its developing new ideas of housing and employment policies, representing the immigrant community in the political bargaining process, and implementing new policies on funding by the local and national government.

In sum, the policy of local government is to recognize of the Amuta as representing the interests of the immigrant community, and to stress the importance of "consulting with the community" and "assisting communities and their associations". However, tensions may arise out of this pattern of interaction between immigrants and the local government. The policy assumes the existence of a single immigrant community with uniform goals, and it recognizes certain individuals as leaders of the community and therefore as representing the interests of most of the community members. The incorporation of ethnic associations into systems of state-sponsored organizations may demonstrate the goodwill of the political center and make ethnic leaders jointly responsible for the administration of state policies. But it may force individuals to identify themselves with a single "cultural community" which may become dominated by specific individuals and ideologies in order to gain support and representation in the local government (Vertovec, 1996).

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Table 1

Minorities and immigrants as percent of the total population of Haifa

	1990	1994	1995	1996
Veteran Israelis	80.74	75,35	74,00	70,00
Russian immigrants	9,68	13,81	16.00	18.70
Arabs	9,68	10,84	10.00	11,30
Total	100.0	100.0	100.00	100.00

Table 2.
Age distribution of immigrant population in comparison with Haifa's population and Veteran Israeli population in 1993

Age group	new immigrants	total population of Haifa	total population of Israel
0-14	16.5	21	30
15-29	21.5	22	25
30-44	23.5	19	20
45-59	16.5	15.5	12.5
60-74	15.5	15.5	8.5
75+	6.5	7	4

Table 3.
Percentage of immigrant population in Haifa's districts

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1997
Kiriat Haim	5.5	8.3	8.8	8.6	9.4	16.6
Downtown	8.5	8.3	8.4	8.8	10.2	13.3
Western Haifa	7.2	11.3	12.9	14	15.6	31.2
Carmel	4.2	5.4	4.9	4	3.4	6.5
Hadar Hacarmel	17	22	22.7	24.4	26.6	40.9
Neve Sha'anan	7.6	11.7	12.7	13.3	14.5	27.6
Total percentage	9.5	12.1	12.7	13.1	13.9	20
Absolute numbers	23196	30422	31851	32210	37074	53050

Table 4 : Distribution of new immigrants according to Haifa's districts

	percents						absolute numbers					
	1989-1991	1992-1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1989-1991	1992-1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Kiriat Khaim	9.4	9.5	9.5	9.18	8.9	8.8	2190	3040	3529	4002	4511	4648
Downtown	2.9	3.1	3.1	3	2.3	3	681	997	1155	1299	1500	1578
Western Haifa	27.7	23.5	24.4	25.5	26.2	25.6	6400	7474	9054	11135	13276	13577
Carmel	5.8	5.8	5.6	5.5	5.4	5.3	1361	1847	2090	2384	2719	2822
Hadar Hacarmel	25.3	27.8	28.7	29	29	29.5	5872	8843	10651	12600	14740	15657
Neve Sha'anan	19.7	19.6	19.4	19	18.3	18.1	4580	6190	7198	8206	9282	9632
Other Districts	9.1	10.8	9.1	9	9	9.7	2112	3454	3397	3946	4591	5136
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	23196	31845	37074	43572	50619	53050

Ethno-Racial Politics in London

Zig Layton-Henry

It is impossible in a short paper to do justice to the history of London as a centre for international settlement, cosmopolitanism and ethnic diversity. Since its foundation by the Romans around 50 AD, at the lowest crossing point of the Thames, the city quickly established itself as the major centre of population and the major port in Britain. Although for a time the Norman Kings had two capitals, in reality London was too large and too strategically important to allow for any rivals and it quickly became the political capital of the Kingdom. This consolidated its pre-eminence. London greatly expanded in the 16th and 17th Centuries and was extensively rebuilt after the great fire of 1666. By the 18th Century it had become the industrial, commercial and political capital of a wealthy and growing Empire, a position that was strengthened in the 19th and early 20th Centuries. Since World War II there has been a relative decline in London's position in world terms as the second half of the 20th Century has seen the rise of many new global cities and London is no longer the Metropolis of a great imperial hinterland. However the City remains an important European centre of population, commerce and culture.

During the whole of its history London has attracted migrants both from within the British Isles and from the rest of the world. The Romans were succeeded by Saxons, Angles and Jutes who in turn were followed by Danes, Normans, Germans, Huguenots, Scots and Irish. In the latter part of the 19th Century and during the first part of the 20th Century there was a large migration of Jewish refugees fleeing pogroms in Russia and eastern Europe. These refugees mainly settled in the east end of London or further migrated to North America. They made a major impact on the commercial and cultural life of the city and the country.

During the Second World War London hosted a number of European and other allied governments and forces. After the war some of these remained notably the members of the Polish armed forces and their families. Some 50,000 Poles settled in London after the war. These were followed by large numbers of migrant workers attracted by the employment opportunities provided by the post-war reconstruction and the great post-war expansion of all the West European economies. Immigrants came from Ireland, eastern Europe, the British West Indies, Italy, British West Africa, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. There were also a number of groups of refugees notably Hungarians, East African Asians, Vietnamese, Chileans, Turks and Zairians. The latest group of refugees are people from the former republic of Yugoslavia. London, like other global cities, thus includes a diversity of peoples that historically can be considered astonishing though this heterogeneity is increasingly normal in today's global metropolises.

The Demography of London

The resident population of Greater London consists of some 6.7 million people living in 32 local government areas called boroughs.[1] There are 12 inner London boroughs and 20 outer London boroughs.[2] Before 1964 the inner London boroughs were administered by the London County Council which was generally controlled by the Labour Party. In the early 1960s the Conservative government decided to reorganise the government of London and they created the Greater London Council which came into existence in 1964. As the Conservatives usually controlled many of the outer London boroughs this reorganisation gave them a better chance of winning control of this greatly expanded regional government for London. However in the 1980s the Greater London Council was controlled by a radical Labour majority led by Ken Livingstone which continually came into conflict with the fiercely Conservative administrations led by Mrs Thatcher. This led to a further local government reorganisation and the Greater London Council and the Metropolitan authorities were abolished in 1986. In London, the individual boroughs took over most of the local government duties in their areas.

The population of London has always been more diverse and cosmopolitan than that of other parts of the country and this continues to be true. Nearly half of Britain's visible ethnic minorities[3] live in Greater London and 16 of the first 20 districts defined in terms of visible ethnic minority population occur in Greater London. The

Greater London area contains 12.2% of the total population of Britain but 44.6% of visible ethnic minorities. Certain groups are highly concentrated in London which includes, for example, 82% of people born in Ghana, 77% of these born in Nigeria and 69% of the Moroccan born population. Two thirds of people born in Turkey, Guyana, Sri Lanka, Portugal, Cyprus, Japan, the Philippines, Mauritius and Vietnam, who are resident in Britain, live in London.

As far as those with white ethnicities are concerned London also contains a higher proportion of those born outside Britain than the rest of the country. Outside Greater London 97% of the white population is British born while in London this is 87%. The major white ethnic minority communities in London are 214,000 people born in the Irish Republic, 51,000 in Cyprus, 33,000 in the USA, 32,000 in Germany and 30,000 in Italy. London also includes 113,000 people born in Scotland, 71,000 in Wales and 42,000 in Northern Ireland. These figures do not always equate with ethnicity so that, for example, a significant number of those born in Germany will be the children of British servicemen stationed there as part of the NATO forces. There are 33 communities in London of foreign born people which are larger than 10,000 people.[4]

The high profile in Britain of issues concerned with racism and racial discrimination resulted in an ethnic question being included in the 1991 census to obtain a more accurate estimate of the visible ethnic minority population. The result of this for Greater London and Britain is given in Table I.

Table I

Ethnic Groups in Greater London and Great Britain 1991[5]

	Greater London		Greater Britain	
	Number	%	Number	%
White	5,333,580	79.8	51,873,794	94.5
Born in Ireland	256,470	3.8	837,464	1.5
Black-Caribbean	290,968	4.4	499,964	0.9
Black-African	163,635	2.4	212,362	0.4
Black-Other	80,613	1.2	178,401	0.3
Indian	347,091	5.2	840,255	1.5
Pakistani	87,816	1.3	476.555	0.9
Bangladeshi	85,738	1.3	162,835	0.3
Chinese	56,579	0.8	156,938	0.3
Other-Asian	112,807	1.7	197,534	0.4
Other-Other	120,872	1.8	290,206	0.5
All Ethnic Minority Group	1,346,119	20.2	3,015,050	5.5
Total	6,679,699	100	54,888,844	100

Source: 1991 Census Local Base Statistics (LBS)

This table indicates that the country of birth data seriously underestimates the size of many ethnic minorities due to the large numbers who are British born. Thus there are thus 151,619 people living in London who were born in India but 347,091 Londoners who identify themselves as Indian in the census. Similarly there were 44,741 people born in Pakistan and 87,816 who identified themselves as Pakistani. The Black-Other category in Table I consists largely of these who identified themselves as Black British. They were overwhelmingly born in Britain. The Other-Asian group consists of people from such countries as Sri Lanka, Japan, the Philippines, Mauritius and Vietnam. The Other-Other category consists of people of mixed origins and people from the Middle East and North Africa.[6]

Geographical Distribution

The geographical distribution of ethnic minorities in London varies considerably depending on length of residence, occupation and access to the housing market. Bangladeshis are the most segregated group being highly concentrated in the east end of London in the borough of Tower Hamlets. They form 60% of Spitalfields ward and over 30% of four other wards in the borough. Indians have three major areas of settlement one around Southall in Ealing which extends into Hounslow and Hillingdon. This population is mainly Punjabi Sikhs. In North West London there is a significant population in Harrow and Brent where Gujerati speaking Asians from East Africa are the largest group. There is also a substantial settlement in east London in Newham and parts of Redbridge where there is a mixed population of Sikhs, Hindus and Muslims. London's Pakistani population is also largely located in east London especially in Walthamstow and the Waltham Forest area of Leyton.[7]

The Black-Caribbean community is largely located in South London especially Brixton, Lambeth, Southwark and Lewisham. They are also significant in Hackney, Haringey and Brent especially Harlesden and Kensal Rise. The Black-African community is located in a very similar way as the Black Caribbean community. Irish born people in London are spread across the whole city but especially north of the Thames. They are particularly concentrated in Brent and Islington.[8]

The Governance of London

At present there is no overall local government authority for the governance of the Greater London area. Before 1964 the London County Council was the overall authority for the 12 inner London boroughs with responsibility for cross borough activities such as planning, housing, education and transport. The Labour Party was the dominant party in inner London and normally controlled the LCC with a large majority. It was therefore not surprising that the Conservatives decided to reorganise the governance of London and create a new wider ranging authority. In 1964 the Greater London Council was created covering the 12 inner London boroughs and also 20 outer London boroughs. As the Conservatives usually controlled most of the outer London boroughs they had a much better chance of winning control of the new Greater London Council. In any event the major parties would be much more evenly balanced and the Labour Party would not be able to assume control of the prestigious capital as a matter of course.

Control of the Greater London Council did fluctuate in the 1960s and 1970s. However in 1981 Ken Livingstone, a radical Labour councillor, became leader of the Greater London Council, and embarked on a series of policies which brought him into increasingly conflict with the Conservative Government. Livingstone was attracted by the idea of building a permanent Labour majority in London based on a rainbow coalition of disadvantaged groups such as women, the poor and unemployed, disabled people, homosexuals and ethnic minorities such as Afro-Caribbeans, Irish and Asians. He led the GLC, for example, in a high profile campaign against racism. The Thatcher government became increasingly irritated that their policies such as sales of council housing, were being continuously opposed by the Greater London Council so that they decided, once again, to reorganise the governance of London and they abolished the GLC together with the large metropolitan authorities outside London. Most of the powers of the GLC were devolved onto the boroughs. At present the 32 London boroughs control most of the local government functions in their areas. However the present Labour Government is committed to establishing a new Greater London Authority with an executive mayor along 'American' lines. The major parties are devising their selection procedures for this new high profile post and well known figures like Lord Archer for the Conservatives and Ken Livingstone for Labour have already indicated that they would like to be selected as their party's candidates. However Ken Livingstone's candidacy seems to be strongly opposed by the Labour Party leadership.[9]

Ethno-Racial Representation

In Britain, citizens of Commonwealth countries and Ireland can vote in all elections: local, parliamentary and European. These liberal election laws were created to strengthen colonial and Commonwealth links and to ensure that all British subjects, resident in the UK, had equal political rights. When Ireland left the Commonwealth in 1948 the then Labour government continued the traditional rights of Irish citizens to vote in British elections. These laws have had the enormously beneficial effect of ensuring that the large majority of post-war migrants to Britain have had voting rights as soon as they arrived in the UK. Now, under the Maastricht treaty, citizens of the

European Union can vote in local and European elections in any member state but not in elections to national Parliaments of which they are not citizens.

The British single member, simple plurality electoral system,[10] places a high value on the representation of local communities organised at ward level for local elections and constituency level for Parliament. This system is disadvantageous for minorities which are geographically widely dispersed but favours minorities which are residentially concentrated. In London there is a high degree of residential concentration of the Afro-Caribbean and South Asian minorities. This concentration ranges from a low of 3% in the borough of Havering to a high of 44.8% in Brent. Ealing, Hackney, Lambeth and Tower Hamlets all have Afro-Caribbean and South Asian minority populations of over 30%.

It is thus at the local level where the impact of ethno-racial minorities is potentially the most significant. The concentration of Afro-Caribbeans and South Asian voters in working class, inner city areas means that they are well represented in many safe Labour constituencies as well as in Conservative and Labour urban marginals. They are in a position to play a significant role in local ward and constituency parties in these areas. In fact in order for them to gain political representation they have to join and even take control of the local party organisations. Political representation in Britain is largely controlled by the three major parties. Occasionally ratepayers associations may be quite strong in local politics or the Nationalists in parts of Scotland and Wales but otherwise independents or other political parties are insignificant.

Afro-Caribbeans and South Asians overwhelmingly support the Labour party and this support has been remarkably stable over the last 30 years.[11] The reasons for this support are largely to do with class, overwhelmingly so for Afro-Caribbeans who identify themselves as working class and also prefer the Labour Party's policies on their key priority issues which are unemployment, health, housing, racial discrimination and the alleviation of poverty. Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, the main Asian groups, also prefer Labour by a large margin mainly for economic and class reasons but also because they prefer Labour policies on immigration policy and racial discrimination. This preference has been reinforced by their settlement in Labour dominated areas. Labour councillors and MPs in urban areas have noted the demographic changes in their wards and constituencies and have assiduously wooed their new electors. Requests for help with housing, social welfare, education and immigration problems have brought many ethnic minority people into contact with their local politicians and they generally have had a more favourable response from Labour representatives than Conservatives. This has reinforced their support for the Labour Party. Gradually as the Afro-Caribbean and Asian share of the electorate has grown local Labour parties have worked harder to consolidate this support. Local Politics in many parts of London has been transformed by the rise and expansion of the ethnic minority electorate. Boroughs like Brent, Ealing, Hackney and Tower Hamlets are good examples of this change.

The relationship between the Labour Party and its Afro-Caribbean and South Asian supporters has not always been an easy one. The strong electoral support of these communities for the Labour Party was not quickly rewarded by political nominations and offices at local and national level. Black Labour politicians became so frustrated after the 1979 general election when only 1 black person was nominated by Labour for a parliamentary seat that a campaign for Black Sections in the Labour Party was mobilised in 1980. Although this was defeated it forced the issue of black candidates onto the political agenda.[12] Symbolically the election of the first post-war black MPs in 1987 was an important breakthrough for Britain's Afro-Caribbean and Asian communities. It was not surprising that 3 of the 4 elected to Parliament came from London constituencies. These were Diane Abbott from Hackney North and Stoke Newington, Paul Boateng from Brent South and Bernie Grant from Tottenham. It was more surprising that all three were Afro-Caribbean. In 1992 they were joined by Piara Khabra from Southall in Ealing and then in 1997 by Oona King from Bethnal Green and Bow. At the general election of 1997 a total of 9 Afro-Caribbean and Asian candidates were elected to Parliament. Given the large size of the Afro-Caribbean and South Asian communities in London, which now comprise 20% of the population, one would expect more Afro-Caribbean and Asian MPs than the 5 who were elected.

This is only a modest representation being 6.8% of the 74 constituencies in the Greater London Area. It is however over half of those elected in the whole country. Naturally competition for safe seats is always intense and sitting MPs are hard to dislodge, so demographic changes tend only slowly to be reflected in changes in political representation. At present all the Afro-Caribbean and Asian MPs in London represent the Labour Party although between 1992 and 1997 Nirj Deva, a Sri Lankan businessman, represented Brentford and Isleworth, also in London, for the Conservatives.

It is hard to generalise about the political mobilisation and incorporation of Afro-Caribbeans and Asians in London. Each borough is a miniature political system with its own mixture of communities, classes, unions, pressure groups, associations and political organisations. In Brent considerable efforts were made by local Labour Party activists in the 1970s to recruit Black and Asian people and nominate them for political office. These efforts had considerable success and Brent has always had a good representation of Afro-Caribbean and Asian Councillors though nowhere near their proportion in the borough population. However as white left wing activists attempted to build alliances with African, Caribbean and Asian people they sometimes found that their secular, socialist ideals were not those of ethnic minority community leaders and activists. In 1986 there was a spectacular conflict in Brent when two black female councillors defected from the Labour Party to the Conservatives over a disagreement over the Labour groups education policy. The defection was a major 'cause celebre' as it had the dramatic consequence of causing labour to lose control of the Council to the Conservatives though only for a short period. It was a considerable shock to left wing Labour activists that two 'doubly' oppressed people should switch their political allegiances in this way.[13]

In areas where the Labour Party has been less welcoming it has sometimes been challenged by members of local community groups increasingly alienated by their failure to gain recognition by the party they overwhelmingly support. Eade argues that in the 1970s the local Labour Party in Tower Hamlets made no effort to recruit members of the Bangladeshi community into ward parties and constituency committees. In May 1978 the racist murder of a young Bengali man, Altab Ali, radicalised and mobilised many local Bangladeshis who became involved in anti-racist campaigns with left wing Labour Party members and other Socialist groups. There were large scale demonstrations, the lobbying of local MPs and councillors and the creation of new Bangladeshi organisations. However the local Labour Party failed to seize the opportunity to recruit Bangladeshis and nominate them for local political offices. The political frustration of the Bangladeshis caused some of them to form a People's Democratic Alliance which had the backing of a number of community associations. In the 1982 borough elections the PDA decided to support independent Bangladeshi candidates against the Labour Party candidates convinced they could win seats in predominantly Bangladeshi wards. The Independent Bangladeshi candidates did well in Spitalfields ward coming first and fourth. They captured one seat from Labour and came within 16 votes of capturing two seats. These results alerted Labour Party leaders to the political dangers of neglecting the Bangladeshi community and great efforts were made to recruit more Bangladeshi members and to nominate them for political office. In the 1986 borough elections seven Bangladehis were selected as candidates and of these five were elected as councillors.[14] Increased representation brought other problems as the new Bangladeshi councillors sought to manage the diverse demands of their communities with pressures from the Labour Group and the Tower Hamlets administration and the limited resources provided by Central Government. Intense competition also existed between local white residents and Bangladeshis over the allocation of such scarce resources as council housing.

In Greater London as a whole the election of Afro-Caribbean and Asian Councillors progressed only very slowly. Adolino states that in 1974 there were only 4 such councillors in the whole of London and that this rose to 35 in 1978 and 79 in 1982.[15] Professor Anwar estimates that there were 179 Afro-Caribbean and Asian councillors in 1990 and that this had risen to 200 in 1998.[16] Although this shows a consistent rising trend, progress is slow and even 200 councillors only represents 10.4% of the 1,915 councillors elected for the 32 London boroughs. While there have been some prominent ethnic minority politicians in London boroughs such as, Linda Bellos, who was leader of Lambeth Council and Bernie Grant who led Haringey, the overwhelming majority of ward and parliamentary seats remain in English hands.

Le Lohé draws attention to a major contrast is the success of Afro-Caribbean and South Asians in becoming local councillors. He found that in the seven local authorities outside London, where the Asian population exceeds 10%, they provide 13% of the councillors which was proportionate to their share of the population. An overwhelming 64 of these 65 councillors represented the Labour Party. Afro-Caribbean councillors were also overwhelmingly Labour but there were far fewer of them.[17]

The findings are confirmed for London. In the 1994 London borough elections Le Lohé found that 215 of the 1917 councillors (11.2%) were from visible ethnic minorities. These comprised 144 South Asians, 66 Afro-Caribbeans and 5 from the Vietnamese, Lebanese and Turkish Cypriot communities. They included 194 Labour councillors, 15 Conservatives and 6 Liberal Democrats. Ethnic minority councillors were scarcer in Conservative controlled councils and there was a marked contrast in ethnic minority representative between inner London and outer London boroughs. In inner London South Asians have been very successful, and given the young age profile of the South Asian communities, have achieved a proportionate share of seats. This is not the case in outer London with the exceptions of Ealing, Hounslow and Waltham Forest. In contrast Afro-Caribbeans have only achieved proportionality in Greenwich and Hounslow and are close to achieving it in Lewisham.[18]

Table II

Ethnic Minority Population and Political Representation in Selected London Boroughs (percentages)

Inner London Boroughs

	Asian		Afro-Caribbean	
	Population	Councillors	Population	Councillors
Camden	7.9	5.1	5.5	1.7
Hackney	7.7	6.7	22.0	13.3
Hammersmith	4.2	4.0	10.2	4.0
Haringey	8.1	13.6	17.1	10.2
Islington	4.9	7.7	10.6	7.7
Kensington	5.1	1.9	5.8	1.9
Lambeth	4.8	0.0	21.8	6.3
Lewisham	3.1	9.0	16.3	13.4
Newham	25.7	23.3	14.4	5.0
Southwark	3.8	3.1	17.7	7.8
Tower Hamlets	25.7	30.0	7.7	0.0
Wandsworth	7.0	4.9	10.7	3.3
Westminster	7.9	1.7	7.6	0.0

Outer London Boroughs

	Asian		Afro-Caribbean	
	Population	Councillors	Population	Councillors
Barnet	11.4	5.0	3.6	1.7
Brent	24.1	13.6	16.5	10.6
Croydon	7.6	5.7	7.6	2.9
Ealing	21.8	21.1	7.1	0.0
Enfield	6.1	1.5	6.2	0.0
Greenwich	5.3	9.7	5.4	8.1
Harrow	19.9	4.8	3.7	1.6
Hillingdon	9.1	4.3	1.7	0.0
Hounslow	19.1	25.0	2.7	3.3
Merton	7.9	0.0	5.8	3.5
Redbridge	15.1	11.3	4.3	0.0
Waltham Forest	12.1	17.5	11.3	0.0

Source: M. Le Lohé, Ethnic Minorities and the Electoral System, 1998.

Ethnic minority representation is thus facilitated in areas of high ethnic minority concentration and through the Labour Party. Multi-member seats at the local level may facilitate representation as then the parties can nominate a balanced ticket. Surveys suggest that South Asian electors and councillors have much more positive views about the efficacy of political participation than Afro-Caribbeans[19] and have high rates of turnout for local, national and European elections.[20] Despite some concern in the Labour Party about 'ethnic entryism' and the recruitment and mobilisation of South Asian members[21] the South Asian communities are making progress at the local level. This progress however is almost entirely through the Labour Party.

The Ethno-Racial Policy Environment

Most studies of ethno-racial policy making in London emphasise the success of the major parties in keeping ethnic minority issues and grievances off the political agenda. These studies[22] agree that in the 1960s and 1970s visible ethnic minority groups were poorly organised, under-registered and not well integrated into local politics and so had little impact. This was true of studies of Barnet,[23] Ealing,[24] Harrow[25] and Tower Hamlets.[26] The situation changed in 1981 when the new radical Labour administration of the GLC adopted a strong anti-racist policy and encouraged the London boroughs to adopt new policies to combat racial discrimination. The GLC, for example, supported the keeping of ethnic records and ethnic monitoring to combat racial discrimination in service delivery such as in the allocation of council housing. The GLC also allocated funds to visible ethnic minority organisations and encouraged them to become more proactive in the policy making process. The GLC also wished to combat racial violence which was a particular problem especially on some estates in east London.

The political conditions for a major initiative in London to combat racial discrimination were very favourable because of the serious riots in Brixton in April 1981 which were precipitated by a major police operation to detect and arrest burglars and robbers. The rioting lasted two days from 10-12 April and 226 people were injured, including 150 policemen, and there was extensive damage to property. The Scarman Report on these 'communal disturbances' found that they were essentially an outburst of anger and resentment by young blacks against the police. While most of the Scarman recommendations were concerned with police training and supervision, Lord Scarman argued that a well co-ordinated programme for combatting racial disadvantage was necessary and that this would only be effective if positive action was taken.[27]

Between 1982 and 1984 another important London institution in the policy environment, the Inner London Education Authority (ILEA), committed itself to an anti-racist strategy and this encouraged the formation of new organisations to lobby for ethnic minority educational needs. ILEA prioritised the raising of educational provision for deprived Bangladeshi children in the East End. .

The active encouragement of new organisations and promises of access to funds and the policy-making process was not without problems. In Tower Hamlets the ILEA initiative caused the creation of a new organisation the Bangladeshi Educational Needs in Tower Hamlets (BENTH) organisation. This was created to lobby on behalf of Bangladeshi parents and to press for more resources for ethnic minority education. However the well established Bangladesh Welfare Association resented the competition from BENTH and conflict ensured. BENTH itself quickly succumbed to internal conflict over strategy and tactics and split in1984. This resulted in exclusion from access to ILEA policy making processes and a switch to direct action campaigning. A further problem was resentment by local white residents who felt too many resources were being diverted to Bangladeshis. The local white residents then put pressure on local councillors and officials to address their grievances.[28]

The favourable ethno-racial policy environment created by the GLC in the early 1980s vanished in 1986 with the abolition of the GLC. Local councils reverted to their traditional strategies of marginalising ethnic minority issues and such controversial policies as anti-racism and equal opportunities. Messina argues that Ealing Council is a good example of these processes. Ealing is a large outer London borough in west London. It has three major constituents: Southall in the west, which includes a large Sikh community, Acton in the eastern part of the borough which is predominantly white working class and a middle class central area. Southall is strongly Labour, central Ealing is strongly Conservative and Acton is usually Labour but swings between both parties. Messina argues that issues of concern to Southall residents such as anti-racism, better housing provision in their area and welfare facilities have been ignored by both major parties. This is because the Conservatives are in such a minority in Southall they cannot hope to win seats, while Labour is so strong it can neglect the area with impunity so that resources tend to be focussed on marginal Acton, which is where the battle for control of the council is fought.[29]

Saggar argues that Ealing councillors had much more difficulty in keeping ethno-racial policy issues off the political agenda in the 1980s than Messina's study would suggest. The recruitment of ethnic minority teachers and the bussing to school of ethnic minority children were issues of intense political conflict but generally he agrees with Messina that ethno-racial issues were delegitimized and marginalised. They were too emotional and difficult to handle by politicians more used to and experienced in dealing with economic and class issues.[30]

The Notting Hill Carnival

The marginalisation of ethno-racial politics in London and the neglect of ethnic minorities has at least one major exception and this is the Notting Hill Carnival. This is a major cultural event which takes place over two days on the August Bank Holiday. It was first held in 1965 on a small scale in the narrow streets of Notting Hill in North Kensington. It was inspired by the tradition of carnival in Trinidad but quickly came to involve a wide variety of Caribbean groups in London. The carnival has had considerable problems and in some years there have been major clashes between young people and the police attempting to control pickpocketing, illicit sales of alcohol and damage to property in residential areas. There have also been organisational and financial problems.

However despite these difficulties the Notting Hill Carnival has established itself as an annual event. It is the major event in the calendar of London's Caribbean community. Artistic groups, steel bands, masque groups and other organisations are involved in months of work. It has become so successful that not only does it attract 2 million people but even the leader of the Conservative party, William Hague, considered it worthwhile to be seen dancing in the streets at carnival, with his fiancée, this year.

The Carnival is not only a time of cultural fun and harmony, it provides an arena for Caribbean pride and assertiveness. The Caribbean community mobilises itself to organise this massive two day event which is an expression of artistic endeavour, cultural activity and power. Caribbean people control the streets around Notting Hill for these two days. The Carnival is potentially a difficult policing operation due to the large crowds, the need to protect local residents and shops and the cover it provides for pickpocketing, drug taking and illicit sales of alcohol. The Carnival thus leads to clashes between young people and the police but its greatest political achievement is to exist at all. Despite opposition from some local residents, the police, the local council and right-wing organisations the Carnival has become a successful, national British event. In a way it is the most dramatic and powerful articulation of London's Caribbean community, an event which unites the Caribbean communities more effectively than any other.[31]

The future of ethno-racial politics in London

Demographic trends, in particular, the expansion of the Afro-Caribbean and South Asian communities, are bound to increase the political importance and displacement of ethnic minority communities in London. This is likely to result in more ethnic minority MPs and Councillors. Whether this will lead to changes in policy priorities in hard to predict. The political impact of ethnic minority MPs and Councillors is limited by the power of the party system and the arrangements established to secure party nominations and election. It is likely that the Labour Party will continue to be the only effective vehicle for ethnic minority political aspirations for some time to come, and, active involvement in the party is the only realistic way to secure political nominations and office. The Labour Party leadership appears keen to maintain a firm grip on candidate selection at all levels of the party and members who are defined as too radical or militant are likely to be excluded from party shortlists. The type of electoral system chosen for the new Greater London Authority will also be important. Proportional representation could make it easier for ethnically balanced tickets to be chosen. On the other hand if elections are by districts then residential concentration will enable the ethnic minorities to control some wards. One problem is that at the last general election it seemed clear that the Labour leadership was more concerned to take positive action to redress the inadequate representation of women than it was to prioritize ethnic minority candidates.[32] The election of the new Mayor of London, 'at large', by all Londoners makes it less likely that the Labour Party will select an ethnic minority candidate, though leading black activists have been lobbying for the inclusion of a black candidate on the Labour Party shortlist..

A notable feature of the 1998 local elections in London was the very low turnout 34.7%. This was down from 46.1% in 1994 and 48.2% in 1990. The creation of an executive mayor and a new Greater London Authority may change this by making London elections more significant and exciting but concern about low Afro-Caribbean turnout has been a long standing issue and at the last general election a special campaign 'Operation Black Vote' was mounted to combat this.

A major issue in London at the moment is police-community relations. The public enquiry into the death of the murdered black teenager, Stephen Lawrence, has created a crisis of confidence in the Metropolitan Police across the whole community but especially among members of the Afro-Caribbean community. The Report of the Enquiry is expected to be damming of the actions of the Police and unless the Home Secretary acts vigorously to reform the Metropolitan Police this could result in a further undermining of confidence in the police and the criminal justice system. In any event the publication of the Report could result in the political mobilisation of Afro-Caribbeans in London and pressure for more vigorous action by the government than occurred after the Brixton riots and the Scarman Report.

Notes

[1] The data used is taken from the 1991 census unless otherwise indicated. I am grateful to Dr David Owen for his statistical advice and other helpful comments.

[2] The 12 inner London boroughs are Camden, Greenwich, Hackney, Hammersmith and Fulham, Islington, Kensington and Chelsea, Lambeth, Lewisham, Southwark, Tower Hamlets, Wandsworth and Westminster. The 20 outer London boroughs are Barking and Dagenham, Barnet, Bexley, Brent, Bromley, Croydon, Ealing, Enfield, Haringey, Harrow, Havering, Hillingdon, Hounslow, Kingston-upon-Thames, Merton, Newham, Redbridge, Richmond-upon-Thames, Sutton and Waltham Forest.

[3] The term ethnic minorities or minority ethnic communities are often used confusingly to refer to non-white or visible ethnic minorities. The Scots and Welsh, for example, are often overlooked as ethnic minorities as they share a British identity with the English. The Irish often feel they are also an overlooked ethnic minority who are also discriminated against and treated as second class citizens. They have asked to be recognised as an 'official' ethnic minority for example by having an Irish category included in the census. This paper will focus on visible ethnic minorities from the new Commonwealth mainly Afro-Caribbeans, and Asians from the Indian sub-continent.

[4] M. Storkey and R. Lewis: London a true Cosmopolis in P. Ratcliffe (ed) Ethnicity in the census, Vol III: Social geography and ethnicity in Britain: geographical spread, spatial concentration and internal migration, Office for National Statistics, 1996.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] M. Storkey, London's Ethnic Minorities: One city many communities, an analysis of the 1991 census results. London Research Centre 1994.

[9] Independent 8th November 1998.

[10] Colloquially known as the first passed the post electoral system.

[11] Z. Layton-Henry, The Politics of Immigration, Blackwells, 1992, 100-123.

[12] Z. Layton-Henry, op.cit, 163-169.

[13] Doubly oppressed as being both Black and Female.

[14] J. Eade, The Politics of Community: The Bangladeshi Community in East

42

London, Avebury, 1989, 65-88.

[15] J. R. Adolino, Ethnic Minorities, Electoral Politics and Political Integration in Britain, Pinter, 1998, 44-45.

[16] Advice from Professor Anwar.

[17] M. Le Lohé, Ethnic Minority Participation and Representation in the British Electoral System in S. Saggar (ed) Race and British Electoral Politics, UCL Press 1998.

[18] Ibid.

[19] M. FitzGerald, Political Parties and Black People: Participation, representation and exploitation, Runnymede Trust, 1984.

[20] M. Le Lohé op. Cit.
M. Anwar, Race and Elections, CRER, University of Warwick, 1994.

[21] S. Fielding and A. Geddes, The British Labour Party and 'ethnic entryism': participation, integration and the party context, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol.24, No.1. January 1998.

[22] S. Saggar, Race and Public Policy, Avebury, 1991; J. Eade, op.cit; A. Messina, Race and Party Competition in Britain, Clarendon Press, 1989.

[23] S. Saggar op.cit.

[24] A. Messina op.cit.

[25] I. Kalka, Striking a bargain: Political radicalism in a middle class London borough in P. Werbner and M. Anwar (eds.) Black and Ethnic Leaderships: The Cultural Dimensions of Political Action, Routledge, 1991.

[26] J. Eade, op.cit.

[27] Lord Scarman, The Brixton Disorders, 10-12 April 1981, Report of an Inquiry, Cmnd 8427, HMSO, 1981.

[28] ibid.

[29] A. Messina, op.cit.

[30] S. Saggar op.cit.

[31] A. Cohen, Drama and Politics in the development of a London Carnival in P. Werbner and M. Anwar, op.cit.

[32] B. Criddle, MPs and Candidates, in D. Butler and D. Kavanagh (eds.) The British General Election of 1997, Macmillan 1997.

Ethnoracial Politics in Miami: 'City of the Future' or 'City on the Edge'?

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No city in the US, and few in the world, have been as profoundly affected by immigration in as short a period of time as Miami, Florida. Prior to the 1960s, the greatest influx of outsiders to Miami were tourists from the northern United States. Outside of tourist season, the city's cultural and political life differed little from that of other cities in the deep south prior to the Civil Rights Movement. Yet, by the 1990s, Miami had transformed into a global metropolis bustling with international trade and commerce, populated by the largest proportion of foreign-born residents in the US, and defined by an orientation that was distinctly southern—not Mississippi or Alabama, but Venezuela and Colombia. While immigration constitutes a significant part of recent history, the city has had a long legacy of intercultural exchange. Indeed, Miami's history, and the history of the geographic area that officially became Miami in 1896, is rife with examples of intercultural contact—some peaceful, some not—between diverse groups of indigenous peoples, escaped African slaves, Bahamian immigrants, settlers from northern states, Cuban cigar makers, and various political dictators and/or revolutionaries from Latin America and the Caribbean who periodically took refuge on Florida's southern shores. Yet, due to the cultural, political and economic changes that have occurred in Miami over the last thirty years, ethnoracial conflict and crisis have come to characterize the very core of the city's being.

The city's broiling ethnic and racial tension captured national and international attention in 1980 when a race riot erupted in Liberty City, a neighborhood just north of downtown Miami. After three days of rioting, the loss of eighteen human lives, and property damage estimated at $200 million, the once "Magic City" was more often being dubbed "Paradise Lost." Miami would go on to become the only US city to experience four major race riots during the 1980s. In addition to being one of the most ethnically and racially polarized, Miami also became the fourth poorest city in the nation. During the same time period, however, Miami was also emerging as a 'global city,' or, in the words of Ricardo Petrella, one of an elite group of "high-tech mega-cities that constitute active nodes of the world market" (1992, 1C). More than 300 multinational companies have opened facilities in Dade County. In 1991 alone, $21.7 billion worth of goods was processed through the Miami customs district, and Miami/Dade County has the highest concentration of foreign bank agencies in the southeastern U.S. (South Florida Regional Planning Council, 1993, 4). These seemingly contradictory developments have given rise to varied interpretations and evaluations of Miami's transformation, and to metaphors that range from "America's Riviera" to "America's Worst Nightmare," from a "City of the Future" to a "City on the Edge."

T.D. Allman's 1987 book, *City of the Future*, emphasizes Miami's role as a harbinger: "Every major national transformation the United States is undergoing . . . has converged on Miami. How Miami solves, or fails to solve, those problems cannot but provide clues as to how the whole country will cope with the massive changes . . . (1987, 17). Alejandro Portes and Alex Stepick's *City on the Edge* captures the essence of Miami as a city that sits not only on the geographic edge of two cultural worlds, but also on the edge of a future marked both by uncertainty and by "the promise of path-breaking innovations in urban life" (1993, xiv). What these and other authors convey correctly is that Miami is a city that has, ahead of most, confronted dramatic economic, social and political trends now sweeping the globe, but it is also a city in which the outcomes and implications of mass immigration, economic globalization and political restructuring remain unclear. In this regard, and despite much that is unique about the city, Miami is an important lens for scholars and practitioners interested in urban ethnic relations.

Demographics: The Latinization of Miami

In 1990, the US Census reported that 214,000 residents in the city of Miami, or 59.7 percent of the population, were foreign-born. In absolute numbers, this is not necessarily remarkable, given the even larger population of immigrants in cities like New York or Los Angeles. Yet, when the focus is on the foreign-born as a percentage of the city's overall population, Miami emerges as the most 'immigrant intensive' city in the US (see Figure One). Furthermore, the rate of demographic change in the city of Miami and surrounding Dade County has been staggering. Most profound is the increase in Dade County's Hispanic population from an estimated 4 percent in 1950 to 49 percent in 1990. Also startling is the decline in the county's non-Latin white, or 'Anglo' population, from 83 percent in 1950 down to 31 percent in 1990. The population of blacks residents has remained steady at somewhere between 15 and 20 percent of the county total (see Figure Two). Demographic change in the City of Miami has been similar to, but even more pronounced, than in the county. By 1990, Hispanics constituted 62.5 percent of the city's population, blacks comprised 27 percent, while non-Latin whites made up a mere 10.5 percent.

These three groups contribute to what is popularly perceived and portrayed as Miami's 'tri-ethnic' landscape. The 'tri-ethnic' lens is used frequently to view and analyze political, economic, social and cultural relations in Miami; and although useful in many respects, it has critical flaws and analytical limitations. None of the three groups in question is homogenous. Within each, there are significant intra-group differences along the lines of nationality, race, religion, language, age, political ideology and socio-economic status. While this is the case with ethnic groups in any region or locale, the widespread tendency to view complex realities in Miami in tri-ethnic terms is so embedded as to obscure more nuanced explanations for, and perhaps solutions to the city's social, political and economic strife (Croucher forthcoming). This analysis will make use of the categories "Black," "White," and "Hispanics," for lack of a clear alternative, but begins with an overview designed to problematize the unquestioned acceptance and simultaneous perpetuation of Miami's tri-ethnic divisions.

The term, "Hispanic," has been criticized both by those to whom it is applied and by scholars and practitioners who recognize its instability and ambiguity as an analytical category (Oboler 1995). "Latino" is the preferred term in Miami and, depending on the situation, Latinos in Miami are most likely to self-identify in terms of their nationality--Cuban, Nicaraguan, Puerto Rican, etc. As the largest nationality group in Miami, Cuban immigrants have had the most profound impact on Miami's economy, politics and culture. Yet, the Cuban share of Dade County's overall Hispanic population is declining. In 1970, Cubans comprised 90.6 percent of Dade County's Hispanic population. By 1990, that percentage had dropped to 59.2 percent. Nicaraguans now rank as the second largest Hispanic nationality group in Dade County, comprising 8 percent of the total Hispanic population. Beyond having to encompass several nationality groups, the term, "Hispanic," is also problematic because it is an ethnic, rather than a racial, category. Hence it also fails to distinguish those Hispanics in Dade County that, in the parlance of US racial classification, are black. In 1990, five percent of Dade County's black population was simultaneously classified as Hispanic (Profile 1995, 18).

Although Cubans were living in South Florida prior to the 1960s, the 1959 socialist revolution in Cuba marks the beginning of a massive influx of refugees fleeing the island now under the control of Fidel Castro. Between 1959 and 1995, an estimated 950,000 Cuban refugees arrived in South Florida, and the overwhelming majority settled in, or eventually returned to, Miami. The history of Cuban immigration to Miami is generally characterized in terms of distinct waves (see Figure 3), waves that reflect changing political and economic conditions in Cuba, specific historical junctures in Cuba-US relations, and foreign policy maneuvers on both sides of the Florida Straits (Portes and Bach 1985). The successive waves of immigration from Cuba are also said to be differentiated by the socio-economic status and, to a lesser extent, skin color of the refugees. The earliest waves were reportedly comprised of wealthier and whiter Cubans, and the latter, particularly the group of 125,000 leaving the Cuban port of Mariel in 1980, contained a large number of poor Cubans and black Cubans. This group was also reported to include individuals of allegedly questionable background or character—mental patients, criminals, and people whom Castro and some in Miami referred to as the "scum of Cuban society."

Overtime, the tarnished image of the 'Marielitos' proved to be exaggerated (Boswell and Curtis 1991), and the socio-economic distinctions between the five different waves of Cuban refugees have been shown to be overdrawn. Even among the earliest arrivals, the rich, educated elite were outnumbered by laborers, clerks, farmers, and fishermen (Boswell and Curtis 1984); and as early as the mid-1960s, Miami newspapers were reporting on the arrival of black Cubans ("Negro Exiles" 1963; Bohning 1966).

Although the distinction between waves of refugees over time may not be as stark as some have suggested, the discussion does attest to the diversity of the Cuban immigrant population now living in the US—diversity along lines of class, race, religion, and political ideology. In some cases, the socio-economic divisions that existed among Cubans on the island were simply transplanted or "perpetrated and reenacted in exile" in the US (Pedraza-Bailey 1985). And despite a shared hatred of Castro, exiles groups were violently divided over how to deal with the dictator. The 1970s in Miami were characterized by militant extremism on the part of some anti-Castro groups against those perceived as communist sympathizers—typically other Cuban immigrants (Didion 1987). The atmosphere persisted and, in 1992, led to a report by Americas Watch, an international human rights monitoring organization, entitled "Dangerous Dialogue: Attacks on Freedom of Expression in Miami's Cuban Exile Community."

Despite real differences and disagreements, Cuban immigrants in Miami and the US have forged and maintained a remarkable degree of ethnic unity and cohesion. This cohesion is in part reflected and fueled by residential settlement patterns (see Figure Four). The highly concentrated settlement of Cubans in Miami is unique among other US Hispanic groups (McHugh 1989); and within Miami and Dade County, Cubans also exhibit high levels of residential concentration. The earliest refugees initially settled in a concentrated area southwest of Miami's central business district, and soon began to open small family-run businesses in vacated shops along Flagler and southwest Eighth Street. Eighth Street came to be better known as Calle Ocho, and the surrounding area evolved into Little Havana—the center of Latin social, political and economic life in Miami. Coincident with a rapid increase in population over the last three decades, Dade County's Hispanics have spread out from the central city to more suburban areas. By 1990, ten of twenty-six municipalities in Dade County had populations that were more than 25 percent Hispanic, and in some cities such as Sweetwater, Hialeah, and Hialeah Gardens Hispanics comprised percentages as high as 93 percent, 87. 6 percent, and 82 percent respectively ("Hispanics in Dade 1994, 34)). As is typical of most immigrant groups, the most recently arrived Hispanics settle in the areas with the highest Hispanic concentration. Sweetwater, for example, is predominantly Cuban, but also home to the highest concentration of Nicaraguan immigrants in Dade County—earning it the nickname "Little Managua."

Blacks in Miami comprise a second element of the city's tri-ethnic landscape, and a group that while smaller in number than Cubans, is also internally diverse. Since the 1950, black residents have comprised between 15 to 20 percent of population of the county, and 20 to 30 percent of the population within the city of Miami. The category 'black,' as with 'Hispanic,' masks significant diversity in terms of ethnicity, religion, language, socio-economic status, and culture. Miami is home to black immigrants and descendants of immigrants from the Bahamas, Jamaica, Haiti, and other islands in the West Indies. Yet, it is also home to African Americans, often descendants of former slaves, who migrated south from North Florida and Georgia earlier in the century; and finally, it hosts many black Latinos--primarily Puerto Ricans and Cubans--whose skin color is the same despite differences in language and culture. In 1970, three percent of Dade County's black population was foreign born. In 1980, that percentage rose to 16; and by 1990, 29 percent of Dade County blacks were born outside the US. The overwhelming majority, 80 percent, of foreign born blacks are from the Caribbean, with Haitians representing the largest number, 46 percent, in Dade County ("Profile" 1995). As with the Hispanics groups, relations among these different groups have at times been tense. This was the case during the 1920s when Bahamian immigrants and black Americans from northern states competed for economic opportunities in South Florida; and it was again the case throughout the 1980s when

African Americans in Miami came to resent the influx and incorporation of large numbers of Haitian immigrants (Grenier and Stepick 1992).

Based on standard indices of racial segregation in US cities, Miami ranks in the middle. Blacks in Miami are residentially segregated, but not in a central-city/suburban pattern typical of many cities in the North (see Figure Five). There are areas in Dade County with significant concentrations of blacks, but these neighborhoods tend to be spatially dispersed. This reflects, in part, local government policies that have destroyed middle-class black Miami neighborhoods in order to build freeways through downtown, or, more recently, a new football stadium (Stack and Warren 1992). Overtown, for example, once known as Coloredtown, was a thriving center of black culture and commerce during the 1940s. In the 1950s and 1960s, urban highway and housing renewal programs prompted the local business elite to expand the downtown business district, and begin construction of an interstate highway through downtown—both of which resulted in the relocation of black residents to a housing project six miles from the city core. This housing project grew into the sprawling black ghetto known as Liberty City—which is not actually a city, but a largely unincorporated area of Dade County—and now synonymous with race riots and urban blight.

The third group in Miami's tri-ethnic equation, whites, are generally referred to as 'non-Latin whites' or 'Anglos.' The former label alienates many white residents in Miami who resent being lumped into a residual category of 'whites who are not Latin'. The latter term is a source of resentment among Jewish residents in Miami (an estimated one-third of the county's non-Latin white population) who contend that assimilation under the heading "Anglo" diminishes the distinctness of their own cultural and religious heritage. What is most remarkable about whites as a group in Miami is the rapid decline in population over the last thirty years. This is due in large part to "white flight" out of Miami and Dade County north to Ft Lauderdale and Broward County. This trend intensified in 1992 after Hurricane Andrew devastated southern Dade County and the few remaining predominantly white neighborhoods surrounding Miami.

Political Participation: Global Meets Local

Miami's demographic change has indeed been profound, but, today, the city is only one of many in the US and in the world that features large numbers of immigrants and an ethnically and racially diverse population. Social scientists have devised a multitude of models, concepts and theories to explain the social, political and economic implications of immigration and ethnicity for urban area (Browning, Tabb and Marshall 1990; Feagin 1989). The foci of these studies include patterns of immigrant adaptation to the new environment, the nature and impact of immigrant economic and political participation on the host society, and the alliances that do or do not form with other ethnic or minority groups. In many respects, Miami is a case that defies the general patterns observed in other multiethnic cities; in other respects, it is a bellwether of global change. This section will focus first on the peculiarities that render Miami an outlier in terms of immigration and urban ethnic relations—(namely the existence of a Hispanic immigrant group that has achieved rapid cultural, political and economic dominance in the city) and, second, on Miami's role as an urban harbinger, particularly with regard to the salience and impact of global forces on local politics.

Many of the themes and assumptions that still characterize studies of immigrants and urban ethnic relations in the US have their roots in the Chicago School of ethnic studies. Drawing upon the ethnic experience of immigrants in Chicago early in this century, analysts of the Chicago School characterized immigrants as relatively powerless compared to established residents, and assimilation into the dominant American culture as the primary path to the social, political and economic advancement of immigrants. Yet, Miami's experience during the last quarter of this century, "turns the Chicago School on its head" (Grenier and Stepick 1992, 3).

In a relatively short time period, Cuban immigrants have come to exert substantial, if not predominant, influence on the politics, economics and culture of the city. Cuban political ascendancy began gradually in late 1970s and by the 1990s, it had become well-entrenched.

Cubans currently hold the office of mayor in the City of Miami, in Metropolitan Dade County, and in eight of the county's other 25 surrounding municipalities. Four of five Miami city commissioners are Cuban, as are seven of the thirteen county commissioners. One-third of Dade County's delegation to the Florida State legislature is Cuban, and Cubans also hold prominent positions on local schools boards, chambers of commerce, and the chief executive offices of powerful financial institutions.

This 'Cuban takeover,' as it is referred to by some, begs two important questions: First, how did an immigrant group that only began arriving en masse in Miami in the 1960s, establish political, and to a large degree economic, control over a city that for the first seventy five years of its one hundred year existence was thoroughly dominated by an Anglo elite. And second, what implications has Hispanic ascendancy had for other groups in Miami—mainly blacks and non-Latin whites, and for urban ethnic relations in general? Responses to the first question vary but tend to focus on the unique skills and achievements of the Cuban immigrants—what is commonly known as the 'Cuban success story.' Some scholars point to the exceptional human capital of the early émigrés leaving Cuba, and how this, coupled with their geographic and residential concentration in Miami, led to the rise of a tightly integrated ethnic enclave which provided the exiles with valuable opportunities for economic and social advancement in their new surroundings (Portes and Bach 1985; Wilson and Martin 1982). Other scholars emphasize the unprecedented assistance, financial and otherwise, that the US government bestowed upon this group of refugees (Pedraza-Bailey 1985; Forment 1989).

Also important, and less often emphasized, is the fact that the Cubans coming to the US in the 1960s and 1970s were generally perceived as 'white' in a very race-conscious society, many of whose members remained committed to preserving the advantages and disadvantages associated with skin color. Furthermore, the core of Cuban ethnic discourse in the US—anti-communism—resonated well with the Cold War concerns of the host society and government (Croucher 1996).

All of these factors likely played a role in the successful adaptation and incorporation of Cubans in the US; but also important to note, as do Warren, Corbett and Stack (1990), is the fact that unlike blacks and Latinos in most other US cities, rapid economic gain on the part of Cubans in Miami preceded their political incorporation. This is due largely to the fact that Cubans coming to the US in the 1960 and 1970s overwhelmingly identified themselves as exiles or political refugees, not immigrants. Their primary focus was, and for many still is, the Cuban homeland, not the US mainland. Because their exile in Miami was viewed as a temporary one, few Cubans became US citizens and, as a result, their formal political participation in local politics was minimal. In 1970, only 10-20 percent of Cubans in Miami were citizens, and as the Miami Herald reported, "despite their great numbers here, no Cuban holds political office, or even minor ones. Few are members of Boards, study groups, or citizens commissions. None hold appointive posts. On none of the elected councils or commissions of the twenty-eight units of local governments is there a Cuban. In the race for thirty-one seats for the State Legislature, there was not one Cuban candidate" (Greene 1971).

By the 1980s, the involvement of Cuban immigrants in the US political system began to change. Several factors motivated the change. The local climate in South Florida became less hospitable. Miami was being racked by racial tension, and Cubans were being blamed for the bitterness and hostility of Miami's black population. Anglos were growing resentful of the latinization of Miami, a resentment that was evinced in the passage of a county-wide anti-bilingualism ordinance which passed with 71 percent of the county's non-Latin white vote. Cubans in the US were also coming to the realization that their exile was not to be a temporary one. Political mobilization among Cuban immigrants took the form of foundations such as SALAD [Spanish American League Against Discrimination], FACE [Facts About Cuban Exiles], and the very powerful lobbying organization, Cuban American National Foundation [CANF]; as well as citizenship and voter registration drives. In 1973, Hispanics comprised 6.3 percent of registered voters in Dade County; in 1989, that percentage rose to 26.8 percent, and by 1998, Hispanics comprised 42 percent of all registered voters in Dade County (Metro-Dade Elections Department).

Significant though this political mobilization was, it would be a mistake to characterize Cubans in the US as politically quiescent prior to the 1980s. In fact, Cubans in the US were fiercely political when it came to issues involving Cuba, communism and Fidel Castro. This activism took the form of street demonstrations and public protests in response to policies ranging from Nixon's negotiations with communist China to funding the Contras in Nicaragua.

Nonetheless, the late 1970s and early 1980s marked a transition in Miami's Cuban community from exiles to immigrants, and, within a remarkably short time thereafter, to members of the established economic and political elite. Not only did Cubans have the economic clout, but they now had the numbers to form a formidable ethnic voting bloc—and vote as a bloc they did (Moreno and Warren 1996). A 1989 Congressional election that pitted a Cuban American Republican against a non-Latin white Democrat revealed the political clout of the Latin electorate and foreshadowed the stark battlelines that could and would be drawn between ethnic groups in Dade County. Ninety-four percent of Latin voters voted for the Cuban candidate, and 88 percent of non-Latin whites and 96 percent of blacks voted for the Anglo candidate. The outcome of the election—a victory for the Cuban American—was decided by the fact that Latins outvoted non-Latin whites and blacks by three-to-two and three-to-one respectively. In some precincts, Cuban voter turnout reached 70 percent (Stack and Warren 1992). This election was also a prime example of how politicians in Miami have come to structure their campaigns around ethnicity—arguing, as did both candidates in the elections described above, that this an "American seat," or a "Cuban seat."

As was the case with explanations for Cuban American success in Miami, there are varied interpretations of the impact that Hispanic ascendancy has had on other ethnoracial groups in the city—namely blacks and non-Latin whites. In some multi-ethnic cities, Latin immigration has provided the opportunity for strategic coalitions or political alliance with other disadvantaged groups (Browning, Tabb and Marshall). In Miami, however, Cubans are largely perceived not as potential allies for blacks, but as enemies. In fact, one of the most widely circulated and accepted explanations for racial tension in Miami points to the 'devastating takeover' of blacks' jobs by Cuban immigrants. There is limited empirical support for the job displacement thesis (Croucher 1997), but what is certain is that the timing and nature of Cuban immigration to Miami served to detract needed attention, and possibly resources, from the plight of African Americans in South Florida. The result is a sense of anger, frustration and powerlessness among many segments of the black population in Miami, or what John Stack and Christopher Warren term the "Miami Syndrome." The 'Miami Syndrome' conveys "high levels of black frustration in a stagnant political system combined with a crisis of rising expectations that is often expressed in rioting and other acts of nontraditional political protest" (1992, 167).

Many blacks in Miami are indeed frustrated, but that frustration is not uniformly directed at Cuban immigrants, nor do all African Americans view the Cuban influx as detrimental. Responding to the claim that Cubans took jobs from blacks in Miami, the president of the local NAACP pointed out that "blacks never had the jobs anyway, because if we'd had them, I doubt they could have taken them" (personal interview, 3 September 1992). Another black community leader and former city official offered this: "I hate to fault a group of people for our lacking . . . a lot of them have been employed, and you have to admire them for that" (personal interview, 9 July 1992). Meanwhile, a black business owner in Dade County spoke optimistically of future relations between blacks and Hispanics in Miami: "There are lots of prospects for blacks and Hispanics. We get along better than with whites. We share more cultural traits" (personal interview, 7 July 1992).

Despite the moderate views of some black leaders and elected officials, no lasting alliance has emerged between blacks and Hispanics in Dade County, but the impressive ethnic empowerment of Cubans in Miami has vitalized an ethnic political discourse on the part of blacks. Some black community leaders and residents, for example, have joined the fray with claims to which seats are or should be considered "black seats." The potential ambiguity of this strategy came to the fore when the one African American city council member rejected a black nominee with Hispanic background for a committee position designated for a black. After demanding a letter from the nominee stating that he was indeed black, Commissioner Miller Dawkins was told that the nominee identified as both black and Hispanic. Dawkins replied: "I didn't ask if he's black and Hispanic. I asked if he's black" ("Dawkins" 1990). For weeks, Dade County was engaged in a raging debate over what constitutes blackness. From one perspective, the Miami case illustrates how the pursuit of politics based on race or ethnicity simply serves to deepen divisions in an already dangerously polarized community. From another perspective, however, the potential for advancement on the basis of ethnic solidarity presents itself as one of few promising alternatives to hopelessness and despair.

Perhaps the best example of the potential gains from ethnic solidarity and ethnic political mobilization on the part of blacks was the tourism boycott organized in response to the snubbing of Nelson Mandela by Cuban American city officials during his visit to Miami in 1990. Mandela was visiting various cities in the US to thank supporters of the anti-apartheid movement, including a labor union organization in Miami. Just days before he was scheduled to arrive, Mandela, in a nationally televised interview, expressed gratitude to Fidel Castro for the support he and his communist regime had given to the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa. Cuban Americans in Miami were outraged to hear such praise bestowed upon a man they viewed as a communist dictator—guilty himself of countless human rights abuses. What followed was typical of many protests organized by Cuban Americans in Miami in response to what they perceived as sympathy toward Castro or communism. The response of politicians, Cuban and not, who are well aware of the electoral clout of the Cuban exile community, was predictable as well. The predominantly Cuban American city council voted to rescind the official welcome for Mandela, and no elected city official attended the public ceremonies. What was not typical in this case was that when Cubans showed up outside the Miami Beach Convention Center to protest Mandela's appearance with placards that read: "Mr. Mandela, do you know how many people your friend Castro has killed just for asking the right to speak as you do here?"; they were met by a large crowd of black Miamians protesting the treatment of Mandela by Cuban officials, and carrying signs that read: "Miami City Council = Pretoria" (Portes and Stepick 1993, 176).

Mandela was in Miami for only a short time period, but the events surrounding his visit were the catalyst for unprecedented social, political and cross-cultural mobilization of blacks in Dade County. Under the leadership of several prominent African American attorneys, black residents organized a national and international tourism boycott of Miami, and presented local government officials with a list of demands. In addition to calls for an apology, the list included more opportunities for blacks in Miami's lucrative tourism industry, scholarships for black students to attend Florida International University, and demands relating to the treatment of and policies toward Haitian immigrants in Dade County. Mandela proved to be a potent symbol for uniting blacks of different cultural, linguistic and economic backgrounds, and the boycott eventually got the attention of Miami's power elite. By 1993, the first African American-owned convention hotel opened on Miami Beach; management scholarships were established for black students, and purchasing contracts for black-owned businesses had increased (Pugh 1993).

The boycott organizers added force to their claims by referring to the boycott as a "Quiet Riot," drawing explicit contrast to an alternative and all-too-familiar form of protest in Miami, and the possibility of a not-quiet riot should their concerns go unheeded. Boycott organizer H.T. Smith explained: "Our choices were clear. We could once again resort to the emotion-filled chaotic riots that heap death and destruction on our own community. Or, we could take our struggle to moral high ground . . . move to the battle from the ghetto streets to the executive suites" ("Towards Justice" 1992). H.T. Smith and other boycott organizers issued a similar reminder when an agreement was reached in 1993: "Failure to keep the promises we have made will have serious consequences because we believe in the future we will not have the credibility to harness the rage, the frustration and the indignation [of the black community]" (Pugh 1993). Other indications of a transformation in black political mobilization and power in

Miami include a steady increase in black voter registration from only 6.8 percent of registered voters in Dade County in 1960, to 20 percent by 1990. Recent elections have also seen growing numbers of black candidates competing for power (Fiedler 1998).

The political participation of non-Latin whites in Miami has been less scrutinized and generally perceived as less overtly ethnic in tone. As with blacks in Miami, however, white political discourse has been fueled by, and in reaction to, the ethnic political participation and success of Latinos. As was noted in the demographic section above, non-Latin whites in Miami have lost political clout in large part because of their declining proportion of the area's overall population. Yet, in spite of the trend toward transferring political power from Anglos to Latinos, many analysts acknowledge that the bulk of economic power in Dade County is still wielded by non-Latin whites (Portes and Stepick 1993). In addition to voting and other traditional forms of political participation by whites, political power in Miami and Dade County has long been exercised by an overwhelmingly white 'civic-business elite.' Perhaps most exemplary is the evocatively named "Non-Group," an informal leadership group established in 1971 by Anglo business leaders in Dade County. The continued influence of this group was evident in 1992, in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, when President Bush appointed founding Non-Group member, Alvah Chapman, to lead the federally funded "We Will Rebuild" effort in Dade County.

As was the case with blacks in Dade County, many non-Latin whites have responded to latinization with an ethnic discourse of their own. The English language has become a rallying point for non-Latin whites who see not only their culture, but their economic future, being threatened by the prevalence, if not predominance, of Spanish in Miami. As was the case with Miami's other two ethnic groups, non-Latin whites have also relied on international symbols to further their ethnic political claims. In a fierce battle over redrawing Florida's legislative districts in 1992, several Jewish legislators resorted to emotional recollections of the Holocaust. State Representative Elaine Bloom of Miami Beach complained to a three-judge panel that "no one cares about the Anglo or the Jewish population in Dade County" (Nickens 1992). She and seven other white lawmakers, five of them Jewish, filed this petition in a federal court: "Jewish voters must be protected. Fewer than 50 years ago, European Jewry were victims of the greatest persecution the world has ever seen, the Nazi Holocaust" (Bousquet 1992).

Of the various patterns and trends in political participation identified above, what is most unique in Miami is the rapid economic incorporation and political empowerment of Cubans. Black Americans have and continue to be economically marginalized and politically disenfranchised in many cities throughout the US—although the massive influx of Latin immigrants into Miami has undeniably posed unique challenges for Dade County blacks. Similarly, whites in multiethnic urban areas throughout the country continue to wield power and influence disproportionate to their numbers, and often do so 'behind the scenes', via economic clout and various forms of 'shadow government'. Miami, however, is, if not unique, at least remarkable in another respect—the extent to which local political, economic and cultural issues are influenced by global forces.

One of the most obvious international influences on local realities in Miami is immigration—the movement of peoples of different ethno-racial, cultural and linguistic backgrounds across national borders. Miami has had little autonomy in either controlling or anticipating the influx of newcomers, but the impact has been profound. Meanwhile, international migration is itself rooted in various global economic and political factors that simultaneously influence when, why and where people move, as well as how they are received by the host society and the opportunities and constraints they confront in adapting to their new environment. Cubans fleeing Cuba for the US were warmly received by the host government and society as victims of communist tyranny. Haitian refugees arriving on South Florida's shores were not afforded the same reception.

These same global forces also shape the context in which different ethnic and racial groups interact in Miami. Cuban immigrants in Miami were, on the basis of linguistic, cultural and political ties, well placed to take advantage of economic globalization as it affected, and was effected by, trade and commerce in Metropolitan Miami. African Americans, unlike

Cubans, were not as well positioned to reap the benefits of global market-place. This contributed to the perception that Cubans displaced blacks in Miami's labor market and led to tension between the two groups. Yet, when examining the claim that Cuban economic success in Miami took place at the expense of blacks, Portes and Stepick conclude correctly: "There was no one-to-one substitution of blacks by Cubans in the labor market, nor a direct exploitation of one minority by the other. There was, however, a new urban economy in which the immigrants raced past other groups, leaving the native minority behind" (1993, 43). Finally, as was illustrated above, local political discourse in Miami is infused with symbols, actors and issues rooted far outside the confines of the urban environ.

Reforming the Reform Government

The content and character of ethno-racial politics in Miami has been shaped, in some cases nearly determined by, international forces—a reality that arguably constrains the role and responsiveness of local government institutions. Indeed, local officials in Miami and Dade County have long complained of being held hostage to policy decisions—namely in the area of immigration—over which they have little control. Florida was recently one of several states suing the US federal government for money to help repay the cost of receiving and settling foreign immigrants. Immigration remains the purview of the US national government, but local governments in the city of Miami and Dade County have played a central role in responding to and shaping the social, political and economic conditions ethnic groups face. In some cases, the response has taken the form of committees, task forces, the establishment of a Metropolitan Dade County Community Relations Board, proposals for community policing, enterprise zones, and economic development plans. Some of these initiatives have been valuable, some have not, and many have been criticized as piecemeal responses to much larger and more complex problems.

What is perhaps most interesting and influential with regard to government responsiveness toward immigrants and ethnic groups in Miami is the form, structure and debate surrounding the continued existence of the government itself. Miami, like many US cities, has experienced changes and controversies regarding its electoral structure and institutional design—specifically with regard to the issues of district versus at-large elections, partisan versus non-partisan ballots, and a strong mayor versus a council-manager form of government. The result is a complex and contested governmental structure that has been, and continues to be, closely linked to ethno-racial politics in the region. As Stack and Warren argue, "to explain ethnic and racial conflict without reference to the political system that fosters zero-sum expectations and in fact exacerbates conflicts between blacks and Hispanics overlooks and distorts a critically important aspect of contemporary Miami" (1990, 164).

The political system to which Stack and Warren refer is a two-tiered metropolitan form of government established in Dade County in 1957. In fact, the Metropolitan Dade County government was among the first in the country founded on the principles and assumptions of the Good Government movement. Good Government, or reform government, advocated, among other things, at-large, non-partisan elections and a council-manager form of government. The goal was to move beyond machine politics that built upon and perpetuated the interests of individual neighborhoods or wards, a strong partisan orientation and ethnic voting—characteristics which reformers believed led to corruption and urban decay (Banfield and Wilson 1963). In Dade County, the advocates of reform government proposed bringing the region's 26 municipalities and surrounding unincorporated areas under one metropolitan structure in hopes of forging a civic-minded community interest, providing more efficient service delivery and combating social ills—gambling, smuggling and organized crime—that plagued various Dade County cities, including Miami. What evolved was a two-tiered system of government in which the 26 municipalities entered into a complex power-sharing arrangement that granted broad political power and control to the Metropolitan Dade County government (Sofen 1961).

The Dade County Commission was to be comprised of nine members, including a mayor; all were to be elected county-wide in at-large, non-partisan elections. A county manager, hired by the Commission, held administrative authority over the county's complex bureaucracy. This reform model had widespread support among major business interests in Dade County, and was soon adopted by many of Dade's municipal governments as well, including the City of Miami. The transformation of governmental structures in Dade County and incorporated municipalities mirrored changes taking place in urban areas throughout the US. Debates soon emerged, however, both among academics and policy makers regarding the implications and effectiveness of reform government. One crucial question addressed the impact of at-large, non-partisan elections on the participation and representation of ethnic and racial minorities (Davidson and Korbel 1981). The debate on this issue has not been settled, but has constituted a central feature of ethnoracial politics in Miami. As Stack and Warren maintain: "At present the highly variable political fortunes of each of Dade County's three major ethnic groups are both reflected in and reinforced by the structure of metropolitan government" (1990, 162).

For Anglos, county government long provided an important power base and one that allowed them to continue exercising political and economic hegemony in the face of rapid demographic change. In fact, in 1990, when 49 percent of the county's population was Hispanic and 20 percent was black, seven of the nine seats on the Metropolitan Dade County Commission were held by non-Latin whites. Blacks and Hispanics held one seat each. For various reasons, the structure of metropolitan government worked to marginalize black and Hispanic residents in Dade County. Blacks, in particular, were disenfranchised by an at-large electoral structure that was confusing to and distant from voters and required of candidates large sums of money to run a county-wide campaign. As a result, black candidates that were successful were often compelled, for financial reasons, to support the interests of big business, and later, for reasons of electoral clout, to support Latins, at the expense of blacks. Although blacks comprise 20 percent of the population in Dade County, their capacity for political and electoral power is diminished by their segregated and spatially dispersed neighborhoods, many of which are located in the unincorporated area of Dade County.

The fact that Hispanics comprised close to 50 percent of Dade County's population in 1990 and held only one seat on the Dade County Commission is also due, in part, to the structure of local government. As in the case of blacks, at-large elections worked, at least initially, against the political empowerment of Latinos. This changed, however, as Hispanics came to constitute majorities in several cities throughout the county and eventually in the county as well. Today, many view single-member districts as a mechanism to protect the electoral representation of a non-Latin white minority in a county with a Latin voting majority (Stack and Warren 1992, 180).

If, as some critics charge, one goal of reform government was to weaken the political power of ethnic interest groups, then the project, at least with regard to weakening Hispanic and black political clout in Miami, was successful for the first thirty years of its existence. But the structure of metropolitan government in Dade County did not go unchallenged. Opposition came from a variety of fronts and was motivated by a number of different concerns. Throughout the 1980s, several proposals were put forth to change from at-large to district elections and to replace the council-manager form of government with a strong mayor. The earliest attempts at reforming the reform government were thwarted by the Dade County Commission. Other attempts were put before voters in the form of referenda, and lost (Brierly and Moon 1991). The mechanism that was ultimately successful at altering the structure of local government in Dade County was a 1986 law suit, filed jointly by blacks and Hispanics.

The suit, *Meeks vs Dade County*, charged that Dade County's metropolitan government was unconstitutional under the Voting Rights Act, because it unfairly diluted the voting strength of ethnic and racial minorities. The suit passed through various stages of decision and appeal before federal court judge Donald Graham ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on August 14, 1992. Judge Graham ordered that Dade County's at-large electoral structure be changed to one in which commissioners would be elected from thirteen single-member districts. The districts were drawn; and in April of 1993, Dade County held its first election under the new rules. The impact, at least in terms of descriptive representation, was immediate and profound. Of the thirteen commissioners on the new council, six were Hispanic, four black, and three non-Latin white. Some heralded the transition as a major political breakthrough. Black attorney and activist, H.T. Smith, declared triumphantly: "In South Florida as in South Africa, minority rule is over" (Filkins 1992). Others were less optimistic, however, and feared, as did former commissioner and black community leader Athalie Range, "that those who have approximately three commission seats will certainly not get the attention of those who have six" (Epstein 1991).

Two years later, Dade County voters approved another alteration in the structure of their local government, a switch from the council-manager to an executive mayor. And, in 1997, voters overwhelmingly approved, with 79.5 percent of the vote, a referendum proposing similar changes to the structure of government in Dade County's largest municipality, the City of Miami. Interestingly, the proposal to change from at-large to district elections and to a strong mayor form of government was accompanied by another referendum on abolishing the city of Miami altogether. The creators of the referendum, the Coalition for a New Miami, advocated that the city of Miami be disincorporated and merged into the unincorporated area of Metropolitan Dade County. This push for disincorporation or abolishment, the "Miami Question" as it came to be known, was motivated by the preceding months of political and financial crisis in Miami city government. A federal sting operation in 1996 exposed the city manager and two commissioners in bribery and fraud schemes, and in December of 1996, the city was forced to declare a fiscal emergency when the interim city manager uncovered a $68 million deficit. The Coalition for a New Miami argued that disincorporation would eliminate corruption and make local government both cheaper and more responsive to residents (Villano 1997). The majority of Miami's residents soundly disagreed, with 86.8 percent voting to retain the city.

Conclusions and Future Research Directions

It is not only early in the case of Miami, but also generally difficult to measure the precise and substantive impact of changes in governmental structure on the well-being of distinct ethnic and racial groups or the implications for ethnic and race relations in general. Miami does illustrate vividly the centrality of government structures as both shaping and shaped by ethnic and race relations. The Dade County reform government was successfully challenged by blacks and Hispanics who saw their voting strength diluted by at-large elections. The coalition between these two groups collapsed, however, when some Latinos came to view district elections as a way to limit their growing electoral clout as the county's emerging majority. Both sides also came to recognize that with regard to the question of how districts would be drawn and where, their ethnic group interests were not likely to coincide. The election of Dade County's first executive mayor was itself a textbook case of ethnic bloc voting. The run-off election pitted Alex Penellas, a Cuban American Democrat, against Arthur Teele, an African American Republican. In the end, ethnicity seemed to matter much more to voters than party identification. Ninety-seven percent of Hispanic voters supported the Hispanic candidate and 82.9% of African Americans supported the African American candidate, leading one group of analysts to conclude that "this election was about nothing but ethnicity" (Hill, Moreno, and Cue 1997, 26).

Debates surrounding the 'Miami Question' similarly reflected and reinforced ethnic tensions in Miami. Proponents of disincorporation were predominantly white downtown property owners and homeowners in the city's most affluent enclaves. These residents resent paying high taxes to subsidize the city's poorer neighborhoods like Overtown and parts of Liberty City. Coconut Grove, for example, an affluent, trendy, predominantly white community in Miami, has only five percent of the city's population, but contributes sixteen percent of the city's tax base. Coconut Grove has attempted to break away from the city of Miami in the past, but the city's charter, unlike that of the county, makes secession very difficult. Opposition to abolishing the city came mainly from blacks and Hispanics. Some of these groups feared higher taxes and saw this as an attempt by wealthy whites to turn their back on the poor, and many expressed strong ties to and an identification with the city of Miami. For Cubans, in particular, Miami represents political power and many viewed the calls for disincorporation as an attempt to weaken Latin clout. Some in the exile community went so as far as to suggest that Fidel Castro was behind the plan to abolish the city (Villano 1997).

With respect to the relationship between governmental structures and ethnicity, Miami poses as many questions as it provides answers—questions that present promising directions for future research. Do district elections translate into real sharing of power, or merely heighten the ethnic tensions already dividing diverse communities like that of Dade County? Mayor of Dade County and formerly the sole Hispanic on the County Commission, Alex Penelas, believes: "When you sit people at a table that are more reflective of the community, you're not going to divide the community, you're going to make things work." Harvey Ruvin, a non-Latin white and longtime Dade County Commissioner disagrees: "A person does not have to be a member of a minority to advance the cause of a minority, and to imply otherwise, as this [district] proposal does, is clearly un-American" (Epstein 1991, 1B). A related question concerns whether ethnicity is a legitimate and effective means of political empowerment, or an outmoded primordial attachment that fosters only divisiveness and polarization. The salience of ethnicity in Miami politics frequently manifests itself in futile, if not absurd, debates over whether a particular seat belongs to a white, black or Latino, and, on what basis a person can properly qualify for either category.

On the other hand, ethnic solidarity has been a powerful tool for the political and economic advancement of Cubans in Miami, recently helpful to blacks, and, it might be argued, one reason for the long held privilege and prominence of Miami's white population. In a recent analysis of low voter turnout among the poor, David Callahan rejects that the low level of political participation among poor citizens is unalterable or mitigated only by attacking the root cause—poverty. By examining various poor neighborhoods and communities throughout the US, including Liberty City and Overtown in Miami, Callahan concludes that the poor can and do mobilize politically, and the variable positively influencing voter turnout seems to be "stable neighborhoods with a strong sense of community" (1998, 72). Callahan does not directly address the issue of ethnicity or race, but to the extent that ethnicity can be a surrogate for 'strong sense of community,' the positive potential of ethnic politics becomes clear.

Finally, what Miami reveals most clearly is that no aspect of urban ethnic relations—political, economic or cultural—can be fully understood through a local or even national lens. The jobs that are now created in cities, the residents who get or don't get the jobs, the political issues on the local agenda, the form and content of political expression and group mobilization are all deeply influenced by international issues, actors, and events. Cities, and Miami foremost among them, are not only the sites of global change—both the promise and the peril, but also the most promising laboratories in which to search for solutions.

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Figure 1

PERCENT FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION IN MAJOR U. S. CITIES

1990



Source: U. S. Census Bureau

Figure 2

Ethnic Profile of Dade County: numbers of whites, blacks, and Hispanics, 1950-1990



Figure 3

Five waves of Cuban immigration to the United States



Source: Portes and Bach, 1985.



WHERE HISPANICS LIVE

1990 CENSUS TRACT DATA
PERCENT HISPANIC

☐ UNDER 25%
▨ 25-49.9%
■ 50-84.9%
■ OVER 85 %

METRO-DADE PLANNING DEPARTMENT
RESEARCH DIVISION



WHERE BLACKS LIVE

1990 CENSUS TRACT DATA
PERCENT BLACK

☐ UNDER 25%
▨ 25-49.9%
■ 50-84.9%
■ OVER 85 %

METRO-DADE PLANNING DEPARTMENT
RESEARCH DIVISION

Ottawa-Carleton: An EthniCity In The Making?

Presented at the Third International Metropolis
Conference
Zichron Yaacov, Israel
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John Biles

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This paper does not reflect the views of the Department of Canadian Heritage.

Table of Contents

1.0 Introduction

2.0 Ottawa-Carleton: The Basics

3.0 Ottawa-Carleton: The Diversity Angles

  3.1 Immigrant Diversity
  3.2 Ethnic Diversity
  3.3 Visible Minority Communities
  3.4 Other Diversities

4.0 Ottawa-Carleton: Political Participation Writ Small?

  4.1 Immigrant Representation
  4.2 Ethnic Representation
  4.3 Visible Minority Representation
  4.4 Other Diversities

5.0 Diversity and Government in Ottawa-Carleton

  5.1 Municipal
  5.2 Regional
  5.3 Provincial
  5.4 Federal

6.0 Conclusions

  6.1 Expanding the Definition
  6.2 Substantive Participation
  6.3 Making the Links
  6.4 The Politics of Place
  6.5 Identity and Political Participation

Bibliography

Appendix A

Tables

2.1 Largest/Fastest Growing Canadian Census Metropolitan Areas

3.1 Immigrant Populations of Eleven Municipalities in Ottawa-Carleton

3.2 Largest Immigrant Communities in Ottawa-Carleton

3.3 Largest Immigrant Communities in the City of Ottawa

3.4 Largest Immigrant Communities in the City of Nepean

3.5 Largest Immigrant Communities in the City of Gloucester

3.6 Selection of Fastest Growing Ethnic Communities in Ottawa-Carleton

3.7 Selection of Ethnic Communities in Ottawa, Nepean and Gloucester

3.8 Visible Minority Communities in Ottawa, Nepean and Gloucester

3.9 First Official Language Spoken in Ottawa, Nepean and Gloucester

3.10 Aboriginal Communities in Ottawa, Nepean and Gloucester

4.1 Number of Representatives in Ottawa-Carleton

4.2 Place of Birth of 64 Responding Representatives

4.3 Self Ascribed Ethnicity of 64 Responding Representatives

4.4 Gender of Representatives in Ottawa-Carleton

4.5 Official Language Group of Responding Representatives

1.0 Introduction

In their seminal book, EthniCity: Geographic Perspectives on Ethnic Change in Modern Cities, geographers Roseman, Laux, and Thieme coined the term "EthniCity." They use the term to describe the "many urban areas in the developed world (which) are experiencing ethnic diversity in their populations that is of recent origin. . . . along with cities that have a longer history of ethnic diversity, contain(ing) varieties of peoples having distinctive cultures and origins" (Roseman, Laux and Thieme 1996: xvii). In this paper I will argue that Ottawa-Carleton is an EthniCity in early adolescence. This status is a vital contemporary policy concern because fuelled by close to a quarter of a million immigrants arriving in Canada every year many Canadian cities are becoming diverse for the first time (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 1997: 1). Unfortunately, smaller urban centres such as Ottawa-Carleton are usually left out of the research conducted on urban diversity in Canada. The majority of research is conducted in the three largest immigrant centres: Toronto, Vancouver and Montreal.

I intend to make a case for studying smaller cities on the cusp of immigration fuelled population explosions. Further, I will argue that the importance of studying urban areas early in their evolution towards supra-diverse populations allows policy makers at all levels to create and implement policies which can alleviate the worst growing pains experienced by cities' whose populations have already arrived at mature diversity. This view appears to be shared by the Government of Canada. The 10th Annual Report on the Operation of the *Canadian Multiculturalism Act* observed that, "the successes of Toronto, Montréal and Vancouver over the last three decades must now be adapted to suit the needs of smaller cities and towns across Canada which are facing increasingly diverse populations" (Department of Canadian Heritage, 1999: 5).

This paper marks the first stage of a much broader project which will examine the political participation of selected ethnocultural communities in the Ottawa-Carleton region. This project is an initiative designed to inject research findings into a fast changing public policy environment vis-à-vis municipalities and governmental responses to increased diversity. For example, the Ontario Conservative Government under Mike

Harris has moved to sharply reduce the number of politicians at both the provincial and municipal levels. To reduce the number of elected officials and increase accountability to the electorate is counter intuitive. However, to move in this direction without understanding its possible impact on the diverse communities resident in Ontario, threatens the democratic structures upon which Canada's governance system is based and has long depended (Biles and Panousos 1999).

As a natural starting point I will outline the basic demographic and geographic realities of the Ottawa-Carleton region. I will then turn to the extent to which immigrants, women, ethnocultural and visible minority communities are represented within the formal political structure of the four tiers of government in the Ottawa-Carleton region. This will lead to an examination of policies and initiatives each tier of government has put in place to ensure that all inhabitants have an opportunity to participate fully in the formal political structures of their communities. I will focus on the municipal and regional levels of government because the provincial and federal levels have been covered extensively elsewhere (Jaworsky 1979, Schiffer-Graham 1988, Fleras and Elliott 1992, Pal 1993, Joshee 1995, Joshee 1996, Biles 1997, Canadian Heritage 1999).

Based on these three preliminary sections it is possible to draw some broad conclusions about participation in the region and barriers to participation. These conclusions lead to suggestions for future study and areas where international comparisons would illuminate best practices.

2.0 Ottawa-Carleton: The Basics

Canada's capital, Ottawa, sits astride the border between Canada's two largest provinces – Ontario and Quebec. It is the fourth largest metropolis in Canada with the fifth largest growth rate according to the 1996 census.

Table 2.1 Largest/Fastest Growing Census Metropolitan Areas in Canada[1]

Rank 1996	Census Metropolitan Area	Population 1991	Population 1996	Percentage Change
1	Toronto	3,898,933	4,263,757	9.4
2	Montreal	3,208,970	3,326,510	3.7
3	Vancouver	1,602,590	1,831,665	14.3
4	Ottawa-Hull	941,814	1,010,498	7.3
5	Edmonton	841,132	862,597	2.6
6	Calgary	754,033	821,628	9
7	Quebec City	645,550	671,889	4.1
8	Winnipeg	660,450	667,209	1
9	Hamilton	599,760	624,360	4.1
10	London	381,522	398,616	4.5
11	Kitchener	356,421	382,940	7.4
12	St Catharines – Niagra	364,55	372,406	2.2
13	Halifax	320,501	332,518	3.7
14	Victoria	287,897	304,287	5.7
15	Windsor	262,075	278,685	6.3

It is important to observe that this paper is about the Ottawa-Carleton region as denoted by the boundaries of the Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton. This regional tier of government covers eleven municipalities with a territory roughly analogous to the Ontario portion of the Ottawa-Hull Census Metropolitan Area established by Statistics Canada for use in the national census. Wherever possible demographic data drawn from the census is built from the compilation of the eleven municipalities. Where this has not proven possible, the data is drawn from the Ontario portion of the Ottawa-Hull census metropolitan area.

The Ottawa-Carleton Region has four primary tiers of government – federal, provincial, regional, and municipal. As the national capital it also has a great deal of land controlled by the National Capital Commission, but as that body is not elected by the population at large, it is outside of the scope of this paper.

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[1] Unless otherwise noted, demographic data is drawn from the 1996 Census.

Each tier of government is mandated to accomplish different goals with the majority of the macro level goals addressed by the larger orders of government and the micro goals and service delivery primarily provided by the lower tiers of government. The division of labour is not static, indeed, it is constantly evolving to meet the changing needs of the populace. At present the entire governmental system is engaged in a broad group of activities covered by the rubric of disentanglement or "down sizing."

Federal

The division of labour between the federal and provincial tiers are ruled by the Canadian constitution, most notably provincial responsibility for education. The federal government has been involved in creating and maintaining Canada's famed social safety net since the end of the Second World War. This role has primarily been based upon ensuring national standards by means of providing or withholding financial resources. Increasingly, however, the federal government has been withdrawing from national programs and has been handing responsibility to the provinces. An excellent example of this is the movement by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration to get provinces to take more responsibility for immigration policy (Garcea 1994).

Provincial

Provincial governments across Canada have been as focused on reducing expenditures as the federal government. To control the costs of social programs, the provinces have decreased service levels, or have handed off responsibility to municipalities. As a result, municipalities have been forced to deliver more services with less resources transferred from the provinces.

On a more positive note, however, just as the devolution of responsibilities to the provinces has strengthened provincial governments, municipal governments have been gathering strength from the responsibilities delegated by the provinces. This growth in power is tempered by one important difference between the provincial and municipal tiers of government: provincial governments are established by the constitution whereas municipalities are creatures legislated into existence by provincial governments. This fundamental difference is well illustrated by the forced amalgamation of many Toronto area cities into the "MegaCity" of Toronto in 1997-98 despite widespread opposition from the citizenry (Siemiatycki and Isin 1998).

Regional

Regional governments are an interesting upper tier of local government. They are halfway between "megacities" and independent municipalities. This two tier system of local governance allows for the rationalization of services where there are economic benefits to doing so, and retains the openness and accessibility expected from a local government.

Regional government in Ottawa-Carleton is a relatively new phenomenon. It was introduced in 1969 to rationalize resource expenditure on projects of concern to the eleven municipalities in the region. These areas include infrastructure and public transport. Originally it was a council of municipal mayors with only the chair directly elected by the public. However, in an era focused on increased accountability, all members of council have been elected directly by the public since 1989.

At present, the region is primarily responsible for public infrastructure, most notably for the purposes of this paper, for public housing and public transport. In addition, it has responsibility for transportation, emergency services, the environment, and planning and development for the region.

Municipal

Services are usually provided by the government on the lowest rung of the hierarchy pyramid: municipal government. This is certainly true in the case of Ottawa-Carleton. The eleven municipalities (Ottawa, Nepean, Gloucester, Kanata, Cumberland, Goulbourn, Vanier, West Carleton, Osgoode, Rideau, and Rockliffe Park) deliver the majority of services. Consequently, it is on this level which I wish to focus. I assert that the loss of municipal level political representation endangers the flexibility of the Canadian political system.

[MAP]

Population of Eleven Municipalities in Ottawa-Carleton

Municipality	**Population (1996)**
Ottawa	318,990
Nepean	114,225
Gloucester	102,920
Kanata	47,785
Cumberland	47,115
Goulbourn	19,225
Vanier	16,900
West Carleton	16,540
Osgoode	15,825
Rideau	12,345
Rockliffe Park	11,995
TOTAL	713,880

From the map of the region it can be seen that the eleven municipalities are clustered around the largest municipality, the City of Ottawa with a population of 318,990. The other municipalities range in size from Nepean with a population of 114, 225 to tiny Rockliffe Park with just 11,995 residents.

Since seventy-five percent of the population resides in the City of Ottawa and the ring cities of Gloucester and Nepean, they will be the primary area of concern in this paper.


KANATA
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RIDEAU
NEPEAN
OTTAWA
VANIER
GLOUCESTER
CUMBERLAND
OSGOODE
GREENBELT / CEINTURE DE VERDURE
URBAN AREA / ZONE URBAINE
RURAL AREA / ZONE RURALE
MUNICIPAL BOUNDARIES /
LIMITES DES MUNICIPALITÉS
Ottawa Carleton
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3.0 Ottawa-Carleton: The Diversity Angles

Immigration is an excellent indicator of growing diversity in Canada. However, given the fluctuations in immigration in terms of numbers of immigrants and countries of origin over more than a century, it is widely accepted that it is necessary to consider both immigration *per se* and ethnocultural diversity as reported by individual Canadians. In addition, growing numbers of visible minorities add another aspect of diversity to the picture. This complex intermingling of diverse peoples in Canada is vital to understanding the Canadian public policy set which surrounds diversity.

Unfortunately, policy formation and research on specific aspects of diversity is frequently divided and little cross fertilization takes place. This is especially true between work on ethnicity and immigration, even though as political scientist, Jerome Black, notes, "questions about immigrants and politics naturally overlap with questions about ethnicity. It is neither possible, nor desireable to evaluate the political activity of immigrants without taking into account the relevance of their diverse ethnic and racial backgrounds" (Black 1998, 15).

3.1 Immigrant Diversity

As Table 3.1 illustrates the three largest cities, Ottawa, Nepean and Gloucester have eighty-five percent of the immigrants in the region and seventy-five percent of the total population. The rapidly increasing population is a harbinger of change in the Ottawa-Carleton region in terms of demographics, but also in terms of policies for service delivery and citizen engagement. Those communities which are either the largest or the fastest growing will obviously exert the greatest demographic pressure on policy development.

Table 3.1 Immigrant Populations of Eleven Municipalities in Ottawa-Carleton

Municipality	Population	Immigrant Population	Percentage Immigrant
Region	713,880	146,165	20.5%
Ottawa	318,990	78,425	24.6%
Nepean	114,225	26,195	22.9%
Gloucester	102,920	18,370	17.8%
Kanata	47,785	6,775	14.2%
Cumberland	47,115	4,935	10.5%
Goulbourn	19,225	2,025	10.5%
Vanier	16,900	2,330	13.8%
West Carleton	16,540	1,745	10.6%
Osgoode	15,825	1,365	8.6%
Rideau	12,345	1,440	11.7%
Rockliffe Park	11,995	535	4.5%

The largest communities are likely to have influence due to the length of time roots have had to develop whereas the fastest growing and most recent communities are likely to exert influence on the basis of need. While it is dangerous to discount the social and human capital of recent arrivals, especially given Canada's immigrant selection policy, it is important to note the impact of barriers faced by immigrants when they arrive in Canada. It is also vital to remember that recent arrivals are a combination of refugees, family class immigrants, and those who have been selected via entrepreneurial programs. In short, immigrants are not a homogeneous group and consequently have different issues and concerns depending upon a vast array of socio-economic and cultural variables.

Table 3.2 Largest Immigrant Communities in the Region of Ottawa-Carleton

Place of Birth	Immigrant Population	Percentage Total Population	% of Immigrants Recent Arrivals (1991-96)	Number of Recent Arrivals
United Kingdom	21,625	14.8%	3.9%	835
Lebanon	8,625	5.9%	29.6%	2550
Italy	7,215	4.9%	-	-
United States	6,875	4.7%	11.7%	805
China, People's Republic	6,615	4.5%	47.1%	3115
India	5,930	4.1%	23.8%	1410
Viet Nam	5,210	3.6%	27.0%	1405
Poland	4,895	3.3%	23.7%	1160
Germany	4,880	3.3%	4.9%	240
Somalia	4,245	2.9%	77.4%	3285
Jamaica	3,545	2.4%	24.0%	850
Hong Kong	3,205	2.2%	26.5%	850
Netherlands	3,020	2.1%	-	-
Philippines	2,755	1.9%	43.0%	1185
Iran	2,555	1.7%	40.6%	1035
Haiti	2,420	1.7%	30.4%	735
Portugal	2,275	1.6%	2.0%	45
El Salvador	1,685	1.2%	31.2%	525
Guyana	1,640	1.1%	12.2%	200
France	1,570	1.1%	14.0%	220

Hungary	1,540	1.1%	-	-
Egypt	1,455	1.0%	19.6%	285
Yugoslavia	1,415	1.0%	60.4%	855
Trinidad and Tobago	1,390	1.0%	9.7%	135

Table 3.2 reveals a number of interesting facts. In the first instance, the dramatic difference between the percentage of recent arrivals from European source countries an those of source countries from the rest of the world. The percentage of recent arrivals from Europe is nearly five from Germany, nearly four from the United Kingdom, two from Portugal, and too low to be recorded by Statistics Canada for Italy and the Netherlands. This compares to seventy seven percent for the Somali community, over sixty percent for the communities from the former Yugoslavia, over forty seven percent for the Chinese community and forty three percent for the Filipino community.

Given the sizes of these populations the percentages of new arrivals could be misleading. However, the vast disparity remains even when absolute numbers of recent arrivals are compared. Eight hundred thirty five new immigrants arrived from the United Kingdom between 1991 and 1996, two hundred forty from Germany and forty five from Portugal. This compares to three thousand two hundred eighty five from Somalia, three thousand one hundred fifteen from China, and two thousand five hundred fifty from Lebanon.

Importantly the two largest communities with the largest numbers of new arrivals, Somali and former Yugoslavia are disproportionately composed of refugees fleeing conflicts. This can be expected to translate into a much higher demand for mental health services among others, than would be the norm for immigrants arriving under an entrepreneurial program.

While interesting from the level of regional government, table 3.2 does not indicate which communities may require the most attention at the municipal level. As there are no recent immigrant communities reaching a critical mass of one thousand people outside of the core cities of Ottawa, Nepean and Gloucester, the smaller eight municipalities will not be covered in any detail here.

Table 3.3 Largest Immigrant Communities in the City of Ottawa

Place of Birth	Immigrant Population	Number of Recent Arrivals (1991-1996)	% of Immigrants Recent Arrivals
United Kingdom	9,710	355	3.7%
Lebanon	5,650	1,815	32.1%
Italy	3,925	-	-
China, People's Republic	3,810	1,825	47.9%
United States	3,685	370	10.0%
Somalia	3,205	2,475	77.2%
Viet Nam	3,100	975	31.5%
Poland	2,545	610	23.9%
India	2,200	740	33.6%
Jamaica	2,080	545	26.2%
Germany	2,075	120	5.8%
Iran	1,560	640	41%
Hong Kong	1,355	420	30.9%
Portugal	1,270	0	0%
Haiti	1,270	425	33.5%
El Salvador	1,265	380	30.0%
Philippines	1,130	520	46.0%
France	1,020	160	15.7%
Netherlands	1,015	-	-

Since the largest percentage of immigrants settle in the City of Ottawa, it is not surprising that table 3.3 shows that most of the immigrant communities represented in the region are primarily located in the City of Ottawa. The largest communities are the Lebanese, Italian, Chinese, American, Somali, Vietnamese, Polish, Indian, Jamaican and German communities. Obviously, many of these communities have long histories in the Ottawa area and it could be anticipated that while recent immigrants from some of these source countries would require some services, it is unlikely that they would require the same services as some of the communities which have little history in Canada.

Consequently, the communities most likely to require new and/or different services from the City of Ottawa are communities which have high percentages of recent arrivals. These would include the Somali, Yugoslavian, Chinese, Filipino, El Salvadorian, Haitian, Iranian, Lebanese, Vietnamese, Hong Kong, Jamaican and Indian communities.

While Nepean and Gloucester have significantly less immigrants than the City of Ottawa, they each have several significant communities. The three immigrant communities with the most recent arrivals in the City of Nepean are the Polish, Indian, and Lebanese communities – communities which are also significant in the City of Ottawa. It would, therefore, be expected that Nepean municipal services would be targeted at these communities, and would, perhaps, cooperate with similar services in the City of Ottawa.

Table 3.4 Largest Immigrant Communities in the City of Nepean

Place of Birth	Immigrant Population	Recent Arrivals (1991-1996)	% of Immigrants Recent Arrivals
United Kingdom	3,970	165	4.1%
Italy	2,060	-	-
India	1,705	420	24.6%
Poland	1,240	345	27.8%
China, People's Republic	1,205	125	10.4%
Viet Nam	1,115	190	17%
Lebanon	1,130	240	21.2%

The City of Gloucester has only two immigrant communities of more than one thousand people: the United Kingdom and Lebanon. As mentioned earlier, immigrants from the United Kingdom, with their well established communities in the region, are likely to seek government services for the same reasons and at the same rate as the native born population. On the other hand, given the relatively shallow roots of the Lebanese community, we would expect the City of Gloucester to be extending its outreach programs to the Lebanese community.

Incidentally, the Lebanese community is the only community which has significant recently arrived populations in all three core cities. Given the size of the Lebanese community in several municipalities, it should not be surprising that it has the highest profile of any recently arrived community in Ottawa-Carleton. It boasts the only federal Member of Parliament from these communities, and has gained recognition via the annual regional Leborama festival.

Table 3.5 Largest Immigrant Communities in the City of Gloucester

Place of Birth	Immigrant Population	Recent Arrivals (1991-1996)	% of Immigrants Recent Arrivals
United Kingdom	2,250	60	2.6%
Lebanon	1,180	360	30.5%

3.2 Ethnic Diversity

Having examined the primary engine driving the diversity in Ottawa-Carleton, it is time to turn to the deeper diversity in the region: ethnic communities. The population of

Ottawa-Carleton is quite diverse in terms of ethnic background although it pales before the mature diversity of Canada's, and perhaps the world's, most diverse city – Toronto (Lastman 1998). Over one hundred ethnic origins are represented in Ottawa-Carleton with fifty nine ethnic communities in the region surpassing a critical mass of one thousand people.

Like the recently arrived immigrant communities, most ethnic communities are spread fairly evenly over the core municipalities of Ottawa, Gloucester and Nepean, with the highest proportion residing within the City of Ottawa. The largest communities reporting their ethnic origin on the census are English (29%), Canadian (27%), French (25%), Irish (22%), Scottish (20%), German (8%), Italian (4%), Chinese, Dutch and Polish (each 3%), Lebanese, United Kingdom, North American Indian and Welsh (each 2%). (See Appendix A)

As seen with immigrant communities, ethnic communities which are rapidly expanding, should also receive increased governmental attention. Using the ethnicity data from the 1991 and 1996 censuses Table 3.6 illustrates the rapid increase in population among some ethnic communities in Ottawa-Carleton.

Table 3.6
Selection of Fastest Growing Ethnic Communities in Ottawa-Carleton

Ethnic Origin	1991	1996	% Increase
TOTAL	671,345	713,880	6
English/British	381,460	514,665	34.9
French	201,275	176,310	-12.4
Canadian	14,965	194,125	1,197
Chinese	16,065	20,960	30
Lebanese	12,535	16,255	30
Somali	-	7,295	100+
Spanish	4,710	6,225	32
Vietnamese	3,910	5,995	53
Portuguese	4,945	5,340	8
Haitian	1,775	3,825	115
Filipino	2,465	3,790	54
Iranian	2,065	3,160	53
Korean	535	675	26

The most striking figures on this table are those illustrating the explosion of "Canadian" as a response on the 1996 Census[2] and the dramatic decrease in those reporting French origins. Equally important is the more than doubling of the Somali and Haitian communities and the rate of increase in the Filipino, Iranian and Vietnamese communities versus the six percent rate of growth among the entire population in the region.

There are clear policy ramifications for such rapid population growth in specific communities. While at present these communities only comprise ten percent of the total population, their rapid growth rates suggest a possible rapid rise in their demographic weight. This is very much in keeping with demographic projections for Canada as a whole. Chinese Canadians, due to their growth rate, are expected to be the fourth largest ethnic group in Canada by 2006 (Canadian Heritage 1999; 4).

Table 3.7 shows the distribution of ethnic communities across the three core cities of Ottawa, Nepean and Gloucester. Close to half of all members of the largest ethnic communities in the region reside in the City of Ottawa, with the second largest grouping in Nepean and the smallest communities in Gloucester – the same pattern as the immigrant communities.

Notable exceptions to this pattern include the large Haitian and Portuguese populations in Gloucester.[3]

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[2] Sociologists Fernando Mata and Ravi Pendakur have reported that the majority of those reporting "Canadian" as their ethnic origin on the 1996 Census were likely to have previously reported British or French (Mata and Pendakur 1998).

[3] Unfortunately, residential concentration data is notoriously difficult to come by in Canada unless it is in the big three cities of Vancouver, Montreal and Toronto. Further research will include pursuing this data for Ottawa-Carleton.

Table 3.7 Selection of Ethnic Communities in Ottawa, Nepean and Gloucester

Ethnic Origin	Region	% pop.	Ottawa	% of ethnic pop.	Nepean	% of ethnic pop.	Gloucester	% of ethnic pop.
TOTAL	713,880	100	318,990	47	114,225	16	102,920	14
Chinese	20,960	2.9	10,375	49	4,265	20	2,640	13
Lebanese	16,255	2.3	10,130	62	2,375	15	2,185	13
Somali	7,295	1.0	5,585	77	640	9	935	13
Spanish	6,225	0.9	3,620	58	925	15	635	10
Vietnamese	5,995	0.8	3,605	60	1,170	20	830	14
Portuguese	5,340	0.7	2,795	52	495	9	815	15
Haitian	3,825	0.5	1,985	52	150	4	1,110	29
Filipino	3,790	0.5	1,540	40	870	23	575	15
Iranian	3,160	0.4	1,885	60	480	15	390	12
Korean	675	0.0	350	52	125	19	90	13

3.3 Visible Minority Communities

While there is a great deal of confluence among immigrant, ethnic, and visible minority communities in Canada today, and the barriers they face, there are still valid reasons to differentiate these three aspects of Canadian diversity. In the first instance, there are significant barriers facing each group which are unique, or at least disproportionately affect one or more groups. In the second, there are policy implications for each tier of government as their policies have frequently been targeted at a specific group.

As table 3.8 shows, the visible minority population in Ottawa-Carleton is slightly higher than the national average of eleven percent, but it is significantly lower than the thirty two percent of Toronto residents who self identify as a visible minority or the thirty one percent in Vancouver (Mitchell 1998)[4]. That being said, as the growth rates illustrated by table 3.6 revealed, the visible minority population in Ottawa-Carleton is increasing rapidly. The governments in the region should be developing policies now to help address the barriers visible minorities have encountered in Toronto and Vancouver. At the very least, they should be developing connections with these communities so that tensions may be tackled before they escalate.

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[4] Despite relatively small numbers captured by the 1996 Census, many observers have noted a significant flow of French speaking African immigrants who immigrate to Montreal, under Quebec's selection policy which gives more weight to French language ability. Many of

Table 3.8 **Visible Minority Communities in Ottawa, Nepean, and Gloucester**

Visible Minority	Region	% Pop.	Ottawa	% Pop.	Nepean	% Pop.	Gloucester	% Pop.
Vis. Min.	107,270	15.0	60,245	18.9	17,800	15.6	15,065	14.6
Black	28,845	4.0	18,425	5.8	3,090	2.7	4,605	4.4
Arab/ West Asian	20,800	2.9	13,115	4.1	3,100	2.7	2,640	2.6
Chinese	19,235	2.7	9,595	3.0	3,970	3.5	2,370	2.3
South Asian	17,010	2.4	6,435	-	4,180	3.7	2,835	2.8
Korean	630	-	330	-	125	-	95	-
Japanese	1,030	-	680	-	140	-	120	-
Southeast Asian	8,070	1.0	4,720	1.5	1,490	1.3	1000	1.0
Filipino	3,500	-	1,415	-	795	-	550	-
Latin American	5,490	-	4,020	1.3	460	-	585	-

3.4 Other Minority Communities

Many studies looking at immigration and studies fail to take into account the already existing complex diversities of what is popularly, although sadly too often incorrectly, referred to as the "host" society. In Ottawa-Carleton two further diversities which need to be examined include the bilingual (English-French) nature of the area and the sizeable population of urban Aboriginal peoples.

Table 3.9 **First Official Language Spoken in Ottawa, Nepean, and Gloucester**

	Region	% pop.	Ottawa	% pop.	Nepean	% pop.	Gloucester	% pop.
French	114,720	14.0	49,800	15.6	6,250	5.5	27,955	27.0
English	576,530	71.0	255,810	80.0	104,360	91.0	71,765	69.7
Both	12,645	1.5	7,165	2.2	1,960	1.7	1,925	1.8
Neither	9,955	1.2	6,210	1.9	1,650	1.4	1,270	1.2

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these immigrants then move to the Ottawa area. More reliable numbers will be available following the 2001 Census.

Roughly similar size segments of the region's population speak French or are members of a visible minority community. However, the visible minority communities are more evenly spread over the three ring cities than the francophone community. In addition, francophone's are heavily concentrated in the City of Vanier. In fact, 51% of the City of Vanier's population belongs to the francophone community and only 11% belong to visible minority communities.. As geographic proximity frequently leads to political power, we should expect that there will be more francophone representatives in Vanier than in the other areas of the region.

Another key aspect of diversity in the Ottawa-Carleton region is the urban Aboriginal community. While small in comparison to Winnipeg and Regina, they are an important part of the socio-cultural composition of the population.

Table 3.10 Urban Aboriginal Communities in Ottawa, Nepean, and Gloucester

	Region	% pop.	Ottawa	% pop.	Nepean	% pop.	Gloucester	% pop.
North American Indian	14,610	2.0	7,235	2.3	1,850	1.6	2,130	2.1
Inuit	510	-	240	-	50	-	35	-
Métis	3,425	-	1,395	-	405	-	670	-
Total	18,545	2.6	8,870	2.8	2,305	2.0	2,835	2.8

Much like the other diverse communities examined, the largest concentrations of Aboriginal peoples are in the three ring cities. The one deviation from the norm is the comparatively large Inuit population in Vanier. While only 50 and 35 respondents on the Census selected Inuit as their ethnic origin in Nepean and Gloucester, twice that number selected Inuit in Vanier.

Having examined the demographics of the residents of the Ottawa-Carleton region, I will now turn to how that diversity is formally reflected in the four tiers of government in the region.

4.0 Ottawa-Carleton: Political Participation Writ Small?

The Canadian Multiculturalism Act (1988) is based upon the belief that political participation by all members of a society is considered to be of fundamental importance to the legitimacy of a democracy. Indeed, it states that the Government of Canada will, "promote the full and equitable participation of individuals and communities of all origins in the continuing evolution and shaping of all aspects of Canadian society and assist them in the elimination of any barriers to that participation." Further, it commits the Government of Canada to, "encourage and assist the social, cultural, economic and political institutions of Canada to be both respectful and inclusive of Canada's multicultural character."

These policy goals are substantiated by a body of literature which suggests that, "minorities that are continually denied access to power will feel excluded and discriminated against and will lose their allegiance to the regime" (Seidle 1994, Lijphart in Philips 1995, Preston 1997, Stasiulis 1997, Kymlicka 1998, Tremblay 1998, Black 1998, Siemiatycki and Isin 1998]. Given the importance of power sharing to the health of the democratic system of governance, I decided to examine the level of access to political power available to immigrant, ethnic and visible minority communities in Ottawa-Carleton. To do so I surveyed all one hundred and two formally elected political representatives in the Ottawa-Carleton Region at all four levels of government in 1998. The survey questionnaire was developed with simplicity in mind to enhance the response rate. It was administered in three waves (e-mail, mail, and fax). It resulted in a response rate of 64% which compares favourably to those conducted by Frizell which garnered 28% and Black which garnered 49% (Black 1997).

This survey was driven by three main considerations. In the first instance, I wished to critically examine the belief that the lowest tiers of government are the most open to diversity [Abu-Laban and Stasiulis 1991].

In the second, the province of Ontario has passed legislation (Bill 81; "The Fewer Politicians Act") to reduce the number of representatives in the provincial parliament from one hundred thirty to one hundred and three, and is pursuing an aggressive amalgamation of municipalities with accompanying loss of representatives.

In addition, other significant changes unfolding in Ontario and other Canadian provinces endanger the democratic process. These changes include the increased spending limits, shortening the time from the dropping of the election writ to election day, eliminating other parties, and establishing a permanent registered voters list. Each of these changes privilege parties supported by wealthy, well-established citizens who understand the intricacies of the electoral process.

The rejection of the directions suggested by the Lortie Commission[5] came at the same time as the decimation of interest groups and the downscaling of government efforts at public consultations.[6] All these changes are likely to have negative effects on the representativeness of governments and their legitimacy.[7]

As a result of these changes, the 1997 municipal elections may have been the last elections for which two levels of local government are elected. If the hypothesis of Stasiulis and Abu-Laban is correct (municipal governments are the most open to diversity), the diversity of elected representatives in the 2000 elections should decrease. In this sense, this survey and paper lay down a base line against which future comparisons can be made. A longitudinal survey of the formal representation of diversity in the political process should yield a firmer understanding of how diverse communities become involved in the formal political process. The relative youth of the Chinese, Lebanese, Somali, Spanish, Vietnamese, Portuguese, Haitian, Filipino, Iranian and Korean communities will provide a window into the integration process at work.

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[5] According to Seidle, Jane Jensen suggested that the Lortie Commission sought a 'paradigm shift' on issues of representation (Seidle 1994).

[6] Good examples of the elimination of consultative bodies used by the government in the past include the Canadian Multiculturalism Advisory Council (CMAC) which was used to seek input on policy questions around ethnocultural diversity, and the flawed attempts at public consultation surrounding the overhaul of the *Immigration Act* in 1998.

[7] Several recent surveys suggest that the Canadian public do not believe that the government is representative of their interests [EKOS, Rethinking Government IV].

Table 4.1 Number of Representatives in Ottawa-Carleton 1998

Federal Parliament (M.P.s)	8
Provincial Parliament(M.P.P.s) [8]	10
Regional Council 1 Chair 18 Councillors	19
Municipal Councils	65
Ottawa 1 Mayor 6 Councillors	
Gloucester, Nepean (each) 1 Mayor 4 Councillors	
Kanata, Cumberland, Vanier, Goulbourn, West Carleton, Rideau, Osgoode, Rockliffe Park (each) 1 Mayor 4 Councillors	
TOTAL	102

Several aspects of diversity can be considered from this data, including gender, ethnicity, place of birth, mother tongue, previous occupation, motivation for running for office, age, and educational background. For the purposes of this paper only gender, place of birth and ethnicity have been analysed. Numbers are too small to make much sense of cross tabulating these three variable, so they have been left as univariates in this paper.

4.1 Immigrant Representation

The participation of immigrants in the political process is not well understood. As Black notes, "The foreign born are one particularly important group that has not received much consideration from scholars interested in examining political activity. Indeed, relative to the enormity of the general participation literature that has been produced and its significant segments devoted to other social categories, the limited attention paid to immigrants is striking" (Black 1998, 13).

Immigration figures for the representatives are derived from a question on the survey instrument on place of birth. While there is not an exact correlation between immigrant status and place of birth, place of birth is frequently used as an acceptable proxy.

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[8] This number has decreased to 8 during the 1999 Provincial Election.

Table 4.2 Place of Birth of 64 Responding Representatives

Country of Origin	Number of Responses	Percentage	Percentage of Population Reporting in 1996
Canada	1	1.5	
Ontario	41	64	
Quebec	11	17	
B.C.	1	1.5	
Alberta	1	1.5	
Nova Scotia	1	1.5	
CDN TOTAL	56	87.5	79
England	2	3.1	3
Holland	1	1.5	0.4
Lebanon	1	1.5	1.2
Italy	1	1.5	1.0
New Zealand	1	1.5	-
France	1	1.5	0.2
Germany	1	1.5	0.7

Twenty-five percent of the population of Ottawa-Carleton consists of immigrants, and twelve and a half percent of the elected representatives are immigrants. While this is quite low at first glance, immigrants cannot run for public office until they have met citizenship requirements, it takes time to build a base for an election campaign, and generally speaking recent immigrants have other immediate priorities for their first years in their new country. Geographic concentration is also important for political participation. Consequently the level of immigrants in the pool of elected representatives in Ottawa-Carleton is within the Canadian norm [Black 1998, Preston 1997, Siemiatycki and Isin 1998].

It comes as no surprise that the majority of foreign born elected officials in Ottawa-Carleton come primarily from "traditional" countries of immigration. They, for the most part, are members of well-established communities, and they are not visibly different from the majority of the electorate.

4.2 Ethnic Representation

Previous research on political representation and diversity has largely relied upon ascribing ethnicity to representatives on the basis of last name analysis or photo identification (Black 1997, Preston 1998). Unfortunately, ascription of ethnicity leads to a variety of complications, not the least of which is the contradiction of defining an individual's identity, when ethnicity is usually held to be a self-defined category.

Consequently, this study is based upon responses to a survey where candidates were asked to self identify their ethnic background(s).

Table 4.3 Self Ascribed Ethnicity of 64 Responding Representatives

Ethnic Origin	% Representatives	% Population
Canadian	52	27
British	17	
French	16	25
Irish	14	
White/WASP	6	
German	5	8
Italian	5	4
Dutch	3	3
Scottish	3	
Lebanese	1.5	2
Acadian	1.5	
Norwegian	1.5	1
Slavic	1.5	

Many respondents indicated multiple ethnic origins, consequently totals do not add up to 100%.

Two main disparities emerge from this table: Politicians are twice as likely to select Canadian as their ethnic origin as the general population in the region; and Canadians of French origin are dramatically under represented. However, as noted earlier, previous work by sociologists Ravi Pendakur and Fernando Mata suggests that those who select Canadian as a response to the ethnicity question on the Census are most likely to be of British or French origin (Pendakur and Mata 1998).

Given the high level of British Isles (British, Irish, Scottish, and perhaps WASP) response from politicians in this survey, it seems likely that those who identified as Canadian are most likely to be of French origin. This makes sense in the highly politicized Ottawa-Carleton Region where it is deemed important for politicians of French origin to identify strongly with Canada so as not to be painted a separatist.[9]

4.3 Visible Minority Representation

A question on visible minority status was not asked on the survey instrument. Consequently, this aspect of identity can only be commented upon by ascription based on photographs of the elected officials and by using place of birth as a proxy. Given the limited usefulness of this approach (visible minority status is a self-defining characteristic and in many instances the self definition does not match the externally ascribed status), little will be reported here. Suffice to say that the one elected official from a visible minority community is not a reflection of the ten thousand two hundred seventy members of those communities. In fact, fifteen percent of the electorate has less than one percent of the formally elected representatives in the region.

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[9] For an example of the linguistic politicization in the region consider the appointment of David Levine to the board of a local hospital which has resulted in a public outcry carried in the region's papers for months [Marlin 1998].

Given the near absence of formal representation, later stages of this study will seek to examine how these communities are represented by political representatives from outside of their communities.

4.4 Other Diversities

Other important diversities which one could expect to find represented within the over one hundred political representatives are Aboriginal peoples, women, and francophones. No respondents reported Aboriginal backgrounds, many reported francophone backgrounds and less than expected were women.

Work on representation of women has been covered extensively elsewhere so will not be covered in depth here (Vickers, Rankin, and Appelle 1993; Maillé 1990; Erickson 1992,; Arscott and Trimble 1997; Brodie and Vickers 1982; Brodie 1985, 1987; Bashevkin 1989, 1993; Megyery 1991; Ship 1998).

Table 4.4 Gender of Representatives

Level of Government	Women	Men
Federal Parliament	2 (25%)	6 (75%)
Provincial Parliament	0 (0%)	10 (100%)
Regional Council	7 (16.8%)	12 (63.2%)
Municipal Councils	20 (30.8%)	45 (69.2%)
TOTAL	29 (28.4%)	73 (71.6%)

Similar to the previous literature, the gender breakdown in table 4.2 shows that women are massively under represented at an aggregate level and at each tier of government. However, it also shows that women are least under represented at the municipal and federal levels. This result would suggest that the assumption of Stasiulis and Abu-Laban that party structures impede access should be examined more closely, or some headway may have been made in the last decade. Action taken by the parties at the federal level may be having a positive impact on the representation of women.

Table 4.5 Language Used by Responding Representatives

	French	English	Both	Other	Total
Responding Representatives	9 (13%)	48 (65%)	6 (8.6%)	7 (10%)	73 (71.6%)

Note due to multiple responses total is greater than 64 responses received.

5.0 Diversity and Government in Ottawa Carleton

Given the low level of representation of Canadians of diverse backgrounds in the governments in the region, it should come as no surprise that very few resources are devoted at present to issues surrounding diversity. Two key aspects of governmental processes designed to assist diverse communities should be kept in mind: 1) the ability of governments to adapt to increasing diversity and 2) slippage or backtracking when governments eliminate programs designed to facilitate participation by diverse communities.

5.1 Municipal

Of the eleven municipalities in Ottawa-Carleton, only the city of Ottawa has an office devoted to diversity and equity issues. This office oversees two primary policies relating to diversity: a Multiculturalism Policy, and Human Rights and Employment Equity Policy. In addition to the diversity and equity office, there is a municipal advisory committee has been mandated to oversee the enactment of these policies.

Policies are only as good as the means by which they are enforced. At present, the City of Ottawa has dedicated resources for only one full time employee and no budget for major initiatives in the area of equity and diversity. (The repeal of the provincial *Employment Equity Act* led to the reduction of staff from six to one employee.) Consequently, the policies in the City of Ottawa are not living up to their full potential.

While the full-time staff has been drastically reduced, an advisory committee continues to function, albeit in a limited capacity. The City of Ottawa has had an Advisory Committee on Visible Minorities since 1982. The committee repositioned itself in 1997 to encompass more than just those issues related to visible minority communities. The committee stated that:

> Since the advisory committee was established in 1982, there has been a revolution in terminology, attitudes, and social values respecting race relations and equality. Earlier terminology reflects the mind set of the 1960's civil rights struggles and the members of the 1997 advisory committee wish for their work to reflect contemporary realities (City of Ottawa, 1997).

Recent initiatives in the last few years have included an investigation into the perceived discriminatory hiring practices within the Ottawa Fire Department, the institution of culturally sensitive swim times for religious minority women, and the denial of public space as a platform for the Heritage Front to use for holocaust denial (Smith 1998).

5.2 Regional

Like most governments in Canada in general and Ontario in particular, the focus on ensuring full and equitable participation of the entire electorate by the Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton, has been subsumed under a veritable obsession with fiscal austerity. This has resulted in a decreased emphasis on equity issues as measured by a decrease in both political leadership and resources.

During the lifespan of the *Ontario Employment Equity Act*, three full-time employees were devoted to handling equity issues for the Regional Municipality. At present, there are one and a half staff members assigned to these tasks.[10]

The primary equity issues of concern to the regional government are focused on employment. Consequently, the two policies of interest for this paper are: Human Rights and Workplace Equity; and Workplace Harassment.

Equity issues within the regional government are handled by several working committees designed to handle grievances and to ensure that access to services is available to all residents in the region.

Recent initiatives of the Regional government in the field of diversity centre around employment, complaints, training, and policies.

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[10] The staff member responsible for public transport, a federally regulated area, is split between her transportation duties and those for the Regional Government.

5.3 Provincial

Ontario has had a long history of provincial interest in diversity issues. The Ontario Advisory Council was established in 1973, an Official Multiculturalism Policy was created in 1977, the *Ontario Human Rights Act* was passed in 1981 (with a Human Rights Commission mandated to "promote multicultural understanding in compliance with the Act") [Fleras and Elliott 1992], and the *Employment Equity Act* was passed in 1993. This *Act* required employers to undertake a mandatory process for the development of employment equity plans [Currie 1998].

Since the election of the Conservative party under Mike Harris in Ontario, programs relating to equity and diversity have been devastated. Central to the platform of the Harris Government was the *Job Quotas Repeal Act* (1995) which repealed the *Employment Equity Act* passed by the previous government.

In addition, the Conservatives have dissolved citizenship programs, cut budgets and abolished anti-racism programs. Services such as Multilingual Access to Social Services, Community Neighbourhood Support Services, and the Multi-service Centre Program have been eliminated. Budgets for remaining programs have also been cut. For example, programs designed to ease the integration of newcomers were cut by 6%, budgets for cross-cultural sharing and multicultural events by over 75%, and budgets for social justice grants by 24%. Anti-racism programs within government were abolished. Most notably, the Ontario Antiracism Secretariat and the Race Relations and Policing Division (Joshee 1996).

At present there are two primary vehicles the Government of Ontario employs to address issues arising from the diversity of its populace: *the Ontario Human Rights Code* and the Equal Opportunity Plan.

The Minister of Citizenship, Culture and Recreation, Marilyn Mushinski, outlined the government's Equal Opportunity Plan in the Ontario Legislature on December 14, 1995. She announced that, "This government's approach to fairness in the workplace is merit-based, inclusive, voluntary and built on partnership. . . It is based on co-operation, not coercion, and will encourage all of us - government, employers and employees - to work as partners to develop workplaces where merit is the basis for employment practices" (www.equalopportunity.on.ca).

The Conservative government of Mike Harris has almost completely eliminated the role of the provincial government in the proactive tackling of issues around diversity. Instead, it has converted the provincial response, like that of the municipal and regional governments, to a more reactive stance.

Recent initiatives undertaken by the Government of Ontario include the launch of a website entitled "Gateway to Diversity." The site is designed to help the Ministry of Citizenship, Culture and Recreation to build partnerships with organizations and to provide them with access to information, resources, and best practices (Canadian Heritage 1999).

Another important initiative in this area was the addition of mediation to the Ontario Human Rights Commission's portfolio: seventy-five to eighty-five percent of cases sent to mediation have ended in settlement. This process has cut the Commission's backlog considerably (Canadian Heritage 1999).

5.4 Federal

The Government of Canada has a long standing tradition of state polices designed to handle issues resulting from diversity. These polices have been well documented elsewhere, so they will not be covered in any depth here (Fleras and Elliott 1992, Joshee 1995, Biles 1997, Canadian Heritage 1999, Biles 1999). That being said, the commitment of this tier, like the other three tiers of government, has diminished in recent years. At least as measured by high profile political leadership, funding, and new initiatives.

While the federal policy set surrounding diversity in Canada is extensive, there are two key policies, Multiculturalism and Employment Equity, which must be considered.

The *Canadian Multiculturalism Act* sets the context and objective of the Government of Canada to ensure the full participation of all Canadians in the social, cultural, economic, and political aspects of Canadian society. The objectives of multiculturalism were most actively pursued by the Conservative Governments of Brian Mulroney, but with the election of a Liberal government and the arrival of the anti-multiculturalism Reform Party on the national political scene in 1992, the objectives of the *Act* have not received extensive attention in terms of political leadership or resources (Biles 1997).

The *Employment Equity Act* is designed to ensure the full participation of all Canadians in the labour market. This policy originally set in 1986 and revised in 1996 has yet to achieve significant improvements in the hiring and promotion of visible minorities even in the federal public service.

It is readily apparent that one of the key elements in federal response to diversity is an acknowledgement that diversity is a cross-cutting issue which is the responsibility of all federal departments and agencies. Correspondingly, many of the initiatives led by the federal government involve many departments. Important initiatives at present tackle issues of social justice and ensuring that policies are developed on the basis of solid research results.

To sum up, political leadership and resources have been dramatically reduced at all four levels of government in the areas of diversity and equity. This has resulted in few new initiatives and a reversion to reactive policy responses from the proactive stance governments tried to create in the 1980s. The impacts of these changes is not yet known, but given the accelerating increase of diversity in cities across Canada, the lack of knowledge and practical policy experience within governments is unlikely to result in governments which have the capacity to handle tensions resulting from increased diversity. Governments should not be scratching their heads in bewilderment about how their electorates feel disconnected from them, when they have systematically eliminated the avenues by which Canadians have been connected to their governments in the past.

6.0 Conclusions, Policy Research & Future Directions

Diversity in Canada continues to increase. Consequently, governments at all levels are going to need to become more responsive to the needs of diverse communities within their jurisdictions. While the experience of no two jurisdictions will be identical, it is reasonable to assume that there are significant past practices which would benefit newly emerging "ethniCities" both in Canada and around the world.

Obviously, the full and active participation of all citizens in the democratic structures of the society within which they live is a key goal of democratic governments. Equally clearly, from the results of this study, significant communities are not represented in the formal political structures of the region. Nor is their demographic weight well represented by the policies enacted by the different levels of government. In fact, as diversity has increased, it appears as though commitment to handling issues resulting from diversity has diminished.

The extent to which communities in Ottawa-Carleton are effectively disenfranchised from the formal political structures of the region is fairly clear from this study. What is not clear, however, is whether these communities are actively participating in other arenas, or if their isolation is equally pronounced in those areas. Some of the key areas for further study to help governments in the region enhance participation by all of its residents are explored below.

6.1 Expanding the Definition

One of the most important findings from studies on the political participation is that we must move beyond the focus on formal political structures. One of the more obvious candidates for an expanded definition on political participation is participation in school boards. An examination of the nomination process would probably yield a better understanding of the barriers which face candidates from minority backgrounds.

In addition, factors such as language use, availability of daycare, media coverage and others should be considered in further studies on the formal political process. The impact of devolution/amalgamation/disentanglement or other political jargon for the decrease in the number of representatives must also be examined to understand the impact this will have on minority communities.

6.2 Substantive Participation

Merely expanding the scope of studies on formal participation will not give rise to a full understanding of the (dis)enfranchisement of specific communities. It is important to delve into the substantive representation to fully understand how community concerns get addressed in a democratic system of governance. Questions which will need to be answered include: to what extent a community can be represented by an elected official from outside of their community, and to what extent does formal participation of communities translate into a higher profile for their issues and concerns.

A great deal of work has been done in this area by feminist scholars which could be profitably mined to kick start work in this area.

6.3 Making the Links

A great deal of work has been done on the subject of political participation. Unfortunately, as Stasiulis notes, remarkably little has been done on the subject of the political participation of immigrants and ethnocultural/racial communities. Even where work has been done on disadvantaged groups, it does not necessarily contribute to the study of other groups. For example, while much work on political participation in women has been conducted (Ship 1998: 313), it has not forged many connections with work on immigrant and ethnocultural diversity.

Clearly, there is a pressing need to bring together researchers and policy makers working in the area of inequality. This extends beyond the need to integrate the work of feminist scholars into the work on immigration and diversity. As the City of Ottawa's Advisory Committee on Visible Minorities noted in 1997, "Increasingly, there is a recognition that there are significant links between work to overcome inequalities for disadvantaged groups. Racial and ethno-cultural issues are linked to women's issues, disability, sexual orientation and poverty issues" (City of Ottawa, 1997).

The forging of links between the interests of different minorities has received a greater degree of attention since Dr Hedy Fry was appointed as the Secretary of State for Multiculturalism AND the Status of Women. This joint appointment has given rise to greater cooperation between her two departments than has hitherto been the case. Examples include family violence initiatives and the Metropolis Project.

6.4 The Politics of Place

There is a disjuncture between the political spaces that are being claimed by groups and those which are being offered to them. As Magnusson observed, "The world keeps surprising us, not least in the constant innovations of the young who keep inventing political spaces of their own." (Magnusson, 1996]. This observation could just as easily be applied to groups based on gender, race, ethnicity, immigrant status, sexual orientation or language. Findings by the World Values Survey as recorded by political scientist, Neil Nevitte, observe that people around the world are become increasingly active politically, but are less likely to do so through formal political processes (Nevitte 1996).

Just as an understanding of the findings of feminist literature around empowerment and participation can be of use to those studying immigrants and ethnocultural minorities, so too can the knowledge gleaned from different sites of political organizing give us knowledge necessary to fashion political structures which are encompassing of the entire population. This entails an active engagement with scholars who are examining shopping malls, places of worship, public transport, athletic facilities, urban gardens, the internet, and community centres to name but a few.

6.5 Identity and Political Participation

The Government of Canada has long understood the importance of identity to the exercise of full citizenship. This positioned has been buttressed by researchers like Jerome Black who has observed that, "a noticeable body of evidence has built up indicating generally positive relationships between group consciousness and political activity, particularly for minority groups" (Black 1998, 24). Before abandoning programs designed to foster the identities of diverse communities, governments better examine what impact that will have on the participation of those communities within their societies.

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Appendix A

Thirty-two most frequently reported ethnic origins in Ottawa-Carleton

Ethnic Origin	Region	% pop.	Ottawa	% pop.	Nepean	% pop.	Gloucester	% pop.
TOTAL	713,880	100	318,990	100	114,225	100	102,920	100
English	205,650	29	85,315	27	36,140	32	26,470	26
Canadian	194,125	27	74,680	23	28,000	25	31,575	31
French	176,310	25	74,070	23	20,620	18	33,560	33
Irish	156,005	22	65,420	21	27,465	24	18,950	18
Scottish	140,875	20	59,725	19	24,085	21	16,740	16
German	56,185	8	23,730	7	9,290	8	7,415	7
Italian	30,655	4	13,675	4	7,685	7	3,885	4
Chinese	20,960	3	10,375	3	4,265	4	2,640	3
Dutch	20,910	3	7,785	2	3,775	3	2,630	3
Polish	20,755	3	9,100	3	4,320	4	2,560	2
Lebanese	16,255	2	10,130	3	2,375	2	2,185	2
Ukrainian	14,685	2	6,390	2	2,430	2	2,165	2
N. Am. Indian	14,620	2	7,235	2	1,850	2	2,130	2
East Indian	13,870	2	5,250	2	3,350	3	2,270	2
Welsh	12,135	2	5,165	2	1,950	2	1,590	2
Jewish	11,965	2	6,410	2	3,640	3	690	1
British (n.i.e)	8,070	1	3,540	1	1,455	1	1,035	1
Somali	7,295	1	5,585	2	640	-	935	1
Spanish	6,225	1	3,620	1	925	-	635	1
Jamaican	6,130	1	3,465	1	815	-	965	1
Vietnamese	5,995	1	3,605	1	1,170	1	830	1
American	5,915	1	2,635	1	1,085	1	825	1
Russian	5,865	1	3,030	1	1,165	1	685	1
Hungarian	5,420	1	2,605	1	1,240	1	565	1
Portuguese	5,340	1	2,795	1	495	-	815	1
Greek	4,590	1	2,475	1	835	-	445	-
Norwegian	4,230	1	1,770	1	750	-	675	1
Swedish	4,040	1	1,840	1	680	-	410	-
Haitian	3,825	1	1,985	1	150	-	1,110	1
Filipino	3,790	1	1,540	-	870	-	575	1
Austrian	3,595	1	1,715	1	550	-	550	1
Danish	3,510	1	1,475	-	580	-	580	1

(N.B. Due to the recording of multiple responses and rounding the percentages do not add up to 100%)

MULTICULTURALISM AND GOVERNANCE: AN AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVE

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Introduction

Australia has a long history of immigration. British penal colonies were first established in 1788 and since that time more than nine million immigrants have settled in the country (Burnley, Murphy and Fagan, 1997:1). Now a nation of some 18 million people, the development of Australia is characterised by the entry of wave after wave of migrant groups. Up until the Second World War, the majority constituted English speaking people, principally from the United Kingdom and Ireland. In the postwar period there were significant migrations of Greek, Italian and other southern Europeans. In the 1970s and 1980s many South East Asian and Middle Eastern immigrants came to Australia. In the 1990s Australia boasts one of the most multicultural populations in the world (Jupp, 1991). Its largest city, Sydney, is home to more than a million overseas born people.

The multicultural nature of Sydney is recognised internationally. During his visit to the city, the President of the United States, Bill Clinton, suggested that Sydney was a fine example of a place where cultural difference is accommodated without forced assimilation or segregation.

> When you drive down the streets of Sydney tonight and you look at all these different people making a contribution to your country, think with sadness, but prayerful hope about all the people who live around the world who are still being persecuted because they are different from their neighbours, because they have different religious views or they're from different ... ethnic or tribal groups... And I cannot think of a better place in the entire world, a more shining example of how people can come together as one nation and one community than Sydney, Australia (Clinton, 1996).

In this paper we discuss governmentis response to the needs of migrant groups in Australia. Our focus is Sydney, the capital of the state of New South Wales (NSW). We are particularly interested in the mechanisms in place at the local government level which recognise the needs of a multiculturally diverse population and encourage participation of people from different cultural and linguistic backgrounds. We report research from an ongoing project which is being conducted by academics working within a geographic and urban planning context.

Sydney: a demographic overview

The Greater Metropolitan Area of Sydney is the largest and most diverse geographic region in

Australia. In 1996 the city had a population of 3.7 million people, and projections suggest that it is now in excess of four million (ABS Census, 1996). Of the total population, 2.4 million were born in Australia, whilst the remaining 35 per cent were born overseas (ABS Census, 1996). With continuing economic growth, the development of major national and international transportation links and its position as the primary destination for immigrants (Burnley, 1996; Murphy, 1995), Sydney generally fulfills the criteria of a "Global City" (Friedmann & Wolff, 1983; Friedmann, 1993; O'Connor, 1993; Stimson, 1995, Searle, 1996).

The Greater Metropolitan Area of Sydney is made up of 45 Local Government Areas (LGAs), each managed by a council (see Chart 1). Local government is the third level of governance within the Australian system. The other two, Federal and State, also influence the direction of Sydney's growth. LGAs are autonomous areas but individually encompass a great deal of heterogeneity in both population size and land use. The former ranges from 11,834 persons in Hunters Hill, to 231,437 persons in the Blacktown LGA (See Table 1). Inner ring suburbs are dominated by gentrified residential land use and a declining industrial base. These patterns of development have been encouraged by a non-partisan state government policy of urban consolidation. Middle ring suburbs provide a mix of both residential and commercial/industrial land use. In this region, employment growth has been concentrated in two major centres or isatelliteî cities, Parramatta and Chatswood. The inner and middle LGAs also contain the vast majority of employment opportunities within Sydney. The suburban outer ring from the Sutherland Shire in the south through Campbelltown, Fairfield, Blacktown, Penrith, Baulkham Hills, Ku-Ring-Gai and Hornsby, has the bulk of Sydneyís residential population growth. The LGAs on the cityís outskirts include new residential centres and mixed land use such as agriculture, national parks and major water catchments.

Insert Chart 1 Here (Sydney Statistical Division: Local Government Areas)

Sydney has a diverse mix of people and culture. The total populations and numbers of overseas born persons within the cityís LGAs are shown in Table 1. The highest concentrations of overseas born are in the western suburbs with Fairfield having the greatest number (53.6% of its total population) followed by Auburn (51.8%), Canterbury (49.3%), Ashfield (47.3%) and Sydney/South Sydney (47.0%). Of the 1.15 million people born overseas, 72.5 per cent (832,000 persons) come from mainly non-English speaking countries. Fairfield (50.5%), Auburn (48.3%), Canterbury (45.4%), Ashfield (40.6%) and Botany (40.5%) have the highest levels of non-English speaking background people. Other major immigrant concentrations are located to the east, south and west of the central business district (CBD). These include suburbs dominated by earlier phase migrant settlements such as those of the Greeks and Italians. The lowest representations of non-English speaking background (NESB) groups appear in the developing periphery LGAs, with Wyong, Gosford and Wollondilly all having less than 15 per cent overseas born residents.

Table 1: Numbers of overseas born persons, detailing major countries of birth and total persons in Sydney Local Government Areas - 1996

LGA NAME	Total Persons	Overseas Born Persons	Overseas Born Persons NESC	ATSI Persons	Fiji	New Zealand	United Kingdom & Ireland	Federal Republic of Germany	Greece	Italy	Le
Ashfield	39715	18791	16156	267	291	731	1603	166	618	2659	
Auburn	50703	26258	24535	380	515	644	960	121	342	328	
Bankstown	157161	52298	45[illegible]64	947	882	1470	4796	869	2625	2606	
Baulkham Hills	118797	30267	19547	298	333	1917	7483	778	358	1442	
Blacktown	231509	72350	55355	4952	2708	4055	11274	1403	920	2031	
Blue Mountains	71994	12567	4313	689	65	1026	6406	616	95	175	
Botany	34438	16002	13939	458	339	712	1174	113	1240	519	
Burwood	28324	12995	11431	115	144	433	1007	113	571	1491	
Camden	33047	5448	2550	342	43	365	2396	195	64	385	
Campbelltown	143431	35200	21535	3048	1059	2392	9925	781	337	664	
Canterbury	131686	64953	59760	646	2097	1995	2681	350	6082	3309	
Concord	23541	7537	6134	68	62	275	933	92	410	1739	
Drummoyne	30116	8900	6459	67	115	617	1570	116	553	2877	
Fairfield	181233	97303	91401	1177	1280	1464	3711	1063	679	5999	
Gosford	144415	20495	6697	1551	196	2300	10519	599	171	349	
Hawkesbury	57117	8285	3644	747	58	615	3681	339	111	221	
Holroyd	80237	26358	21899	576	816	1175	2986	365	700	1407	
Hornsby	135859	37223	23324	337	330	2422	9375	757	180	1079	
Hunter's Hill	11874	2687	1485	36	17	250	725	53	124	223	
Hurstville	65044	19690	15681	331	416	1016	2514	207	1200	888	
Kogarah	47366	14914	11794	135	300	832	1821	150	1475	708	
Ku-ring-gai	97976	29827	16431	80	154	2007	6983	694	152	444	
Lane Cove	29684	9009	5485	44	67	757	2159	182	120	226	
Leichhardt	57319	16556	9185	618	199	1880	4728	351	584	1532	

Table 1 (cont) LGA NAME	Total Persons	Overseas Born Persons	Overseas Born Persons NESC	ATSI Persons	Fiji	New Zealand	United Kingdom & Ireland	Federal Republic of Germany	Greece	Italy	Leb
Liverpool	119793	42218	35681	1856	2303	1423	4607	752	843	3355	
Manly	35481	9757	3762	91	87	1236	3807	239	166	186	
Marrickville	75519	33538	28184	1035	694	1752	3019	314	3742	1130	
Mosman	25118	7129	2871	21	42	790	2483	200	81	155	
North Sydney	52554	17275	8883	82	132	1955	4938	358	97	226	
Parramatta	138164	48145	38916	1029	1450	2247	5965	578	833	1157	
Penrith	162763	36848	21132	2634	738	1966	12444	1237	631	1147	
Randwick	117208	42936	31482	1335	431	2825	7166	703	2543	1231	
Rockdale	84279	33491	28321	333	644	1683	3034	293	3559	1506	
Ryde	91784	31628	24787	248	474	1538	4319	434	529	2233	
Strathfield	25788	11364	10089	112	156	345	725	134	300	748	
Sutherland	193393	33083	17214	925	362	2779	11392	958	1169	1440	
Sydney/South Sydney	95835	34641	22776	157	286	3647	6742	614	1113	615	
Warringah/Pittwater	174431	43068	20711	439	247	4286	15440	1145	307	2514	
Waverley	60381	24006	14544	226	125	2037	5229	553	413	590	
Willoughby	53098	19180	13614	80	114	1355	3212	319	259	757	

Wollondilly	33345	4792	1899	449	22	298	2427	229	43	181
Woollahra	49254	16011	8622	119	88	1620	3868	515	273	388
Wyong	115750	13937	4468	1727	88	1750	7254	415	104	361
SYDNEY	**3705524**	**1148860**	**832350**	**30827**	**21029**	**66882**	**209490**	**20483**	**37616**	**53421**

Source: ABS Census 1996 - Customised Tables

The eight largest origin birthplaces of persons resident in the Sydney region in 1996 were the United Kingdom and Ireland (5.7% of the cityís population or 210,000 persons), New Zealand (1.8% or 67,000), China (1.7% or 62,500), Vietnam (1.6% or 59,500), Italy (1.5% or 53,500), Lebanon (1.4% or 51,000), Philippines (1.1% or 42,500) and Greece (1.0% or 37,500).

Migration from Italy and Greece has been a significant contributor to the population growth of Sydney since the end of World War II. Recent trends indicate a decline (Thompson, 1976; Bottomley, 1986) as diminished chain migration, mortality and return migration have had their impact. Both Greek and Italian migrants have concentrated their communities in the Sydney region with under 20 per cent residing in the remainder of NSW. Initial settlement for Greek migrants occurred within the inner LGAs surrounding the Sydney CBD where low cost housing was available. In 1996, the early settlement of Greek migrants in the Marrickville LGA (5.0% of total population) was still evident. The remaining four of the five highest representations were in the middle ring LGAs of Canterbury (5.3%), Rockdale (4.2%), Botany (3.6%) and Kogarah (3.1%).

Although Italians also settled within the inner LGAs, they formed some peripheral and non-metropolitan settlement. Migrants with agricultural expertise started market gardens in western Sydney or took to the countryside, establishing farms and vineyards. In 1996, Italian born personsí residential locations showed a significantly different pattern to those of the Greeks and were suggestive of earlier dispersions. The five highest representations were all in middle-ring LGAs to the west of the CBD with 9.6 per cent in Drummoyne followed by 7.4 per cent in Concord, 6.7 per cent in Ashfield, 5.3 per cent in Burwood and 3.3 per cent in Fairfield. The largest community was in the Fairfield LGA with almost 6000 persons in 1996, whilst a further 3,300 resided in Canterbury (2.5% of total population). Significantly, the lowest representations were in the outer and peripheral LGAs. Few Greek or Italian migrants reside in the outer southern, western or northern regions of the city.

Insert Chart 2 Here (Sydney Statistical Division - Overseas Born Persons 1996)

Lebanese migration to Sydney has had a long history dating back to the 1880s (Burnley 1982). Since the 1950s the flow of immigrants has been continuous, although the cultural and religious mix has changed. Earlier migrants were predominantly Maronite, Melekite and Orthodox Christian religious groups which settled within the inner suburbs of Sydney. Since the 1976 onset of civil war in Lebanon, Muslims have dominated the increased refugee migrant intake. In 1996 the largest proportions of Lebanese migrants were in the outer middle-ring LGAs of Canterbury (6.9% of total population), Bankstown (5.9%), Auburn (5.1%), Parramatta (4.3%) and Holroyd (4.1%). These five LGAs all border each other and the levels of concentration can be linked to the location of Mosques and community services within this region. Low levels of representation are apparent in outer and periphery suburbs and are significantly low in middle ring northern areas.

The highest levels of Chinese born migrants in the 1996 Census were in the inner and middle ring LGAs of Ashfield (8.5% of total population), Auburn (7.3%), Canterbury (5.8%), Burwood (5.6%) and Strathfield (4.7%). The Canterbury LGA also contains the largest community group (7,500 persons), whilst over 4,000 individuals reside in the Fairfield and Parramatta LGAs. This inner-ring concentration has some historical links to earlier community settlements and the presence of "China Town", located south west of the CBD. Though outer and periphery representation is low, there are some indications of northern middle-ring settlement occurring.

A more recent phenomena is the migration of persons born in the Philippines, significantly women marrying Australian men. The pattern of settlement has also been different from that of many other groups as these women tend to move into already established homes (Hugo & Channell, 1986). Nearly a quarter of Sydney's Philippine born population (10,900 persons) live in the Blacktown LGA (4.7% of that regions total population) whilst other high representations can be found in Auburn (2.8%), Botany (2.7%) and Ashfield (2.4%).

The immigration of people born in Vietnam is the largest part of the Asian component of Australia's migration since the 1970s. Sydney is at its focus. Many Vietnamese migrants were refugees from the Vietnam War and tended to form significant kinship and community support networks centering around the Fairfield LGA. Consequently Fairfield has the largest community (24,750 persons) and the highest representation of Vietnamese people in Sydney (13.6% of its population). There are settlements in the nearby LGAs of Auburn (7.4%), Marrickville (5.6%), Bankstown (5.5%) and Canterbury (4.0%). These five LGAs comprise 78 per cent of the total Vietnamese born population in Sydney, which also makes this group one of the most concentrated in the region.

One important, though numerically small group within Sydney, is that of the Indigenous Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders (ATSI). See Chart 3. Though only representing 0.8 per cent (30,800 persons) of the total population of Sydney in 1996, there are some significant local groups within the Metropolitan area. These provide cultural and community support, and have become a focus for growth. Two groups are located in the outer west and south-west ring of Sydney, with the large communities in Blacktown (4,950 persons) and Penrith (1,350 persons) forming one group, whilst the Tharawal community in Campbelltown (3,050 persons) and adjacent Liverpool (1,850 persons) form another. Two smaller, but symbolically important communities live closer to the CBD. One is in the Randwick LGA (1,350 persons) and the other in Redfern (1,720 persons). This suburb is immediately south of the CBD and has long been a site of urban Aboriginal activism.

Insert Chart 3 Here (Sydney Statistical Division - Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders 1996)

Although these statistics are not a complete description of all birthplace groups, they give an indication of Sydney's profound diversity. So too do the figures on the languages people speak at home. In 1996, 26.2 per cent of Sydney's residents reported speaking languages other than English (LOTE) at home. However, many LGAs have levels of LOTE significantly higher than the Sydney average. These are principally located in the inner and middle western suburbs, with the LGAs of Fairfield (64.1%), Auburn (62.6%), Canterbury (62.2%) and Burwood (50.0%), all having at least half their populations speaking a LOTE at home. It is also apparent that a continuous band of LGAs from Botany in the east, to Liverpool in the outer west, all have levels over one third of their population. See Chart 4.

The largest reported language groups were Chinese (4.3% of Sydney's population), Arabic/Lebanese (2.7%), Greek or Italian (2.4% each), Vietnamese (1.4%) and Spanish (1.2%). Though the Chinese language is not homogenous, as it includes the major dialects of Mandarin and Cantonese, as well as many others, it is considered as one group here. The pattern of residence is similar to that of the birthplace group, however the levels are at times twice that previously indicated. The largest representation is again in Auburn where 7.3 per cent were born in China but 15.6 per cent spoke Chinese in the home. Similarly, Burwood had 11.6 per cent language maintenance, again nearly twice its birthplace representation. However Ashfield, with the largest birthplace proportion (8.5%), had only 12.5 per cent language maintenance.

The spatial pattern of Arabic/Lebanese adherence has mirrored that of Lebanese settlements. Again LOTE levels are significantly higher than the birthplace groups, indicating the significant cultural/religious maintenance of these people. Canterbury had the highest representation (14.8%) which was over twice the birthplace level. This pattern was similar for Auburn (12.8%), Bankstown (12.7%), Parramatta (9.2%) and Holroyd (8.8%).

The five highest language maintenance areas where Greek was spoken are the same as the birthplace areas and similarly, the level of Greek spoken in the home is twice that of the birthplace level. Canterbury had the highest representation at 12.1 per cent of its population followed by Rockdale (9.9%), Marrickville (9.1%), Botany (8.7%) and Kogarah (7.7%). By contrast, the levels of Italian spoken in the home, the major European group in Australia, have not been as resilient amongst subsequent generations. However, the largest proportions are in the same geographic regions. Nearly 16 per cent of Drummoyne's population speak Italian at home, which is nearly 60 per cent higher than the birthplace group (9.6%). Similarly, Concord (13.0%), Ashfield (10.5%), Burwood (8.6%) and Fairfield (5.8%) all indicate a lower level of language maintenance than the previously discussed groups.

Insert Chart 4 Here (Sydney Statistical Division - Persons who speak a language other than English at home 1996)

The Vietnamese community has similar language adherence patterns as its birthplace distribution. This reflects the fact that it is a recently arrived immigrant group. Fairfield had the highest level in 1996 (12.9%) which was slightly below the birthplace level. This was followed by Bankstown and Marrickville (5.7% each) and then Canterbury (3.7%). The 5th largest concentration was in Auburn (3.4%) which is more than 50% below the birthplace group in this LGA (7.4%).

The final group to be mentioned is those persons of Spanish speaking backgrounds. The fact that they were not mentioned as a significant birthplace group is due to their global diversity. In Sydney, 4,300 people were born in Spain, but the city has also received migrants from Spanish speaking countries including South America and more recently, the Philippines. This has produced some inner ring Spanish language adherence in areas such as Botany (5.6% of the total population) as well as in the middle-ring areas of Fairfield (5.4%), Liverpool (3.3%) and Ashfield (2.0%).

Table 2: The ten LGAs in NSW with the highest proportions of people speaking a language other than English at home, 1996

LGAs	Population speaking a LOTE at home	Major language groups in order of size					
	Per cent	First	Second	Third	Forth	Fifth	Sixth
(1) **Fairfield**	67.5	English	Vietnamese	Chinese	Italian	Spanish	Arabic
(2) **Auburn**	67.4	English	Chinese	Arabic	Vietnamese	Turkish	Croatian
(3) **Canterbury**	66.1	English	Arabic	Greek	Chinese	Korean	Italian
(4) **Burwood**	54.2	English	Chinese	Italian	Greek	Korean	Hindi
(5) **Botany**	52.4	English	Greek	Spanish	Chinese	Arabic	Italian
(6) **Ashfield**	52.0	English	Chinese	Italian	Greek	Korean	Hindi
(7) **Marrickville**	51.4	English	Greek	Cantonese	Italian	Vietnamese	Portuguese
(8) **Strathfield**	51.1	English	Chinese	Italian	Greek	Korean	Hindi
(9) **Rockdale**	49.9	English	Greek	Chinese	Macedonian	Arabic	Italian
(10) **Bankstown**	43.7	English	Arabic	Vietnamese	Greek	Chinese	Italian

Source: ABS Census, 1996. Customised tables.

Note: (1) Chinese comprises several languages, the largest group being Cantonese.

(2) All language groups shown had at least 1000 members in each LGA.

Responding to multiculturalism: National legislative and policy measures

Even though Australia has always had a diverse population, its political institutions have until recently tended to operate as if society was homogeneously British. The Federal Governmentis *White Australia Policy* aimed to maintain cultural unity by discouraging the immigration of "coloured" people. It was actively supported by both major political parties throughout the first three quarters of the twentieth century. Moreover, this approach was followed by the attitude that migrant people were expected to "assimilate" to the dominant Anglo cultural norms. Both sets of policies failed to recognise the existence of indigenous Australians, who were not even considered to be legal citizens of the nation until a referendum in 1967.

Although demographic diversity in Australia has increased rapidly since the Second World War, its national political acknowledgment was apparent for the first time only with the publication of *A Multi-Cultural Society for the Future* (Grassby, 1973). A minister in the first left-wing government to be elected in the post-war period, Al Grassby was, to this day, one of the few non English speaking background (NESB) migrants to reach high political office. His publication recognised Australia's ethnic heterogeneity and suggested a model of cultural pluralism using the metaphor of a "family of the nation" (Grassby, 1973, 4). Later, a Federal Government report entitled *Multiculturalism for All Australians: Our Developing Neighbourhood* (Australian Council on Population and Ethnic Affairs, 1982) extended Grassby's analogy. This report advocated a model of cultural pluralism based upon principles of social cohesion, cultural identity, equality of opportunity and access, and primary loyalty and commitment to, and participation in, Australian society.

The *Galbally Report* was another national landmark statement which demanded a more systematic and flexible framework of migrant services (Review of Migrant Services and Programs, 1978). It established four core principles of federal multicultural policy in Australia: equal opportunity and access to services, maintenance of cultural heritage, modified mainstream services with ethno-specific programs where necessary, and client consultation and community self-help. Many of the most significant institutional developments in multicultural policy were taken from the *Galbally Report* and it formed the foundations of a significant change in the official construction of national identity.

Nevertheless, the shifts towards a multicultural national identity have been vigorously contested. In 1984, there was a national debate about the desirability of large-scale NESB immigration and the worthiness of multiculturalism as a model for Australian society (Lewins, 1987). A government investigation, numerous reports, and the implementation of new policies and programs resulted. This flurry of activity culminated in the *Jupp Report* which confirmed multiculturalism as the most sound ideal for Australian governance services (Committee of Review of Migrant and Multicultural Programs, 1986). Debate erupted again during 1988, when the conservative Federal Opposition Leader (now the Prime Minister of Australia) criticised levels of "Asian" immigration and aspects of multicultural policy (*The Sydney Morning Herald*, 1/8/88 and 20/8/88). The Federal Government at the time reaffirmed its commitment to a multicultural nation and issued a report entitled, *National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia* ...

Sharing Our Future (Office of Multicultural Affairs, 1989).

The National Agenda statement asserted that Australia should be defined as a multicultural nation, and that national identity should be dynamic and flexible. It defined multicultural policy as having three broad dimensions. These were:

the right to retain cultural identity and to express it;
the right to social justice and equal opportunity;
the need to fully utilise the economic potential and abilities of all Australians.

The *National Agenda* statement also imposed limits to Australian multiculturalism. It demanded from all Australians an over-riding commitment to the nation, the acceptance of the basic structures and principles of Australian society (law, respect for freedom of speech and religion, democracy and equality of the sexes) and acceptance of the right of others to express their culture and views (Office of Multicultural Affairs, 1989: vii).

The same Government issued a cultural policy statement in 1994, *Creative Nation* (Department of Communications and the Arts, 1994), which went even further. This statement posited Australia as a "hybrid" nation, composed of the mixing of "imported and home-grown cultures". This afforded particular importance to Australia's indigenous peoples, securing for them a specific contribution to national identity (Department of Communications and the Arts, 1994: 1,6). *Creative Nation* represents the most inclusive and complex government statement of Australian national identity ever articulated.

The new conservative Federal Government elected in March of 1996 has developed an ambivalence to the continued embrace of multiculturalism (McLeay, 1997). Reference has been made to a "disillusioned mainstream" whose history and institutions have been "demeaned" (Howard, 1995:11, 14; 1996: 2-3), as well as a so-called "politics of division" (Howard, 1995: 5, 17, 43). This Government has also instituted a review of multicultural policy, this time focusing on whether the term "multiculturalism" remained appropriate, and determining what the core values of Australian society should be (National Multicultural Advisory Council, 1997: 12-14). The reviewís terms of reference included the requirement that all subsequent recommendations be consistent with Government directions and priorities as follows:

a society united by common, values, goals and aspirations;
the advancement of the interests of the wider community, and hence the national interest, as distinct from the special interests of sectional groups;
to reaffirm the strength of the unifying values that Australians share (NMAC, 1997: 14).

At face value these principles seem laudable. However, they can be seen to be part of an assimilationist rhetoric which excludes those who are marked as culturally different from a presumed "mainstream". There is also an implied suggestion that multiculturalism has been about servicing the special interests of sectional groups at the expense of a "wider" or majority community. No evidence for such special treatment is provided, nor is the majority community ever defined, so it is difficult to engage with this implication.

In this rhetoric, governance which is sensitive to cultural difference risks being represented as culturally divisive. Ethno-specific service provision has been portrayed as "special treatment", and vilification legislation dismissed as a project of "political correctness". An independent member of Parliament recently picked up these themes, re-igniting a "race debate", in which the recognition and maintenance of cultural difference was criticised as "separatism" (Hanson, 1996, 3860-3862).

The citizenship of indigenous and Asian-Australians has been publicly questioned in this "race debate". Some opinion polls have reported disturbing levels of community support for these views. Multicultural identity, programs and planning have been publicly questioned. Once again, as in 1984 and 1988, multiculturalism in Australia must be explained, justified and advocated.

Responding to multiculturalism: state and local legislative and policy measures

Australia has three levels of government - federal, state and local. The latter is closely linked to the state level as many legal requirements for local government emanate from state legislature. Indeed, in NSW, local government exists by virtue of a State Act (*The Local Government Act*, 1919, revised in 1993). Local government is administered by councils under the direction of locally elected councillors, led by a mayor. In NSW, the most populous state in Australia, there are 177 councils. Significant legislation is in place to encourage local government to act responsively to its multicultural and diverse constituents (Thompson et al, 1998: 74-75). In 1987 the NSW Department of Local Government combined with the Ethnic Affairs Commission of NSW to help co-ordinate a *Local Ethnic Affairs Policy Statement* (LEAPS) project. LEAPS initiatives focused upon improving translation services, access to local government services and communication between government and different ethnic groups at the local level. This program was later reinforced with the legislative backing of the NSW *Charter of Principles for a Culturally Diverse Society* (Ethnic Affairs Commission NSW, 1993). These principles included:

participation in all levels of public life;
respect and accommodation of the culture, language and religion of others;
the greatest opportunity to make use of and participate in relevant activities and programs
  provided and/or administered by state government;
recognition and promotion of NSW's linguistic and cultural diversity as an asset.

The *Charter* required NSW state government departments and agencies to produce a *Statement of Intent* on how they planned to "diversify their policies and activities", as well as implement access and equity principles (EAC NSW, 1993: 1). NSW has incorporated this *Charter* into its local government legislation, requiring councils to "exercise their functions in a manner that is consistent with and actively promotes the principles of cultural diversity". Councils must also report annually on programs undertaken to promote services, as well as access to services for people with diverse cultural and linguistic backgrounds (*Local Government Act, 1993*: Sections 8(1) and 428 (2j)). These institutional requirements have compelled many organisations to confront the need for reform, and to embrace, rather than shrink from cultural difference.

Other State legislation acknowledges local government as a significant player in service provision for different ethnic and cultural groups. It also recognises the important role of encouraging participation in the processes of governance, especially through effective consultative techniques. Discrimination on the grounds of race is outlawed and the need has been established for special provisions to ensure equitable access to services and facilities. Most recently a new regulation was added to the NSW *Local Government Act* mandating local councils to develop a detailed social plan which integrates issues relating to indigenous and NESB people *(Local Government (General) Amendment (Community Social Plans) Regulation 1998*).

Immigrant participation in society: the response of local government

Local government in Australia has the unique opportunity to encourage the participation of immigrant groups in the processes of municipal governance. This involvement can extend from direct political representation to being in a position to access appropriate services and facilities available in a local area. We are engaged in an ongoing research project which is examining the ways in which local government has responded to the needs of a culturally diverse population. This is particularly important in Australia's most multicultural city, Sydney, where every local council has some degree of cultural diversity. In this section we discuss the ways in which local councils are modifying their practices and communication techniques to ensure that more immigrant groups can participate in the processes of local governance.

In a comprehensive questionnaire sent to councils across Australia, we asked respondents to identify the ways in which they endeavour to make services accessible and equitable. We found that many councils are working in a variety of innovative ways to reach both immigrant people and traditionally marginalised groups such as the poor, aged, disabled, youth, gays and women. One Sydney council acknowledged that multiculturalism "presents a challenge to deliver services in ways that are equitable and easily accessible to all residents". Nevertheless, it saw it had an ethical responsibility to go beyond employing specialist officers and supporting multicultural events and grants. It considered that a "holistic workplace change in culture" was necessary.

> It is about a new way of thinking and acting… it is about working from a social justice framework… Access is about providing all our citizens with the same opportunities to maximise quality of life objectives. Equity… is about recognising that although all citizens are meant to be equal in their rights and in the way they are treated by government, they are in fact very different in their needs, interests and values. Treating everybody the same simply perpetuates existing inequalities… intervention must provide appropriate rules, programs and service provision to combat barriers on social markers concerned with language, culture, race or religion, [and] gender, if we are to provide a socially just customer service commitment to our NESB community (Liverpool City Council, 1998-99: 2).

Access and equity policies, as they are known, range from culturally sensitive employment programs to specific staff training, the widespread use of translation and interpreter services, communication strategies, and data gathering and review techniques (Blackwell, 1994). Our survey revealed that many councils are making use of various initiatives, although this is somewhat ad-hoc and uneven.

The recruitment and training of staff is a key area in developing accessible and equitable service provision (Blackwell, 1994: 12). Local government cannot develop cultural sensitivity if it does not have appropriately skilled officers able to develop policies and practices that acknowledge diversity. Only 11 per cent of all respondents had an access and equity officer, with more in urban areas (22.7%) compared with non-metropolitan (6.3%). We did, however find council-wide attempts to expand the diversity of staff by providing a culturally aware and sensitive work environment. Eighty four per cent of respondent councils had equal employment opportunity (EEO) policies. These aim to remove structural and attitudinal impediments to employment and to treat all employees fairly (Blackwell, 1994: 13). EEO tackles unfair or biased practices affecting workers, as well as ensuring that management decisions are fair. It also encompasses policy and practices which recognise and nurture the diversity of staff who can then deliver the best possible service.

Of those councils surveyed, only a few hire specialist personnel such as disability workers, community development officers and ethnic and indigenous liaison officers to deal with specific multicultural and diversity needs. However, the workforce in some councils is fairly representative of the local ethnic population. We found many examples of customer service teams with bilingual staff trained to offer assistance as language aides. Councils also reported working closely with migrant resource and neighbourhood centres to enhance their sensitivity to the needs of different groups living in their regions.

Twenty five per cent of General Managers estimated that their staff are trained about access and equity issues. These respondents identified a range of training activities including education in cross cultural communication, customer service courses and individually tailored programs to raise awareness levels of the needs of various ethnic and indigenous communities. Some training was done in-house and some by specialists and different government departments. There did not appear to be any institutionalised access and equity training programs. Nevertheless, General Managers identified definite successes including the appointment of language aides and the establishment of clear procedures for translations and the use of interpreters. Community Services staff rated themselves as having the best knowledge of access and equity policies (77 per cent either excellent or good), followed by Town Planning and Health, both with 59 per cent, and Engineering with 53 per cent. While this is a reasonable indication that access and equity training programs are working, there are still many council employees who have a very poor understanding.

Use of interpreting and related services

> …the lack of English is the greatest barrier to access to services and participation in the local community (Blackwell, 1994: 27).

> It is important for Council to know [the] composition and languages of its local area so appropriate communication strategies are put in place and all residents have equal access

to Council services (Town Planner, metropolitan NSW in Thompson et al, 1998: 46).

Councils have a responsibility to ensure that they appropriately and adequately inform all residents about the services available to them. In multicultural communities this necessitates the use of properly resourced translation and interpreting services. Suitably qualified staff are also critical. In addition, state and commonwealth governments publish brochures for local government distribution in community languages. These include explaining town planning policy, advising restaurants and shops about correct food handling procedures and educating people about health issues. Many councils reported using these resources as well as helping each other to develop better communication strategies with their ethnic and indigenous communities.

However, we were surprised to find that some respondents failed to see any need to offer translation and interpreter services, suggesting that it was the responsibility of migrants to learn English. One council officer said, ìEveryone in Australia should be able to speak and read English. Those that canít should be educatedî (Thompson, et al, 1998: 48). Given the extent of diversity across the nation, to say nothing of recent Federal Government cuts to English language courses, this is an unreasonable expectation and will only result in barriers to accessing services.

The adoption of a plain English policy for official correspondence, documents and regulations is an integral part of any broad based communication strategy. Our research revealed that 61 per cent of Town Planning, 40 per cent of Community Services, 52 per cent of Health and 50 per cent of Engineering departments used plain English. Nevertheless, perceptions of what constitutes plain English vary, and some documents may unwittingly include jargon and technical language.

Expanding usage of council services

Some councils set targets for expanding the usage levels of their programs by all community groups. Thirty per cent of Community Service departments did this, compared with eleven per cent of Health, four per cent of Town Planning and three per cent of Engineering. Our survey results show a wealth of different ways in which councils try to reach specific cultural groups.

Some town planners work through the consultation process to specifically target different cultural groups. As one Sydney council planner stated, "In exhibiting planning related material we target the ethnic groups which would be affected and prepare translations or use language aides to ensure they have the opportunity to comment" (Thompson, 1998: 49). They may also use special programs and officers, cultural or community networks, general customer service improvements in accessibility and in some cases, the development of cultural and economic policy statements.

Many Council Health departments have been trying to increase child immunisation rates, often with the help of local ethnic workers. Some departments undertake training in food handling for small businesses, focusing on specific ethnic groups. Rubbish removal and recycling are also areas of concern. Multi-lingual pamphlets are frequently used to help educate the community about waste reduction. Educational programs have also been run for particular ethnic groups and range from anti-drug programs and women's health advice, to videos about local government processes and activities.

Community Services departments reach local groups in a variety of ways. These include employing specialist officers to research, understand and target disadvantaged and marginalised community groups. Some councils provide part-time staff to work in the community as well as with different organisations such as migrant resource centres. Survey respondents also cited examples of where they fund training for different service providers to help raise levels of cultural awareness. Senior citizens have been the subject of special programs such as fostering greater participation by different ethnic groups in senior citizen centres, providing special recreational activities and supplying culturally appropriate home delivered meals (known as "meals on wheels").

Local Council Engineering departments have also developed inclusionary practices. Brochures were produced in community languages to inform residents of the availability of services and how to access them. Education programs in road and vehicular safety were also used. We found examples of multi-lingual instructional brochures to increase child restraint use in cars. Traffic and parking proposals were sometimes advertised in other languages and children were targeted in an effort to reduce pedestrian and bicycle accidents.

Many councils have published NESB and indigenous ìcommunity profilesî, recognising different needs and identifying appropriate services. In some areas, particularly disadvantaged groups are targeted in order to improve their access to services and facilities. For example, ethno-specific youth development programs have been instituted. Local libraries are often a focus point for the dissemination of information packages and the provision of multi-lingual material. Child care centres have developed anti-bias curricula and other culturally appropriate services.

Local government also has a role in giving support to ethnic communities to assist them in fund raising and grant capture. In addition, many councils have established regular community consultative committees for indigenous and immigrant groups. These are designed to promote the involvement of indigenous and non-English speaking background people in developing culturally appropriate services as well as encouraging their participation in the management of services and programs, and the development of policy and legislative responses.

Information gathering techniques

Data collection, as part and parcel of a systematic research program, must be the cornerstone of local government policy development and implementation. Not only should a council know who makes up its community, but it needs to closely monitor service usage levels. We asked councils about their use of techniques for assessing diversity levels and community perspectives on local issues. We also examined their review mechanisms.

As well as the many traditional research and data collection techniques, councils employ a variety of formal mechanisms to gather alternative perspectives on local issues. These include liaison officers, forums, workshops and advisory / consultative committees. Directories of religious and ethnic community organisations are valuable for identifying particular community representatives. Access and equity implementation guides (for example, Blackwell, 1994) are also helpful in giving councils ideas about inclusionary practices and policy development.

Regular reviews of which ethnic groups use department services need to be part of council practice. Without a systemic process it is very difficult to measure what is really happening, or to argue for the allocation of additional resources. Some councils have institutionalised review mechanisms which involve examining and reporting on ethnicity data censuses, as well as conducting regular user needs surveys, gathering customer feedback and collecting client statistics. In some cases, an issue is examined in relation to the needs of different cultural groups (for example, domestic violence). And some councils take note the number of specific ethnic or indigenous users of a facility.

Opening up council services and processes to the community

Our survey findings suggest that community participation and consultation techniques are widely used in Australian local government (Thompson et al, 1998: 54). However, the act of asking people for their views on plans, policies, program design and development proposals, does not guarantee that those opinions are carefully considered and incorporated into the decision making process. Nor can we be sure that all community groups feel comfortable using the participation techniques offered. The rhetoric of participation is sometimes used without special commitment to empowering the community (Filippeli, 1989). This results in a frustrating and alienating process. Nevertheless, we found a high level of usage of various participation techniques including publications, public meetings, advertising, research / project officers, polling, surveys, focus groups or workshops, public inquiries, consultative committees, discussion papers, advisory committees, and seminars and conferences.

We also found that councils utilise a wide range of different sites or representatives to assist them in communicating with multiple cultural groups. This indicates an awareness of the need to go outside the traditional information sharing modes in order to reach more people in the community. Some of the sites and representatives include council inquiry counters, social and sporting clubs, libraries, religious centres and schools, community centres, ethnic day schools, child care centres, ethnic print media and radio, post offices and banks, health centres, ethnic organisations, citizenship ceremonies, migrant resource centres, English classes and specialist indigenous land, health and legal services.

Council meetings are where formal decisions are made and it is important that the community is encouraged to participate at this level. Some councils **actively** encourage indigenous and immigrant people to attend their meetings. Strategies include personally approaching and inviting community members to participate. Information about council meetings is distributed through the ethnic media and special efforts may be made if the issue to be discussed and voted on, is especially culturally sensitive. Respondents also reported examples of encouraging non-English speaking background and indigenous individuals to stand for election to become local representatives or councillors. In turn, this encourages greater participation of these groups in every aspect of local governance.

Conclusion and future research directions

> This council does not have a large ethnic population. However, we do have a very comprehensive social plan which includes ethnic employment targets and also [our] EEO plan has similar requirements (Engineer, metropolitan NSW).

In our research on local government and multiculturalism we have found a growing commitment to implementing policies and programs of inclusion to ensure that people from different cultural backgrounds are afforded the opportunity to participate in the processes of local governance. This is particularly noticeable in the cities of Melbourne and Sydney where there are significant levels of diversity. Given such profound and widespread levels of cultural diversity, local government in Australia must institute a systematic response to the needs of different groups. Not only should councils develop an awareness of the nature of their local diversity, they have to identify and abandon discriminatory and iniquitous practices in the provision of services and facilities. An ad-hoc approach is no longer sustainable. Even in those areas which have lower percentages of immigrant groups, there is an emerging realisation that an appropriate response is required.

But still there are pockets of resistance from every level of government. In our review of legislative and policy responses to multiculturalism, we have described some of the landmark political statements made by right and left wing Australian governments over the years. Nevertheless, the most recent debates at the Federal level suggest a shying away from multiculturalism and a turning back to assimilationist positions. However, the recent history of multiculturalism suggests that the "Multicultural Project" will emerge stronger and more entrenched than ever. The widespread acceptance of a shift in national identity indicates that a most important change has been made. The criticisms, or "backwashes and eddies" (Morrissey and Mitchell, 1993: 22-5), provide a platform for researchers and policy makers, community members and citizens to develop and reaffirm the principles and practices of multiculturalism.

Our research has revealed a wealth of innovative local policy and practice in the provision of accessible and equitable services and facilities to reach non-English speaking background immigrant and indigenous groups. These extend from training staff, to employing specialist officers, and implementing creative practices to expand the usage of council services. As residents, all members of the community have a right of service and participation. To refuse to acknowledge these rights is to effectively deny citizenship.

Our research has produced a comprehensive list of recommendations across the three levels of government. Not only do these posit further options for study, they also make suggestions about practical approaches to policy development and implementation. In particular, we are interested in further researching examples of good practice which are currently being used by councils to reach immigrant and indigenous groups. We are also concerned about the inadequate funding mechanisms available at the local government level and the ways in which money is distributed. Staff training in cross cultural awareness is another area warranting attention. Our research suggests that council officers currently involved with the community are well placed to assist their colleagues in other departments. Resource kits to assist in both policy development and practical program implementation must also be investigated and devised for use by local councils.

In the next phase of our research project we turn to the community to assess its perception of how well multicultural policies are working at the local government level. Together with the findings from the first part of our work, we will be able to evaluate local governmentís responsiveness to cultural diversity and make recommendations for enhanced local citizenship which will both celebrate diversity and embrace principles of social justice.

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Chart 1: Sydney Statistical Division
Local Government Areas


Gosford
Wyong
Hawkesbury
N
W
E
S
Blue Mountains
Baulkham Hills
Hornsby
Warringah
Pittwater
Concord
Willoughby
Hunter's Hill
Lane Cove
Manly
North Sydney
Mosman
Drummoyne
Leichhardt
Woollahra
Strathfield
Burwood
Waverley
Sydney/South Sydney
Ashfield
Marrickville
Randwick
Botany
Canterbury
Rockdale
Kogarah
Ku-ring-gai
Penrith
Blacktown
Parramatta
Ryde
Holroyd
Auburn
Fairfield
Liverpool
Bankstown
Hurstville
Camden
Campbelltown
Sutherland
Wollondilly
0
10
20
Kilometers

Chart2: Sydney Statistical Division
Overseas Born Persons


Gosford
14.2
Wyong
12.0
N
W
E
S
0
10
20
Kilometers
Hawkesbury
14.5
Blue
Mountains
17.5
Wollondilly
14.4
Percent Overseas Born Person
■ 46.5 to 53.7
■ 36.6 to 46.5
■ 32.9 to 36.6
▨ 28.9 to 32.9
□ 17.0 to 28.9

Chart 3: Sydney Statistical Division
Persons Speaking Language Other Than English at Home (1996)


0
10
20
Kilometers
Gosford
3.6
Wyong
3.0
Hawkesbury
5.7
Blue
Mountains
4.6
Wollondilly
5.3
Percent Speaks LOTE (1996)
50.0 to 64.1
45.3 to 50.0
32.3 to 45.3
21.2 to 32.3
8.7 to 21.2

Chart 4: Sydney Statistical Division
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Persons (1996)


0
10
20
Kilometers
Gosford
1551
Wyong
1727
Hawkesbury
747
Blue
Mountains
689
Wollondilly
449
ATSI Persons
3,050 to 4,960
1,860 to 3,050
1,180 to 1,860
620 to 1,180
20 to 620

JEWS, ARABS, RUSSIANS AND FOREIGNERS IN AN ISRAELI CITY: ETHNIC DIVISIONS AND THE RESTRUCTURING ECONOMY OF TEL-AVIV:

1983-1996

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JEWS, ARABS, RUSSIANS AND FOREIGNERS IN AN ISRAELI CITY: ETHNIC DIVISIONS AND THE RESTRUCTURING ECONOMY OF TEL-AVIV:

1983-1996

1. Introduction

The question of growing inequality and polarization in cities and of the emergence of deep division lines and their relationship with immigration on the one hand and with economic processes on the other hand have been at the focus of interest for a long time ((Mollenkopf and Castells 1991; Fainstein et. al 1992; Waldinger 1996b; Hamnett 1996, 1996; Bruegel 1996).

In the following I will present the major lines of emerging new ethnic division of labor in Tel Aviv, in the context of large waves of migration to and from the city and urban economic restructuring. Similar to other urban metropolitan centers, Tel Aviv has experienced significant demographic changes in the recent decades. Between the years 1961 and 1988, the city lost approximately 18 percent of its population. The late-1980's marked a reversal in the trend, with the city experiencing in-migration as well as a large influx of both new immigrants and foreign labor migrants, leading to an increase in population by approximately 20 percent. The growth in population is occurring at the same time that the city has been experiencing economic changes leading to the restructuring of its economy.

What follows falls into three parts: First data on the demographic flows and economic restructuring in Tel Aviv will be outlined and analyzed. Then some data on the economic restructuring of the city will be presented an analysis of the new ethnic division of labor in the city that emerged during the 1990's will be presented.

Ethnic Divisions in Israel and Tel-Aviv

Israel is considered to be a multi cleavage society on the basis of several lines of division. It is also a society of immigrants, with over half of the Jewish population born outside the country. The Jewish population is distinguished by two major categories, each one comprising about half of this population: Israelis of European descent, known as Ashkenazie, and the Israelis of Asian-African origin, referred to as the Mizrachim.

This geo-cultural division line has a clear stratification dimension, with the Ashkenazie Israelis enjoying an advantaged position in terms of jobs, education and income as compared to the Mizrachi Israelis. The question of the persistence of stratification gaps between these two large population groups has been the subject of extensive research in Israel (Semyonov 1997, Haberfeld 1993, Shavit 1984) The residential concentration of the Mizrachim in the periphery of the country is considered one of the factors contributing to the persistence of the ethnic gap. (Spilerman and Habib, 1976).

Another major line of ethnic division in Israel exists between the Jewish population and the Israeli Arab population. About 83% of the population of Israel is Jewish and the rest are Arab Moslems and Christians. The line of division among Jews and Arabs has religious, citizenship status, stratificational and spatial dimensions (Semyonov and Lewin Epstein 1987; Smooha 1990; Herzog and Shamir 1996). In the 1990s, Israel experienced a large wave of migration, comprising of two groups: a large influx of

Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union and a large wave of foreign workers whose stay in Israel is considered temporary.

Research on Israeli society is cast in terms of these ethnic cleavages, and they provide the framework for the analysis of changes in the ethnic division of labor in Tel Aviv. Before turning to this analysis some data regarding economic restructuring in Tel Aviv is presented.

Economic structure and economic restructuring in Tel Aviv

In recent decades the economy of Tel Aviv has undergone changes similar to those that have occurred in other cities experiencing occupational and spatial restructuring. Table 1 presents the distribution of employed in Tel Aviv by the economic sectors and tracks the changes in the city's economy from the period 1975 to 1994 and highlights the trends discussed above.

Table 1

Distribution of employed in Tel Aviv by economic branch 1975-1994

Year	**1975**	**1983**	**1989**	**1994**
Total Employed in Tel Aviv	244,400 100.0	256,000 100.0	259,600 100.0	320,500 100.0
Manufacturing industry % share	57,800 23.6	50,000 19.7	44,600 17.2	50,100 15.6
Construction % share	13,800 5.6	9,500 3.7	7,600 3.6	16,200 5.1

Commerce Restaurants, hotels % share	40,500 16.6	48,600 19.0	53,300 20.5	61,300 19.1
Transportation % share	20,200 8.3	17,000 6.7	18,400 7.1	22,300 7.6
Finance and business services % share	38,000 15.3	58,700 22.9	62,800 24.2	75,900 23.7
Gov. and public services % share	55,000 22.7	52,700 20.6	53,100 20.5	65,800 20.5
Personal services % share	15,000 6.1	13,700 5.3	16,800 6.5	24,600 7.7
Other % share	3600 1.4	5,200 2.1	3,000 1.1	4,300 1.3

As it may be seen, between 1975 and 1989, the number of jobs in Tel Aviv rose from 244,000 to 259,600, representing an increase of 8.1%. After 1989, the job growth rate intensified and employment numbers grew by a much higher rate of 23.4%, from 259,600 jobs in 1989 to 320,500 by 1994. Thus the early 1990s are clearly an era of revival in the city.

The overall economic growth does conceal important differences between various sectors of the urban economy, for while some sectors have enjoyed uniform growth, other industries have suffered a decline. The financial and business services clearly represent a growing sector, for while in 1975, 38,000 were employed in the sector, by 1994, 75,900 were employed, representing an increase by 99.7 percent. Other growing sectors include the retail, hotel, and restaurant sector, which increased by 51 percent from 1975 to 1994, and the personal services sector, which has increased by 64% over the same period. The number of those employed in manufacturing, on the other hand, declined from 1975 to 1991, by 29.1 percent. Coinciding with the arrival of many immigrants who found employment in manufacturing such as garment factories, the number of manufacturing jobs increased again from the years 1991 to 1994 by 14.9 percent.

The combination of the above factors indicate that Tel Aviv is going through an economic restructuring process since the mid 1980s, thereby enabling the application of the restructuring hypotheses in the further analysis of the city.

Population flows and the changing ethnic composition of Tel Aviv 1972-1994

In 1948, after the state of Israel was established, Tel Aviv's Jewish population numbered 248,000. Growing throughout the 1950's Tel Aviv reached a peak of 386,000 residents in 1961. The next two decades were then characterized by a negative immigration balance and the city experienced a dwindling of its population by 18 percent. In 1988 the city numbered 317,000 inhabitants.

The migration flows and other demographic processes that took place altered the structure of the labor force in Tel Aviv in terms of ethnic group representation. Table 2 presents changes in the ethnic composition according to the geocultural group and citizenship status.

Table 2
Tel Aviv population: changes by geocultural origin, period of arrival and citizenship status 1983-1994 (percentage)

Citizenship status	Origin	1983	1989	1994	1996
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	

Israeli citizens	AsAf	38.0%	38.3%	37.0%	
Israeli citizens	EuAm	54.1%	49.1%	42.0%	
Israeli citizens	Israel	5.6%	8.8%	10.1%	
Israeli citizens	Israeli Arabs	2.3%	2.9%	3.3%	
Israeli citizens	Russian immigs.	--	--	7.4%	
Not citizens :temporary residents or illigal	Labor migrants	--	--	--	~30,000 %~
Total population		327,265	321,715	355,197	~

Jewish veteran immigrants

Until 1988 one major ethnic division line in the city was that within the Jewish population, between the Jews who arrived from European countries and those who arrived from Asian and African countries (Ashkenazie and Mizrachim in the city). The proportion of those of European-American origin in the labor force decreased from 54 percent in 1983 to 42 percent in 1994.

Regarding the geocultural split among the Jewish population the questions arise:

A. How do the gaps between the Ashkenazie and Mizrachim in the city change?

B. How do the gaps between the groups within the city compare to the gaps between Ashkenazie and Mizrachim in the country as a whole?

The Arab Minority

A second major division line was that between the Jewish population and the Arab population in the city. The Arab population numbered about 3,000 residents in 1948, as most of the 70,000 Arabs who resided in Jaffa sought refuge in neighboring Arab countries during the 1948 war. The Arab population reached the size of about 15,000 in the 1990s. It is a small ethnic minority consisting in 1994 approximately 4.6% of the total city population. The interesting question is what changes occurred in the socioeconomic status of the urban Arab minority as compared to its situation all over the country? The restructuring approach predicts that native minorities may face a decline of opportunities in urban restructuring economies (Waldinger 1992).

The New Immigrants of the 1990s'

The year 1989 marked the beginning of a new phase in the demographic transformation of the city. Between 1989 and 1994, the city experienced a large influx of Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union who received citizenship upon arrival. This was part of large wave of immigration to Israel starting in 1989 which by 1994 added about 548,000 new citizens to the country. About 35,000 of them turned to the city of Tel Aviv, adding approximately 10% to the city population within a period of five years.

Upon arrithese immigrants were characterized with outstanding high human capital, with approximately two thirds of them holding academic degrees, mainly in scientific and technical areas (Israel, 1997). The two largest groups of occupations among them were engineering and medicine. It was a major government priority to ensure the successful occupational integration of these immigrants. Generous governmental support was provided for job retraining and government-funded incentives were offered to employers to hire immigrants. Local municipal governments, competing to attract these highly educated immigrants, made efforts to help integrate immigrants into their local economies and lead them to choose its location for permanent residence.

The question then arises: how did the immigrants that chose to reside in Tel Aviv do with regard to occupational and economic achievements when compared to those in other locations? The occupational integration of this highly qualified flow of immigrants into the urban restructuring economy in Tel Aviv is of much interest and may shed light on the theoretical controversies regarding the questions of the fit of immigrants and restructuring urban economies (Kasarda 1983; Sassen 1991; Waldinger 1992).

Foreign Workers in the 1990s

The city also experienced a large influx of foreign workers who began arriving to Tel Aviv in the mid 1990s. Foreign workers began coming in large numbers to Israel since the early 1990s. Legal foreign workers numbered in 1996 about 103,000 persons and they constituted 5.1 percent of the total population employed in Israel. (Kondor 1997; Bartram 1998). In addition it is estimated that a similar number of foreign workers stay in Israel on illegal terms, having outstayed their permits. Those labor migrants who are illegal or undocumented, face daily fears of being expelled from the country. As a result of poor governmental control, labor migrants do not benefit any of the social security rights that are guaranteed to non citizens (Kondor 1997). Due to the nature of their status, labor migrants represent a new vulnerable minority in Israel.

The city of Tel Aviv houses a very high share of these workers both in relative and absolute terms. In fact large areas in the city are known as foreign workers' neighborhoods (Bartram 1998: 311). While no systematic survey of these worker has been taken yet in the city, officials estimate that at least 30,000 foreign workers currently reside within the municipal boundaries of the city and they add about 9 percent to the city's population (Municipal report 1997). The labor migrants in the city represent a variety of nationalities and religions, including Eastern European countries, such as Rumania, Asian countries such as the Philippines, Latin America , and African countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. The analysis of this group of migrants will enable us to deal with the theoretical issue of the possible emergence of an urban underclass.

Taking place in an era of urban economic restructuring, the demographic compositional changes in the city have the potential to produce a new ethnic division of labor. The major theoretical questions that will lead the examination of the changes in the occupational opportunities of the ethnic groups in Tel Aviv are:

1. To what extent does the occupational and income polarization characterize Tel Aviv in comparison to the rest of the country?
2. How does the restructuring process affect veteran Jewish population, the Arab local population, and the recent immigrants from the former Soviet Union?
3. Does the pattern of the occupational integration of the recent immigrants from the former Soviet Union fit the predictions of the urban economic restructuring approach?
4. Does the arrival of the foreign workers to Tel Aviv mark the emergence of an urban underclass ?

The analysis is based on the census of 1983 and labor force surveys.

Polarization in a restructuring urban economy

First the data regarding whole city population is displayed.

Income gaps are a major aspect of the polarization process. The lowest average incomes were found in personal services, both in the city and the country as a whole. The gaps between the highest income occupational category (managerial jobs) and the lowest one (services) were lower in 1983 in the whole country than in 1994. But the gaps in Tel -Aviv became more pronounced in 1994 (5.9) compared to the national figure (4.6) The ratio of gaps between 1983 and 1994 all over the country was 1.26 while in Tel Aviv it amounted to 1.50. (See figure 1)

Figure 1 about here

Table 3 presents the changes that occurred in the occupational distributions in Tel Aviv and the country as whole during the period 1983-1994. As it may seen both on the city level and the national level the midlevel occupations categories declined between 1983 and 1994. However the decline in the midlevel occupational categories in Tel Aviv is much more pronounced than on the national level. Within the span of 11 years, midlevel occupational among the veteran population in the city decreased in 10.3 percent whereas on the national level it declined in 5.3 percent. Thus is may be said that occupational polarization in the city is more intensive than in the country as a whole. It is also apparent that the influx of immigrants in the 1990s' (not including migrant workers) still increased occupational polarization in the city as compared to the country as a whole. This issue will be discussed in more details below.

Table 3: Proportion of occupational change and polarization measure in Israel and in Tel Aviv 1983-1994

	1983	**1994(not including new immigrants of 1990s**	**%point change 1983-1994**	**1994(including new immigrants of the 1990s)**	**%point change 1983-1994**
Israel					

N	158,108	35,394		40,541	
	100.0	100.0		100.0	
High SES occupations	31.3	34.5	+3.2	33.5	+2.2
Mid level occupations	42.4	37.1	-5.3	36.0	-6.4
Low SES occupations	26.3	28.4	+2.1	30.5	+4.2
Tel Aviv					
N	31,093	2947		3305	
	100.0	100.0		100.0	
High SES occupations	31.3	40.3	+9.0	38.2	+6.9
Mid level occupations	48.1	37.8	-10.3	35.9	-12.2
Low SES occupations	20.6	21.9	+1.3	25.9	+5.3

x2=555.6 Sig= .0000

Ethnic division of labor in Tel-Aviv: 1983-1994

Ethnic differences among the Jewish population: Ashkenazie and Mizrachim

As aforementioned, the geocultural split among the Jewish population Ashkenazie (European-American origin) and Mizrachim (Asian-African origin) is of major importance in Israel. The population of European-American origin (EA) and Asian-African origin (ASAF) groups in the city are compared over the period of three decades, and these results are then compared to the ethnic gaps among the Jewish population in Israel during the same period. Three dimensions of the socioeconomic realms will be compared: representation in occupations, economic sectors and income gaps.

Table 4 shows the representation of the geo-cultural groups in Israel and Tel Aviv in the three upper levels of the occupational scale: academic, professional and managerial jobs.

Table 4: Percent in Academic, professional and managerial occupations by geo-cultural origin of those residing and working in Israel and Tel Aviv 1983,1989,1994.

	Israel			Tel Aviv		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
% in Acad., prof. And mangl. Occup	AsAf	EA	Gaps (2-1) (1\2)	AsAf	EA	Gap (5-4) (4\5)
1983	19.2	42.6	23.4 (0.45)	15.0	42.3	27.3 (0.35)
1989	20.8	46.6	25.8 (0.45)	17.4	46.2	28.8 (0.37)
1994	23.6	48.8	25.3 (0.48)	20.8	50.5	29.7 (0.41)

As it may be readily noted the gap between the representation of the population of European-American origin and those of Asian-African origin in academic, scientific, professional and managerial occupations is larger in Tel Aviv than in the rest of the country in the three points of comparison: 1983, 1989 and 1994. This results from both a lower representation of those of Asian-African origin in Tel Aviv than in other parts of the country in the high levels of the occupational scale, and a larger representation of those of European-American origin in Tel Aviv than in Israel in those occupations. Table 5 presents the distribution among high mid and low occupations and figure 2 presents the relevant graph

Figure 2 about here

Table 5

Occupational Polarization by Geocultural origin and locality -1994

	Jewish Veteran	Asia-African origin	Europe-American Origin	Israeli Arabs	Russian Immigrants

Israel	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
High level occups	33.6	23.6	48.6	37.1	24.5
Mid level occups	39.2	44.6	36.2	25.5	32.1
Low level occups	27.2	31.8	15.2	37.4	43.4
N	32,555	15,801	14,110	342	3318
Tel Aviv					
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
High level occups	35.7	20.2	50.8	24.2	29.3
Mid level occups	42.3	44.7	34.9	22.9	25.2
Low level occups	22.0	35.1	14.3	52.9	45.5
N	2269	882	1,158	70	335

The analysis of income further established the contention of higher gaps in the city than at the national level among the geo cultural categories. As Table 6 and figure 3 shows the gaps in Tel Aviv of 1994 are considerably larger than all over the country, compared to 1989 when those gaps equaled. The larger gap in the city results from the considerably higher incomes of those of European-American origin who reside and work in Tel Aviv compared to their incomes in the country all over. This may reflect the observation that they are much more represented in the expanding and lucrative sectors of the city such as finance, banking and business and in managerial occupations.

Figure 3 about here

Table 6:

Income differences among geocultural groups in Israel and Tel Aviv in 1983,1989 and 1994

	Israel		Tel Aviv	
	AsAf	EuAm	AsAf	EuAm
1983 (Old Shekel)				
Monthly Income	28,895.29 (26,404.62)	38,752.10 (40673.10)	27,955 (29,696)	41,537 (51,201)
Ratio AsAf\EuAm	74.5		67.3	

1989 (NIS)				
Monthly Income	1832.96 (1347.26)	2415.8 (1935.4)	1865.59 (1449.4)	2458.2 (2121.3)
Ratio AsAf\EuAm	74.3		76.1	
1994 (NIS)				
Monthly Income	3745.2 (3637.8)	4258.3 (4242.5)	3637.9 (3816.7)	4521.2 (5668.1)
Ratio AsAf\EuAm	87.9		80.4	

Furthermore, as it may be seen below in Table 7 which presents incomes by branches and occupations of the geocultural groups, the lower incomes of those of Asian and African origin result not only from them being concentrated more heavily icertain branches and occupation, but also from the fact that in each sector or occupation they earn less than the Europeans. The gaps with this respect are larger in Tel Aviv than in the country as a whole.

Table 7
Average incomes by economic sectors and occupational categories by geocultural origin and place of residence -1994 (in NIS)

	AsAf		EuAm			AsAf		EuAm	
	Israel	Tel Aviv	Israel	Tel Aviv		Israel	Tel Aviv	Israel	Tel
Year									
Sector					**occup**				
Manufa.	3,416	2.669	4,383	4,870	**Acad,**	4,687	3,734	6,696	5,99
Indus.	4,657	5,259	6,315	6,607	**Prof, Tech**	4,127	4,322	4,495	4,99
Constr	4,450	3,427	5,829	2,163	**Manag.**	8,542	9,928	9,718	12,1
Commer&Rest&Hotels.	3,316	4,063	4,869	7,078	**Cler.**	3,584	3,402	3,937	3,84
Trans.	4,696	4,514	5,867	4,776	**Sales**	3,875	4,569	4,760	5,54
7Financ&Bus. Serv.	4,368	4,092	5,974	6,627	**Services**	2,123	1,916	2,159	1,97
Public Sev.	3,452	2,775	4,498	4,050	**Skiled Wo**	3,845	3,098	4,532	3,96

Person.Ser.	2,337	2,846	2,391	2,953	**Semi skil**	3,717	2,982	4,301	2,44
					Un skil	2,126	1,173	2,874	1,91

Ethnic minority in a restructuring urban economy: the Arab residents in Tel Aviv

As aforementioned, studies on the Arab citizens in Israel attest to their subordinate socioeconomic status. The situation of the Arab residents of the city of Tel Aviv is not significantly different.

Compared to the Jewish residents, Arab citizens of Tel Aviv have lower education, occupational status and income, thereby constituting the veteran group with the lowest social standing in the city. Yet, at the same time, until the mid 1980s', the Arab residents of Tel Aviv enjoyed a advantaged status compared to Arab residents in other cities in Israel, in terms of occupational status and incomes. However, since the early 1990s, an analysis of Labor Force Surveys of 1991,1992 and 1993 (Semyonov et al 1997) shows that, as opposed to in the past, the local Arab population, as compared to Arabs residing in other Israeli cities, has both lower representation in academic occupations, and lower income returns on education and occupation. A sharp decline in the percentage of local Arab employed in public services and governmental jobs, the authors claim, may be one of the reasons for this deterioration of status.

The data regarding 1994 examined in the present research shows the continuation of the trend described above. The degree of occupational polarization for the year 1994 (see table 7 column 4) shows that among the Arab residents of the city occupational polarization is wider as compared to that of Israeli Arab citizens in other Israeli cities in 1994.

The immigrants from the former Soviet Union in Tel Aviv

This section analyzes patterns of occupational integration of new immigrants of the 1990s' from the former USSR, residing and employed in Tel Aviv and in other part of Israel in comparison to the veteran population in Israel and in Tel Aviv. As it can readily be observed in Table 8, the occupational distribution of the immigrants in Tel Aviv is strikingly different from the general Tel Aviv labor force, and also differs substantially from immigrants from the former Soviet Union in other parts of the country. The most pronounced difference is the high concentration of Tel Aviv immigrant's concentration in low status service jobs. This is expressed in the comparison of the immigrants both to the general Tel Aviv labor force and to immigrants all over Israel. Among the Tel Aviv immigrants, we find that more than forty percent were employed in 1994 in service works, most of them as janitors, institutional and home nursing and domestic aid.

Table 8

Occupation in Israel of Russian new immigrants and veteran Israelis, age 25-65 1992, 1994, total population and Tel Aviv residents (percentage)

	Veteran Population				Russian Immigrants			
	Tel Aviv		Israel		Tel-Aviv		Israel	
	1992	1994	1992	1994	1992	1994	1992	1994
Occupation								
Academic	11.6	14.4	10.4	10.4	5.7	7.3	9.6	10.8
Professional	18.6	18.9	19.6	19.3	12.5	11.4	10.2	13.2
Manager	6.2	7.2	6.1	6.2	—	0.4	0.1	0.5
Clerical	19.1	18.5	16.0	18.1	5.7	4.6	3.4	5.3
Sales	11.5	12.2	8.3	9.5	4.7	5.0	2.7	4.2
Services	13.7	12.1	13.0	12.5	35.9	43.1	24.5	22.2
Agriculture	0.5	0.8	3.0	2.9	—	1.5	2.8	2.1
Skilled workers	7.4	7.4	11.8	10.1	15.6	11.8	22.2	20.9
Semi-skilled	8.8	7.3	9.4	9.0	14.6	11.1	12.2	9.7
Unskilled	2.5	1.4	2.4	2.1	5.2	4.2	11.3	11.2

TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Tel Aviv		Israel		Tel-Aviv		Israel	
Economic Sector	1992	1994	1992	1994	1992	1994	1992	1994
Manufc	8.8	7.9	8.5	7.8	14.4	17.4	17.5	17.6
Industry	7.5	8.6	13.2	12.7	14.4	8.7	20.9	19.8
Electricity & Agriculture	1.3	1.6	5.4	5.9	—	—	0.6	1.0
Construction	4.0	3.2	4.7	4.5	7.5	4.0	9.0	6.3
Commerce, Restaurants & Hotels	16.3	16.9	12.2	13.4	17.2	18.6	10.2	11.7
Transportation	8.2	6.8	6.2	6.0	2.7	3.6	2.5	2.8
Finance & Business Services	19.5	21.0	8.3	8.7	7.8	9.9	6.7	8.2
Public Services	24.9	25.2	34.7	34.9	25.7	22.9	22.4	22.5
Personal Services	9.5	8.9	6.9	7.1	10.7	14.6	10.4	9.4
N =	2,754	3,91	25,363	26,080	310	331	2,353	3,318

Of no lesser interest is the comparison of the immigrants from the former Soviet Union residing in Tel Aviv with those immigrants living in other parts of the country. The proportion of these immigrants occupied in low status service jobs in Tel Aviv is double the proportion of immigrants from the former Soviet Union occupied in those jobs in Israel (43.1% compared to 22.1%), while the proportion of skilled laborers in industry, as well as in professional and technical occupations, is considerably lower. These observations have a double significance in the context of this study. First, they lend support to the restructuring hypothesis, demonstrating that opportunities in the service industry are much more prevalent in Tel Aviv than in other parts of the country. In spite of the high human capital that characterized the immigrants upon arrival, they found employment mainly in low status service jobs, which flourish in the restructuring economy. The large proportion of these immigrants in the lower echelons of the occupational ladder is part of the process of polarization the city.

Turning back to table 5 (column 5) which presents measures for assessing occupational polarization it may be readily seen the immigrants residing in Tel Aviv demonstrated higher proportions in the low and mid level occupations.

Table 9 shows the difference in incomes between immigrants in Tel Aviv and immigrants in Israel and compares them to the figures of the veteran population in the city and all over the country in 1992 and 1994. As it may be readily seen incomes of immigrants in Tel Aviv lag behind those of immigrants all over the country considerably. In 1992 immigrants in Israel earned on average 17% more than those in the city, and in 1994, this gap somewhat decreased to 14%. Moreover, the direction of the gaps among the immigrants is in opposite to that among the veteran population. Among the veteran population we observe higher incomes among the city's population than the national average. Furthermore, when we compare the gaps among the veteran and immigrant population in Israel, with gaps among the city immigrants and veteran population, we observe that the gaps within the city both in 1992 and 1994 are larger than those on the national level. In 1994 the average income of the immigrants in the city was 0.46 of that of the veteran population, while on the national level it reached 0.55 of the average income of veterans.

Table 9: Monthly incomes of veterans and immigrants in Israel and Tel Aviv in 1994(NIS)

	Veterans	Immigrants	Immigrant income as % of veteran inc,	Veterans	Immigrants	Immigrant income as % of veteran inc
	Israel	Israel		Tel Aviv	Tel Aviv	
1994	4295.8	2378.2	55%	4455.4	2087.6	47%
N	(4183)	(788)		(448)	(61)	

To summarize this section: the findings regarding the new immigrants show that in general immigrants in Israel have made it better and are better off than those residing in restructuring urban center of Tel Aviv. These conclusion is reached when we compare immigrants in the city with immigrants in Israel, and find the latter have higher incomes. But one comes to grasp the full meaning of these findings with regard to social divisions in the city when one remembers that not only is the local immigrants income lower than their counterpart in other localities, but also at the same time the income of the local veteran population is higher than in other localities. This points to a more distinct and clear line of division within the restructuring city among veterans and immigrants.

7d. Labor Migrants in Tel Aviv

Starting to arrive not more than a decade ago, by the mid-1990s labor migrants have already added between 10-12% to the city's population at the mid 1990s. Labor migrants are becoming an important element in the new ethnic division of labor in Tel Aviv, with implications on the urban labor market. In terms of the occupational categories that have previously been discussed, labor migrants are employed mainly in lowest service jobs such as domestic cleaning or nursing, institutional janitors, and construction.

While foreign workers are found all over the country, the formation of labor migrants community in the city of Tel Aviv takes a specific form, typical of large urban centers. Tel Aviv houses the majority of labor migrants from central Africa and East Asia who work as domestic help in the entire metropolitan area. Among these migrants compared to those that arrive from Eastern Europe a larger proportion tend to stay after their permits have expired thus becoming illegal on the one hand, and a much larger proportion have established families and have children on the other hand. In fact, most of the foreign workers in Israel who have children reside in Tel Aviv (HaAretz, July 20 1998 b-6). In some areas of the city those children constitute more than half of the age group of 0-6 years. A major reason that attracts the large share of these migrants to the city is the large stock of deteriorated housing in rundown areas, many of them partly abandoned due to the massive outmigration from the city in the 1970s' and 1980s. In these areas, police raids to trace illegal immigrants has become a daily practice.

Labor migrants in Tel Aviv may thus easily be defined as comprising a new underclass in the city in the terms defined by Fainstein and Harloe (1992). They have very few legal rights to protect them from employers' exploitation and in the constant menace of being expelled by the state. Both legal and illegal foreign workers are denied any possibility of entering the avenues of social mobility in Israel. This resufrom legal limitations on the areas of occupation of labor migrants in Israel on the one hand, and the absence of avenues to attain citizenship.

Located at the southern most deteriorated areas of the city, where their concentration has created new segregated public spaces, this new urban underclass in Tel Aviv forms a spatial community. Comprising about 10 percent the local population these new strata is bound to have yet unexamined impacts on the urban social structure and labor market.

However, the above suggests that a main factor in the formation of the new underclass in Tel Aviv is to be found in the incorporation regime of the state of Israel with regard to labor migrants. In contrast to some European states which have implemented some measures of incorporation of such workers (Soysal 1994) such measures have not been taken yet in Israel.

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Table 4

Average monthly income in selected economic sectors and occupations in Israel and Tel Aviv among veterans and immigrants 1983,1989,1994

period of immigration:	before 1989						after 1989	
	Israel	Tel Aviv	Israel	Tel Aviv	Israel	Tel Aviv	Israel	Tel Aviv
Year	1983**	1983**	1989*	1989*	1994*	1994*	1994*	1994*
Panel A								
sector								
Manufa.	28,025	29,351	1,918	2,059	3,612	3,052	2,090.	1,512
Indus.	39,756	36,177	2,593	2,521	5,430	5,914	2,465	2,090
Constr	29,407	37,816	2,153	1,747	4,531	3,256	3,033	3,600
Commer&Rest& Hotels.	27,915	32,529	1,900	2,012	3,925	5,647	1,928	2,177
Trans.	37,879	38,721	2,418	2,075	5,096	4,552	2,906	--
Financ&Bus. Serv.	38,822	42,540	2,503	2,709	5,172	5,136	2,589	2,925
Public Sev.	31,381	36,262	1,893	2,009	3,917	3,579	2,964	2,224
Person.Ser.	22,287	26,294	1,233	1,292	2,352	2,791	1,381	1,453
Panel B								
occup								
Acad,	52,453	55,187	2,967	3,049	6,124	5,711	3,917	2,001
Prof, Tech	3,522	40,806	2,127	2,263	4,371	4,303	3,355	6,563
Manag.	63,792	72,225	4,157	4,513	9,196	11,240	6,716	-
Cler.	28,139	28,461	1,873	1,838	3,762	3,639	2,228	2,543
Sales	27,606	31,527	1,776	1,825	4,200	5,280	1,676	1,415
Services	18,710	19,961	1,119	1,008	2,159	1,973	1,355	1,742
Skilled Wo	30,595	31,247	2,025	1,652	3,992	3,202	2,354	2,027
Semi skill	29,470	33,406	2,002	1,962	3,813	2,940	2,184	1,963
Un skilled	21,673	18,395	1,625	1,208	2,221	1,308	2,086	2,990
Total	32,690	39,037	2,082	2,171	4,301	4,450	2,357	2,087
N	158,108	31,093	5149	512	4605	445	848	61

* New Israeli Shekel **Old Shekel . The New Israeli Shekel (NIS) was introduced in 1985 in the value of 1\1000 of the Old Shekel

THE SITUATION of FOREIGN RESIDENTS in TOKYO

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Providing a Demographic Profile of Tokyo's Immigrant and Multicultural Population

As of June 1998, a total of 271,640 foreigners residing in Tokyo Metropolis had completed mandatory registration procedures. The population of the metropolis is 11,958,932, so this means that 2.3% of Tokyo Prefecture is made up of foreign residents.

The following is a breakdown of these registered foreigners by nationality and population (top 10 nationalities only):

1	North Korea / South Korea	94,464
2	China (including Taiwan)	77,361
3	The Philippines	20,414
4	U.S.A.	16,969
5	U.K.	6,947
6	Brazil	5,645
7	Thailand	3,910
8	Myanmar	3,386
9	Australia	2,877
10	France	2,793

History explains why people with North Korean, South Korean and Chinese (including Taiwanese) nationalities occupy first and second place in this table. During the time Japan ruled the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan (until 1945), large numbers of people migrated to Japan from these lands, which were considered to be part of Japan. In 1945 , with the end of World War □, Taiwan has been returned to China, and North Korea and South Korea have become independent of Japan. Strictly speaking, with the Treaty of Peace with Japan in 1951, Japanese Government has accepted this situation. From 1945 to about 1950's, Japan was very poor, probably poorer than the Korean Peninsula. So, a few people wanted to return to the Korean Peninsula and Japanese Government helped them to return. However, many still reside in Japan, as do their descendants. It would thus be hard to call them "immigrants" in the true sense of the word, even though they intend, more than any other foreign nationality, to remain in Japan as permanent residents. However, some of Chinese are considered to immigrants. They are cooks for Chinese dishes. Japanese Government permits Chinese restaurants and hotels to invite Chinese cooks who have high-level skill. And, some of these Chinese cooks want to resident in Japan forever. They are considered to be immigrants. We cannot find Korean Town or Chinese Town in Tokyo. But, we can find Korean Town in Osaka, and China Town in Yokohama and Kobe.

Many of the people from the Philippines (3rd most populous demographic group of foreigners in Tokyo), Brazil (6th), Thailand (7th) and Myanmar (8th) came to Japan in search of work. We can hardly classify them all as "immigrants," in part because it is quite difficult for foreigners to obtain permanent resident status in Japan. It has been more difficult for them to resident in Japan. Because of a business depression, Japanese companies have discharged temporary employees. These people belong to the temporary employees, so that they have lost their jobs. And, finally, They have to return their countries. The Supreme Court has established the rule of discharge: that is, a company should fire temporary employees in the first, and at last should fire normal employees. So, people from these countries are placed at a disadvantage.

Many of the people from the U.S.A. (4th), the U.K. (5th), Australia (9th) and France (10th) are in Japan for business purposes, so there is no reason to assume that they wish to live permanently in Japan. We cannot, therefore, classify them as "immigrants" either.

Most of these foreigners, no matter what their nationality, are of course different from the Japanese majority in terms of religion and culture, and their values are different as well. In other words, Tokyo Prefecture finds itself with a "multicultural" presence in its midst.

Discussing Patterns of Immigrant and Multicultural Political Participation

Foreigners residing in Japan are denied the right to participate in the political process. This is true both at the national level and at the local government level in Tokyo Prefecture. Two reasons given to justify this lack of political rights are that: (1) it is the exclusive right of citizens to participate in the political affairs of the national and local governments of their own country, and (2) recognizing the principles of national sovereignty, Article XV, § 1 of the Constitution of Japan gives to the people (i.e., the citizens of Japan) "the inalienable right to choose their public officials and to dismiss them."

On 26 February 1993, the Supreme Court refused to recognize the right of foreigners to vote in national elections. Then, on 28 February 1995 it found in favor of the argument that foreigners do not have the right to vote in the election of local governing bodies either. In the latter case, though, the Supreme Court left the door somewhat ajar. It suggested that foreigners who are permanent residents have an especially strong interest in the administration of local affairs, so legislation permitting permanent residents to express their voice in local government affairs would not be unconstitutional. Academic circles have recently tended to support this judgment, arguing that permanent residents should have the right to participate in the local political process.

In October 1998, Mr. Kim Dae Jung, President of Republic of Korea, visited to Japan and requested Mr. Keizo Obuchi, Japanese Prime Minister, to give permanent residents from Korea the right to vote in the erection of local governing. Mr. Obuchi answered as follows:
It is concerned to national sovereignty, local government affairs and the relation between nation and local government. We would like to investigate this matter from different view points.

On the other hand, some opposition parties announced that they would introduce a bill that gives permanent residents who stay legally in Japan over three years the right to vote in the erection of local governing.

Foreigners residing in Japan face a high barrier when trying to join the civil service. In the case of the national civil service, the law prohibits foreigners from becoming foreign service employees (diplomats, etc.), and rules established by the National Personnel Authority state that foreigners are not eligible to sit for civil service examinations, which means, in effect, that they are excluded from joining other parts of the national civil service as well.

Nevertheless, a special law does give foreigners the right to serve as professors and instructors at national universities. Foreigners are also permitted to serve in institutions under the jurisdiction of local governments, holding professional positions as public health nurses, nurses, medical technicians, nutritionists, nursery school teachers, etc. But in the case of general administrative positions that could possibly involve the exercise of official authority or the formation of public policy, local governments have required Japanese citizenship as one condition to employment in the local public service. In this, they are following guidelines established by the Ministry of Home Affairs.

Recently, though, the Ministry of Home Affairs has relaxed its stance somewhat. This has prompted some local governments to hire foreign residents, after first obtaining their understanding that their chances of promotion are somewhat limited. But the Tokyo Metropolitan Government has not followed this development—it maintains Japanese citizenship as a condition for eligibility to work in its general administration. The argument made here is that, if this condition were removed, foreigners could eventually rise to positions that involved the exercise of official authority (for example, making decisions regarding taxation).

Discussing Tokyo Metropolitan Government Responses to Immigration and Multiculturalism

The Tokyo Metropolitan Government offers a number of services to foreign residents, including the following:

1. Its information booklets on living in Tokyo are printed in Chinese, English, French and Korean. Its pamphlets on putting out garbage for collection (a matter which now receives much attention) are printed in these and other languages, including Farsi.

2. It has posted signs giving some information in English within its offices, and publishes English booklets presenting an overview of the metropolitan government.

3. It offers information in Chinese, English and Korean on how to cope with natural disasters. It also provides information in these and other languages on how to prepare for a severe earthquake and how to cope with the substantial damage that would result.

4. It distributes pamphlets explaining the national health insurance plan and the national pension plan in Chinese, English, Korean, Portuguese and Spanish.

5. It distributes pamphlets giving information on nursery schools in English.

6. It distributes pamphlets containing information on inoculations, printed in Chinese, English and Korean.

7. It issues Maternal and Child Health Handbooks printed in Chinese, English and Korean.

8. It issues English-language pamphlets giving information on libraries and other public facilities.

9. It issues information on taxation, printed in Chinese, English and Korean.

As can be seen, many of these publications are printed in English, which has become an "international language," and in Chinese and Korean, languages spoken by the two largest groups of foreigners residing in Tokyo.

Identifying New Research and Policy Directions

Foreigners residing in Tokyo Prefecture do not have the right to vote in elections for the Governor or members of the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly. They are also prohibited from serving in general administrative positions within the metropolitan government. As explained earlier, the Supreme Court has indicated that some foreigners could be granted the right to participate in the political process at the local level, but for this to be achieved, legislation would have to be introduced by the national Government. Such a process could prove to be extremely difficult.

The Foreign Advisory Council of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government was established as a way to compensate foreigners somewhat for their lack of representation. This body is empowered to offer suggestions directly to the Governor, and to make known the opinions and wishes of resident foreigners regarding policies affecting them. The Council had its first meeting on 26 November 1997, and is scheduled to meet about four times a year. Council members serve a two-year term, and are chosen so that both genders and different nationalities are represented in a balanced fashion. Establishment of the Council is a welcome attempt to offer foreigners a form of representation at the metropolitan government level, and to let them participate more fully in the community.

Tokyo Metropolitan Government gives seats for each nationality as follows:
Korea 4 , China 3 , The Philippines 2 , U.S.A. 2 , U.K. 2 , Brazil 1, Thailand 1, Myanmar 1, France 1 , Australia 1 , Iran 1, Vietnam 1, Colombia 1

Immigration & Urban Politics in Toronto

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Introduction

Few cities have become so multicultural so quickly. Within almost a single generation, global migration has transformed Toronto into a remarkably diverse ethnic, racial, linguistic and religious metropolis. Consider the lived experience of Toronto's urban affairs reporter John Barber. Writing in *The Globe and Mail*, Barber contrasted the two 'Torontos' he has known: "I grew up in a tidy, prosperous, narrow-minded town where Catholicism was considered exotic; my children are growing up in the most cosmopolitan city on Earth. The same place" (Barber 1998: A8). Yet few places, few cities, could have been less prepared for immigrant diversity than Toronto. From its founding in the late 18th century until the middle of the 20th century, Toronto was an overwhelmingly British, Protestant community. For much of its history the city was commonly described as 'Belfast of the North'; today the city's newly adopted motto is 'Diversity Our Strength'. This is not a vision earlier generations of Toronto civic leaders would have embraced.

In 1931 for instance, 81% of Toronto's population claimed British origin, prompting one local historian of the day to conclude that "no other city of comparable size...is as homogeneous" (Lemon 1985: 50). Nor was Toronto's civic culture in the past notable for the respect or tolerance exhibited toward minority, newcomer identities. The experience of Jews in Toronto was indicative of the times. During the first half of this century, Jews were the largest non-British ethnic group in Toronto. This made them a primary -- though by no means exclusive -- target of the conformist, xenophobic attitudes of the day. Jews in these years were barred from public swimming areas, could not build synagogues in some areas, and faced a city crackdown on the use of Yiddish in retail store signs. As city Alderman John Cowan argued in 1920: "If foreigners who came here to make a living could not conform to English ways and customs they could return to their native countries" (Ibid: 53). Seventy five years later a storm of controversy would erupt over similar comments from a Toronto area municipal politician directed against the use of Chinese in commercial signs. Clearly Toronto has had to struggle with the politics of difference.

Earlier in this century, leading opinion in Canada routinely opposed granting equal political citizenship to certain immigrant groups. The country's leading public affairs magazine *Saturday Night* expressed the commonly held view during the 1920s that Canada and its cities should not become the "dumping ground for the 'scum of Europe' "; and referring specifically to Jews, the magazine cautioned, "Imagine a gang with names like that running a white man's country!" (Ibid: 53). Today Mel Lastman, a Jew, is the mayor of Toronto -- Canada's largest city and the fifth largest municipality in North America.

This paper explores the distance Toronto has travelled towards 'cosmopolis': to becoming not only home to people of many national, ethnic and cultural origins, but to emerging in Leonie Sandercock's words, as a "city/region in which there is genuine connection with, and respect and space for, the cultural Other, and the possibility of working together on matters of common destiny, a recognition of intertwined fates" (Sandercock 1998: 125). Toronto is keen to promote itself today as home to the world, a city containing the peoples and cultures of the world. Yet as we shall see, many newcomers still feel like outsiders.

Immigration and Diversity in Toronto

Toronto is an urban place with multiple geo-political identities. Like most large metropolises, there are several different incarnations of Toronto which need to be distinguished. All are captured in Figure 1. Toronto as a municipal government now refers to the recently amalgamated (effective January 1st 1998) City, providing a single mayor and council for the six previously federated municipalities of Etobicoke, North York, Scarborough, York, East York and Toronto. This new City of Toronto has a population of some 2.4 million people. The Greater Toronto Area (GTA), represents the Toronto city region as designated by the Province of Ontario, taking in the 25 municipalities from Burlington and Milton in the west to Scugog and Clarington in the east up to the northern-most Georgina and Brock. The GTA is marked by the bolded borderlines of Figure 1, and presently contains a population of some 4.6 million. Lastly, there is the Toronto Census Metropolitan Area (CMA), which is largely, but not wholly overlapping with the GTA. Excluded from Toronto's CMA are Burlington to the west and five municipalities to the east, most notably Whitby and Oshawa. The Toronto CMA's population is 4.2 million. Toronto, then, exists in three different guises and boundaries: as a municipality; as a provincially-conceived city region now groping towards common municipal governance; and as a census area conceived by the federal government. Such is a taste of the complexities of Canadian federalism.

Toronto's immigrant, ethnic and racial diversity is indeed extraordinary. In 1996 immigrants represented 17.4% of Canada's population, with by far the greatest concentration residing in the Toronto city region. Almost half the residents of the amalgamated City of Toronto (47.6%) are immigrants. Home to almost 1,125,000 immigrants, one in every 4 immigrants in Canada now lives in the City of Toronto. By the year 2000, the majority of City residents will be immigrants and it is not too far a stretch to suggest that all Torontonians now share the immigrant experience because both newcomers and life-long residents are living in a new, different urban place. Data from the latest 1996 census confirms the Toronto area's allure to immigrants, and how newcomers are reconstituting the city region's population. Since 1991, 42% of all immigrants to Canada have settled in the Toronto CMA[4]; in 10 CMA residents immigrated to Canada between 1991 and 1996; more than 1 in 5 arrived since 1981 (Statistics Canada 1997a: 5-7).

Yet these statistics alone fail to convey the demographic impact of immigration on Toronto. As Daiva Stasiulis has observed, Canadian immigration policy until the 1960s was designed to develop the country as a "white settler" society (Stasiulis 1995: 198). Until then Britain, Europe and the United States were virtually Canada's sole sources of immigration. Others were effectively barred in keeping with the prevalent view expressed 50 years ago by Canada's longest-serving Prime Minister, Mackenzie King, that "careful selection" must be a hallmark of Canadian immigration policy. As King declared, "The people of Canada do not wish, as a result of mass immigration, to make a fundamental alteration in the character of the population" (Ramcharan 1982: 13). Historically this meant favouring the admission of immigrants from Britain, northern and western Europe. The arrival of large numbers of immigrants from Italy, Greece, Portugal and Eastern Europe after the Second World War marked the limit of post-war Canada's willingness to accept newcomers from non-traditional areas. Then, during the 1960s, for a variety of both principled and pragmatic reasons, Canada for the first time truly opened its immigration doors to the world by establishing an admission 'points system' based on occupation, education, language, skills and age. This was followed by an explicit prohibition of discrimination against immigrants based on race, religion, national or ethnic origin. Immigration to Canada immediately became globalized. During the 1970s many newcomers arrived from the Caribbean, followed by considerably larger numbers arriving from Asia, Africa and Latin America during the 1980s and 1990s.

The impact of changing immigration patterns over these years has been particularly dramatic for Toronto. Until 1961, 9 of every 10 immigrants to its CMA came from Britain and Europe; since then fewer than 2 of 10 have followed the same route. Instead, most recent arrivals have come from Asia, accounting for 60% of newcomers from 1991 to 1996 (Statistics Canada 1997a: 5). The City of Toronto is home to immigrants from 169 countries of origin, over 100 of which have at least 1000 ex-patriots in the city region. (Toronto's diversity is evident in many facets of public life, but rarely as exuberantly as during the World Cup of Soccer, when massive numbers of residents take to the streets to celebrate their ancestral homeland's performance. Not even a threatened police crack-down could prevent spontaneous street shut-downs during the 1998 games. As *The Toronto Star* noted, the city was "one of the few cities in the world that [could] boast supporters of every one of the 16 teams in the second round of soccer's World Cup" [Carey 1998a: A1, A10]) As Table 1 reveals, eight of the twelve largest immigrant groups in both the Greater Toronto Area and City of Toronto came from Asia and the Caribbean. Indeed, with the reunification of Hong Kong and China, their combined totals establish the Chinese community as the Toronto's largest immigrant group (Toronto Profile 1998: 1,3).

This globalization of immigration has of course changed the face of Toronto. In 1961 non-whites, now typically referred to as 'visible minorities', made up 3% of Toronto's population. By 1996 census figures showed that visible minorities comprise 31.6% of the Toronto CMA population; and 37.3% of the new City of Toronto population. Four out of every ten non-whites now living in Canada reside in the Toronto CMA. Three groups in particular predominate: 25% of CMA Toronto's visible minority population are Chinese, 24.7% are South Asian, and 20.5% are Black (Statistics Canada 1998; Doucet 1998: 58; Carey 1998b: A1, A16).

Toronto's ethnic composition has also been reconstituted in the process. While 81% of Torontonians claimed British origin in 1931, by 1996 only 16% of Toronto CMA residents self-identified as exclusively British. At the same time fully 56% of the Toronto CMA's population declared itself non-British/French/or Aboriginal in ethnic origin. Still, residents of British origin are the single largest ethnic group in all but one of the city region's 29 municipalities (the stunning exception being Vaughan, north of Toronto with over 40% of its population Italian and barely 5% British). Yet this British plurality should not be exaggerated: in most of the region's larger municipalities fewer than 1 in 5 residents is British. Interestingly too, hybrid identities are now a significant characteristic of Toronto's ethnic make-up. Based on the 1996 census, 69.6% of the CMA's 4.2 million population self-identified with a single ethnic origin, while 30.4% declared multiple origins. As Table 2 reveals, Chinese and Italians are the two largest non-British, single-ethnic origin communities in the City at 12.1% and 9.2% of single respondents respectively; 9.9% and 8.6% of all residents respectively when single and multiple responses are combined.

Immigrant settlement patterns across the Toronto area have been particularly significant in framing relations with local governments. Where newcomers choose and are able to live says a great deal about the status of immigrants and the outlook of the host society. City regions inevitably contain a distinct variety of urban forms: typically including a core central city, outlying suburbs, once-autonomous older towns now drawn into the metropolitan orbit, and even rural municipalities. Scholarly judgement to date is divided in explaining the prevailing pattern of immigrant and ethnocultural community settlement in city regions. Saskia Sassen contends that the dominant trend in American cities continues to point "toward concentration of immigrants and ethnic populations in the center," as third world immigrants occupy the core cities vacated by white flight to the suburbs (Sassen 1994: 103). By contrast, Peter Muller contends that suburbs and edge cities predominate as immigrant settlement areas as "foreign-settler communities are on the rise in metropolitan rings from Los Angeles to New York to Miami" (Muller 1997: 57). Toronto's experience is characterized by substantial immigrant settlement in *both* the urban core and periphery, with greatest concentrations in the latter.

An important dimension of urban citizenship in the GTA is the fact that the highest concentrations of immigrants are no longer located in the traditional immigrant settlement area of the central city, but in the post-World War II suburbs (North York, Scarborough and Etobicoke), and more recent edge cities (Markham, Mississauga, and Richmond Hill) of the city region.Thus the top 10 concentrations of immigrant population by Toronto area municipality (then in existence) at the time of the most recent 1996 census, as shown in Table 3 were: North York (53.71%), Scarborough (51.97%), York (51.73%), Markham (48.55%), Etobicoke (44.38%), Mississauga (43.78%), Toronto (42.88%), East York (42.24%), Richmond Hill (42.19%), and Vaughan (42.05%).

Several comments flow from these figures and rankings. Beginning in a comparative vein, the Toronto city region's status as one of the world's major immigrant concentration places is reflected in the fact that the top 10 immigrant settlement municipalities in its CMA all had higher proportions of foreign-born residents than New York City -- the classic symbol of the immigrant city, with its 35% (officially documented) foreign-born population in 1995. Toronto's Big Sprawl, its suburbs and edge cities, have higher proportions of immigrants than the Big Apple, Within the Toronto city region it is striking that the core, former City of Toronto (pre-amalgamation) -- for generations the primary site of immigrant neighbourhoods -- ranked 7th in immigrant concentration in 1996 behind 3 post-World War II suburbs, 2 edge cities and 1 early 20th century industrial city. This leads to the final and most significant conclusion from this data. A powerful expression of urban citizenship among immigrants to Toronto over the past two decades is their determination to select their residential location of choice rather than be confined to traditional zones of immigrant settlement. This has seen newcomers from Hong Kong settle directly in Scarborough, Markham and Richmond Hill subdivisions; immigrants from India locating in Brampton; and upwardly mobile Italian immigrants pulling up inner city stakes for homes in Vaughan. To be sure as well, the concentrated settlement of less affluent immigrants in high-rise apartment buildings in Etobicoke, North York, Scarborough and Mississauga is less a reflection of pure locational preference than of their limited financial resources and options.

One of Toronto's pioneer scholars of immigration, Robert Harney, once observed that "No great North American city can be understood without being studied as a city of immigrants, of newcomers and their children, as a destination of myriad group and individual migration projects" (Harney 1990: 229). There is much work to be done pursuing Harney's injunction across Toronto's many spaces of transnational migration. A starting point is recognizing the defining characteristics of Toronto as an immigrant metropolis: 1) its high proportion of foreign-born residents; 2) the many homelands and countries of origin represented in immigrant Toronto; 3) the population's ethnic, racial, linguistic and religious diversity; and 4) the settlement of immigrants across many of the city region's municipalities, most notably its suburbs and edge cities.

Immigrant & Minority Political Participation

Diversity challenges citizenship. As Sharon Zukin has observed, the task confronting ethnoculturally diverse societies is "whether [they] can create an inclusive political culture" (Zukin 1995: 44). There are many potential indicators of an individual or group's political participation. My own research has followed three pathways: 1) immigrant and minority community involvement in the mass, urban movement which arose in 1997 to oppose the Province of Ontario's plan to create an amalgamated megacity of Toronto; 2) the results of the 1997 municipal elections in the Greater Toronto Area; and 3) immigrant and diverse ethnocultural community claims on urban space. Taken together, these three domains of civic participation permit a multi-dimensional assessment of immigrant and ethnocultural citizenship in Toronto. They also reveal some of the city's shortcomings in equitably engaging and serving its diverse population.

During 1997 Toronto's largest citizens' movement in history rallied to resist the provincially-imposed amalgamation of the six federated Metro municipalities of Toronto, York, East York, Etobicoke, North York and Scarborough. The prospect of accessible local governments giving way to a remote megacity burdened with a massive downloading of additional service costs, galvanized a mass movement into opposition. Journalist Joe Chidley captured the city's ensuing passion- play well. "The city is in the grip of Mega-Madness," he wrote in March 1997, "and a riveting drama is being played out on the civic stage" (Chidley 1997: 46). As we shall see, immigrants and diverse ethnocultural communities were completely missing from this movement but eventually would launch their own, autonomous intervention into megacity politics in Toronto.

First a quick overview of the scale of citizen mobilization is helpful. The megacity protest was organized around a non-partisan organization called Citizens For Local Democracy, typically revered or reviled under its acronym C4LD. The group held weekly meetings that routinely attracted between 800-1200 citizens. The group's largest rally was a full-house of 2600 at the venerable concert venue, Massey Hall. February 1997 conveniently brought the 160th anniversary of the Rebellion of Upper Canada, and a crowd variously estimated at between 10 and 15 thousand people re-enacted the march down Yonge Street of an earlier generation of dissidents. Then came provincial hearings into the megacity legislation, which drew over 600 deputants—most speaking passionately against the proposed legislation. And finally, a referendum campaign in March across the 6 Metro Toronto municipalities resulted in considerably higher voter-turnout than typically marks a municipal election. And 76% of the voters rejected the Megacity.

With remarkably few exceptions, the anti-megacity movement represented a mobilization of white, British-stock Toronto. This is a point self-critically acknowledged by the leaders of C4LD. Kathleen Wynne is a member of C4LD's steering committee, and she chaired the group's mass weekly meetings. Reviewing the movement's campaign, she acknowledges that "we have not reached out, we have not succeeded in bringing in people from other ethnic communities. We are an Anglo group, white Anglo. It was mostly an Anglo WASP or WASC, (there were Catholics too!), community that rose up against the megacity" (Wynne 1997).

A variety of factors account for the movement's ethnocultural homogeneity in this remarkably diverse city. There is a strong civic culture of citizenship and participatory governance in Toronto. Rooted in Toronto's distinctive constellation of long-standing, stable and affluent central city residential neighbourhoods, there has always been a powerful ethos of enshrining citizens' voice in urban affairs. The 1995 election of a stridently neo-conservative provincial government beholden to small town and suburban Ontario did not augur well for Toronto. Within Canadian federalism, provinces have sweeping powers over municipalities, and one of the Conservative government's most dramatic initiatives has been amalgamating municipal government in Toronto, and downloading close to $400 million per year in additional costs to the new City of Toronto. A mass movement spontaneously erupted condemning the planned municipal merger for eradicating accessible, democratic local government and leading inevitably to hikes in taxes and cuts to services. According to Kathleen Wynne, Torontonians of British descent were "a constituency that felt comfortable coming into the halls of power and then felt entitled to organize this citizen's movement...Nobody had the authority to stop them" (Wynne

1997).

The anti-megacity movement proved inaccessible and scarcely relevant to the large immigrant and ethnocultural communities across the 6 municipalities targeted for amalgamation. Ever scrambling to respond to a bulldozing and blustering provincial government, C4LD did little to mobilize the city's diverse communities. Except for a short-lived initial attempt, materials were not translated into other languages. The group's regular downtown meeting location in a church was both a geographic and religious mismatch for many newcomer communities. No effort was made to identify amalgamation's threat to issues of concern to immigrant and minority communities such as service access, employment equity and policing. To be fair however, it needs to be acknowledged that C4LD was an under-resourced, citizens movement desperately trying to raise its voice against a provinicial government determined to enact drastic measures at great speed.

The anti-megacity movement never spoke to the city's diversity. Some believe this stemmed from Toronto's own experience of two solitudes. The coordinator of the Mayor's Committee on Community and Race Relations in the former city of Toronto, Augusto Mathias observes that "C4LD was very mainstream, Canadian-born, white European. We've (visible minorities) always been in isolation from the mainstream" (Mathias 1997). This view is echoed by a leader from the South Asian, lawyer Viresh Fernando, who would subsequently be instrumental in mobilizing a distinctive immigrant and visible minority presence in the debate over Toronto's political future. Fernando contends that immigrants didn't participate in C4LD "because they feel powerless... They feel that it's all decided elsewhere" (Fernando 1997). Nor did immigrants and visible minorities share the same sense of attachment and ownership to the targeted local governments that older, white Torontonians did. City Hall had not been as accessible or reflective of their communities. The ethnocultural profile of municipal politicians elected in the former city of Toronto is suggestive. Fully 16 (64%) of the 25 councillors sitting on the city of Toronto council or representing its residents on the regional Metro council were of British ethnic origin. Only 1 was a visible minority. The former city of Toronto's British origin professional and managerial classes dominated the political life of the city and C4LD perpetuated this pattern. Immigrants too were far less attached to parochial municipal identities, and more likely to regard themselves as residents of Toronto, the metropolitan destination of their transnational migration. To this point then the struggle against the megacity may be seen as the old Toronto -- remnants of its "white settler" urban society -- rising to defend its familiar and trusted system of municipal government, while newer Torontonians stood on the sidelines.

But political participation and citizenship are not static phenomena. As the debate over Toronto's restructuring reached its provincially-imposed conclusion, immigrant and visible minority groups mobilized on two fronts: first, through the formation of a new coalition called New Voices For

The New City (discussed in this section); and second, through an assertive campaign to promote the continued commitment to access, equity and anti-racism work in the new megacity (examined in the paper's final section).

New Voices For The New City originated from the provincial hearings into the megacity legislation. One of the few visible minority presentations was by Viresh Fernando, on behalf of the Council of Agencies Serving South Asians—CASSA. Preparing the submission, it became clear to Fernando and CASSA that immigrant communities could be particularly vulnerable in a new megacity. Their brief identified a variety of risks: downloading would lead to cuts in services and funding for community agencies; increased resort to user fees for municipal services was likely, and would have an adverse impact on immigrants and minorities ; ethnocultural groups were better off dealing with seven local governments, more attuned to neighborhood needs than with a more remote centralized institution; a single large council would be harder to lobby and interest in community concerns; municipal sector job losses caused by amalgamation would hit designated equity groups hardest; and the megacity might not follow equity principles in making appointments to its assorted agencies, boards and commissions.

CASSA's deputation did not deter the provincial government's amalgamationist mission, but it did convince CASSA of the need to mobilize marginalized, minority voices in megacity politics. By the summer of 1997, CASSA had pulled together an impressive coalition of 63 diverse community organizations under the banner of New Voices For The New City. Affiliated groups included the Canadian Arab Association, the Chinese Canadian National Council, the Ethiopian Association of Toronto, the Jamaican Canadian Association, the Canadian Sri Lankan Association, the Somali Canadian Association, and the Vietnamese Association of Toronto, as well as a number of women's organizations and unions. Recent immigrant groups predominated, and most were spatially concentrated not in the former central city of Toronto but in the 3 post-war suburbs of North York, Scarborough or Etobicoke. A civic alliance on this scale was unprecedented as New Voices co-chair Viresh Fernando noted, "most of the 63 groups had never come together voluntarily on any issue." (Fernando 1997). Its founding document served notice that New Voices was intended to promote more engaged and effective forms of urban citizenship among traditionally marginalized communities: "Increasing the participation of First Nations, visible minorities, immigrant groups, socially disadvantaged persons in the political process is the main aim of this project...The purpose of this project is to strengthen civic society by ensuring that these voices are heard and that the future Mayor and Council of the Megacity will respond to these concerns." (New Voices of the New City 1997a: 1)

Specifically, and perhaps too minimally, New Voices of the New City committed itself to organizing a megacity mayoralty debate on issues of access, equity and anti-racism. Their objective was to raise these issues in the election campaign; press the candidates to take a stand;

and thereby raise community participation and voter turn-out in the election. New Voices may have set a record for the longest title attached to a political forum. Its mayoralty debate was billed as "Defining the Spaces and Roles, of First Nations, Immigrants, People of Colour, Disadvantaged Women and Other Marginalized Groups in the Megacity." The two mayoralty front-runners as well as an African-Canadian candidate from a field of 17 "also-rans" were invited to participate. Several hundred people were in attendance, media coverage was strong, and Viresh Fernando of New Voices deemed the event a great success, saying: "We brought them [the candidates] face to face with diversity, and the politics of diversity" (Fernando 1997).

Few municipal elections in Toronto history generated as much interest as the 1997 vote. This was the first election of a huge 57 member council, (now enlarged to 58), to run the amalgamated "mega-city" of Toronto. A close race for the mayor's office between two incumbent mayors of municipalities being amalgamated into the new city of Toronto added to the drama. And never before had Toronto's ethnic communities been so actively courted by aspiring politicians. As Viresh Fernando noted: "all the candidates, or the major candidates, were spending more time at the Hindu Temples, at the Muslim Mosques and at the synagogues and so on than they were spending on main street" (Toronto 1998: 15). A voter turn-out of 45% on election day was the highest in decades, undoubtedly assisted by municipal advertisements in the 10 leading non-English ethnic newspapers providing basic information regarding municipal voter eligibility and polling locations. In the end, it was Mel Lastman's commanding lead in the city's most multicultural neighbourhoods of North York and Scarborough which assured him victory as the "mega-city's" first mayor.

Elections are an important, if inherently ambiguous measure of political participation and belonging. Analysing the ethnocultural composition of elected politicians, two Canadian scholars have noted, "may index the equality of access the system provides into the corridors of power" (Black and Lakhani 1997: 2). Yet Daiva Stasiulis concludes a recent literature review of the subject by noting the "complex relationships that exist between *statistical* or numerical representation and *substantive* representation (original emphasis. Stasiulis 1997: 6). Clearly, identity representation in political office is no guarantee of state policy responsiveness; and politicians can give voice and leadership to the policy interests of groups to which they do not personally belong. Yet a group's under-representation in elected office is likely, in the absence of other means of influence, to be reflective of its relative political marginalization.

The ethnoracial composition of Toronto city council perpetuates a pattern of inequitable political representation. Statistically, Toronto's diversity is poorly mirrored among local politicians. A combination of self-identification surveys, biographical information and name identification have been used to establish politicians' heritage and identities. The most striking under-representation is along racial lines. While visible minorities comprised 37.3% of the city of Toronto's population in 1996, they hold only 12% of seats (7 of 58) on city council. This group includes three Black councillors, three of Chinese origin, and one of Korean origin. Among the barriers likely impeding the election of racial minority politicians is the huge number of non-Canadian citizens among Toronto's permanent resident population. In 1996 as Table 2 shows 409,865 permanent residents in the city of Toronto -- over 17% of the population -- did not hold Canadian citizenship, and were therefore ineligible to vote in municipal or other elections. Undoubtedly, visible minorities are vastly over-represented among these non-citizens, primarily because they constitute most recent immigrants who have not yet fulfilled the time requirement for citizenship eligibility. Interestingly the sole visible minority mayoralty candidate in Toronto's 1997 election launched a legal claim during the campaign under Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms calling on the courts to extend the municipal franchise to all landed immigrants (permanent residents). The case was summarily dismissed in court, but represents an important attempt to assert urban citizenship rights for newcomers to Canada.

The ethnic composition of Toronto city council is considerably more diverse and reflective than its racial background, but still reveals a mis-match with the city's demographics. (Regrettably, it will be evident that with the recent release of 1996 census data I have not been able to compile fully comprehensive and consistent demographic data). In order, the largest groups on council are: British (21), Italian (9), British & Other (7), Jewish (6), Multiple European (3), Chinese (2), Greek (2), West Indian (2), Chinese & Other (1) and 1 each of Dutch, Korean, Polish, Portuguese and Slovenian origin. Statistically three ethnic groups are significantly over-represented on Toronto Council: British Single Origin, 36.2% of council but only 16% of the CMA population; Italians who comprise 15.5% of the council, and 8.6% of the population; and Jews who make up 10.3% of the council and 4.4% of the population. Conversely while groups such as the Chinese and Portuguese are under-represented on council, some of the city's largest ethnic communities have no members on council. This includes 3 of the top 10 ethnic groups in the city (East Indians, Jamaicans and Filipinos), as well as a variety of other large groups with distinctive experiences and needs such as Sri Lankans, Somalis, Russians and Croatians.

In Greater Toronto Area municipalities outside the City of Toronto, political representation is considerably more ethnoracially skewed. Only 3 visible minority councillors were elected in 1997 the 212 seats in the assorted municipalities of Halton, Peel, York and Durham despite the huge edge city concentrations of Chinese immigrants in Markham and Richmond Hill, Blacks in Mississauga and South Asians in Brampton. In GTA municipalities the vast majority of seats are held by politicians of British ethnic origin, the sole exception being the Vaughan where Italians comprise more than 4 of 10 residents, and hold 6 of 8 council seats. With the exception of Vaughan, there is a British 'dominant culture' on every Toronto area municipal council.

Does group representation matter? Far more analytical research is required to answer this question. Yet several signs suggest that we should anticipate a nuanced rather than definitive answer. To be sure, members of minority groups frequently point to lack of electoral representation as a significant *cause* of their political marginalization. A typical expression of this view came from the President of the Jamaican Canadian Association in Toronto, Herman Stewart. Reflecting on his community's difficulty securing zoning approval for a community centre in North York, Stewart observed, "the solution is to have more Black people and more immigrants on council. And if we had one of our own on council then that lack of understanding wouldn't be there because we had somebody there who knows exactly what we are about and would be able to talk to their colleagues and say 'hey, they are not there to create problems, they are there to make that community a better place'" (Stewart 1998).

Yet it is clear that there is no automatic relationship between a politician's identity, community and politics. Thus for instance, Viresh Fernando of New Voices dismisses two of Toronto council's visible minority councillors as unauthentic on the grounds they do not advance minority community claims and were elected in predominantly white, affluent wards (Fernando 1997). It did not help that one of them was responsible for the most prejudiced outburst against the arrival of Roma immigrants to Toronto in fall of 1997. Interestingly too, only 1 of the 7 visible minority politicians elected to Toronto council had been endorsed by the Metro Network For Social Justice, the city's leading progressive political coalition of community based organizations, suggesting that the electoral system privileges conservative over progressive voices within minority communities. It also needs to be noted that some of the most outspoken and passionate voices on council in support of immigrant and minority rights have belonged to non-immigrant or minority members.

Municipal Response To Immigration & Diversity

Municipal governments and institutions in Toronto have had a mixed record responding to immigrant diversity and minority claims. While municipalities have established an impressive number of policies and committees devoted to inclusion, access and equity the lived experience of immigrant and minority communities has often raised cries of disadvantage and discrimination. As Sheila Croucher has shown, Toronto's rhetoric of ethno-racial harmony has not always matched its reality (Croucher 1979).

It is correct, as municipal staff working in the area of Anti-Racism, Human Rights, Access & Equity noted in a recent report, that over the past two decades Toronto area municipalities "have demonstrated commitment to and leadership in dealing with issues concerning its diverse communities" (Service Equity Team 1997: 3). Since at least 1979 when the city of North York became the first government body at any level in Canada to create an advisory committee on community race and ethnic relations, the seven municipalities now amalgamated into Toronto have established a host of policies, programs and committees aimed at advancing immigrant integration and engagement in the city. Over the past two decades then Toronto municipalities have commonly adopted policies related to multiculturalism, race relations, human rights, immigrant and refugee settlement, language translation, employment equity , contract compliance, and access to services.. Taken together such measures reflected a commitment to advance immigrant and minority participation in government decision-making; their access to municipal services; and their equitable presence in the civic workforce and among firms securing contracts from cities. Reinforcing these policy statements were both political institutions and staff resources. Municipalities typically had some form of political committee mandated to strengthen relations between diverse communities and city hall. And prior to Toronto's recent amalgamation, its 7 municipalities budgeted over $3 million annually to staff responsible for advancing municipal commitment to diversity, human rights, race relations and equity. As we will see in the final section of this paper, a major challenge facing Toronto now is how best to advance access and equity work after municipal amalgamation.

Yet it is clear that a large body of policies and a small cadre of equity-promoting staff are insufficient to assure municipal responsiveness to immigrant and diverse communities. Over the years, tensions have arisen over a range of municipal issues and services such as policing (particularly police shootings of visible minorities) and schooling (notably academic streaming and heritage language instruction). Yet struggles over space have probably been the most recurring urban conflicts for immigrant communities in Toronto. The policy field that has frustrated more immigrant communities in more municipalities across the Greater Toronto Area has been land use planning. The centrality of urban space as a terrain of conflict for immigrant communities was highlighted in a survey conducted by the author in 1997 of senior staff in all 35 (upper and lower tier) municipalities then existing in the Greater Toronto Area, prior to amalgamation. Almost half (17) of the municipalities reported they had experienced circumstances of conflict with immigrant communities; and in 14 of the 17 instances, land use zoning was the issue in dispute. Nine municipalities experienced conflict over the location of places of worship for minority religious communities, particularly mosques; five had clashed with the Chinese community over the construction of Asian-style malls or the location of funeral homes; and two had disputes over the attempt to establish a Jamaican community centre. Conversely when asked to identify a 'best practice' municipal department which had been particularly responsive to immigrant communities, no respondent identified a Planning Department – Parks and Recreation instead leading the way, with Public Health a close second.

"Cities give physical expression to relations of power in society", John Short has written (Short 1989: 54). Regulating land use is one of the most important powers in the hands of local

government.In the Toronto area, conflicts with municipalities over the use of urban space have generated particularly strong feelings of mal-treatment and marginalization among leaders of immigrant and minority communities. Consider the following recent expressions. The President of the Islamic Society of Toronto complained after the protracted battle to establish a mosque in East York that "there are huge double standards that are preventing Muslims from having the same access to their religious freedoms as others" (Ingar 1998). His counterpart heading the Canadian Islamic Conference, Dr. Muhammad Ibrahim, came to a similar conclusion based on his attempt to establish a mosque in North York, complaining, "There is one set of laws for everyone else and then there's another for Muslim communities. There is no fair and equal treatment for everyone" (Ibrahim 1998). Herman Stewart, President of the Jamaican Canadian Association, summarized his unhappy experience of trying to gain zoning approval for a Jamaican community centre in North York by confessing, "I wouldn't wish it on my worst enemy" (Stewart 1998). Another Association official told the city's leading Black newspaper, *Share*, "They [municipal council] just don't want us up there" (Donkin 1997: 1). And finally, in response to Deputy Mayor Carole Bell's assertion that long-time residents were moving out of the edge city of Markham because of tensions and discomfort created by a growing Chinese immigrant population, the Toronto chapter of the Chinese Canadian Council complained of the hurt inflicted on their community by "immigrants being portrayed as an alien group, invading neighbourhoods with strange cultures and way of doing things that will erode the existing fabrics of the communities" (Chinese Canadian Council 1995: 2). To leaders of the Chinese Canadian community, their right to urban space was a test of Canada's commitment to multiculturalism. Vivian Chang, news editor of *Ming Pao Daily News*, pointedly asked, "Is the mainstream in Canada going to be a mix of various ethnic groups or just Anglo-Saxons?" (*The Vancouver Sun* 22 September 1995: 1).

In Toronto, as in other immigrant cities of the world, land use conflicts have become particularly acute flashpoints of conflict for diverse immigrant and ethnoracial groups in global cities. As Leonie Sandercock has observed, "Products of hyper-mobile capital and complex human migrations, perhaps the most visible characteristics of these cities are struggles over space...Who belongs where and with what citizenship rights, in the emerging global cities?" (Saundercock 1998:3). A full discussion of the aforecited cases and their resolution is not possible here. Yet the expressions of hurt and anger noted above remind us that good municipal intentions and diversity-positive policy statements do not always assure responsive decisions and services.

Future Directions in Policy and Research

Immigration and diversity in Toronto have come to be understood and promoted as strategic urban assets in a competitive global economy. As one recent municipal document asserts, "The diversity of Toronto provides us with unique resources into the global marketplace as well as with significant competitive advantages in this international marketplace" (Toronto 1998: 8). Accordingly, within months of Toronto's recent amalgamation, its mayor's first foray onto the international stage emphasized the city's multiculturalism. Addressing a 'Summit of the Cities' in Birmingham in May 1998, Mayor Mel Lastman delivered a speech titled 'Diversity in Toronto', highlighting the city's many immigrant streams and their contribution to the city. "We believe", Toronto's mayor declared, "municipalities have special obligations to our diverse populations." Yet it is clear the city will face difficulties fulfilling such obligations.

It must first be noted that Toronto's capacity to formulate policies and programs responsive to immigrant and minority communities has been substantially curtailed by the provincial government. The constitutional subordination of municipalities in Canada does disproportionate harm to immigrants, who are concentrated in large urban areas whose cities are subject at every turn to the directives of their provincial masters. As previously noted, the current Conservative provincial government has audaciously advanced provincial control over municipal affairs to new heights. Suffice to mention some measures which impact particularly on immigrant and minority communities.

First on the financial front, estimates are that with the amalgamation of Toronto, and the realignment of provincial-municipal responsibilities, some $379 million in additional costs will be downloaded to the new City (Graham 1998: 182). This represents close to a 6% raise in city government costs, and will lead to cuts in municipal staff and services. It will be difficult for immigrants and minorities to make tangible gains from local government in this context. Indeed, provincial plans (now deferred for a year) to introduce a new funding formula for schools would have forced the Toronto District school Board to close some 140 schools -- with particularly large numbers in immigrant neighbourhoods. Finally of course the province's statutory powers have important regulatory control over municipal services. Changes made by the province to the Police Services Act in 1997, were condemned by a host of ethnoracial and immigrant groups for eroding civilian oversight of policing and essentially restoring police review of complaints against police (Urban Alliance 1997). This occurred in the context of there having been 35 police shootings of civilians in Toronto between 1990 and 1996; in over half the cases, the victim was Black (This Magazine 1997). During this period Blacks comprised 7.5% of Toronto's population. Increasingly the, the parameters of the possible in municipal policy are being set by the province.

One area where municipalities retain significant latitude however, is in their own outreach and access to diverse communities. Over the past year this has become at once a more pronounced and vulnerable sphere of local government activity. The prospect, and subsequent implementation, of municipal amalgamation in Toronto prompted concern over how past commitments to access, equity, anti-racism and human rights would be preserved in a merged megacity. Contributing to apprehensions were the province's own abandonment of many of these concerns, the varying levels of commitment to these issues in the former municipalities being merged, and the more constrained fiscal environment of the new City. Led by a cadre of committed civic staff working in these areas, (self identified as the Service Equity/Human Rights/Race Relations Team), Toronto's municipalities produced a brief in 1997 identifying the municipal institutions and resources required to represent diverse communities in the new City. The goal, declared the Team's document was "enabling and empowering diverse communities to participate in civic life through: participating in political decision-making; accessing equal benefit from the services offered by municipalities; being represented in the workplace; and having their rights protected as employees and residents" (The Service Team 1997: 10). This constituted a huge agenda, though the position paper itself was focussed on a discussion of political and administrative institutional structures to carry forward this work.

The new City therefore began with a momentum of concern and mobilization around minority participation and access. As Mayor Lastman informed his Birmingham audience, one of the new City's early initiatives was to form a Task Force on Community Access and Equity. Yet as Task Force member Pam McConnell subsequently observed, only 2 of 56 councillors then in office volunteered to serve on the Task Force.Three others presumably had to be cajoled or conscripted. To be sure the newly elected council was swamped on all fronts, yet McConnell told a public forum "we've got a lot of work to do" in making the Task Force's work a priority for members of council. To date it appears the Task Force has had difficulty engaging either members of council or equity and access-seeking communities in their deliberations. As the Metro Network for Social Justice reports on the initial consultations and interim recommendations of the Task Force, its work "has not gained public attention and has barely made a ripple among city councillors" (Metro Network 1998).

Any failings cannot be attributed to the Task Force's mandate, which is substantive enough. The goal is to develop recommendations on how council can: 1) best support communities concerned about access and equity; and 2) best integrate access and equity principles into the City's role as a policy maker, an advocate, a provider and regulator of services, a contractor and an employer. These are critical challenges facing municipal governments in all diverse cities. The Task Force's initial proposals do not stake out new ground on these fronts, instead promoting past political and administrative practice: a standing committee of council reinforced by community advisory groups and a civic access and equity centre Toronto, Task Force 1998). But what happens when a process intended to stimulate participation, access and equity engages little interest? The Task

Force has been criticized for its overly institutional and bureaucratic framing of an access/equity agenda, and for proposals which are excessively vague and remote from the lived experience of affected communities (Metro Network 1998).

Perhaps Toronto's current inertia in responding to diversity reflects the limits of good intentions leaning on received wisdom. The time for imagination and risk may be at hand. Participation and equity cannot be willed they need to be cultivated from the bottom up. Toronto gained acclaim for pioneering an inclusive form of metropolitan government in the 1950s. Today the challenge facing municipalities is creating political systems responsive to the diverse identities of their citizens. Both academic research and municipal policy have a role to play in getting there. Particularly helpful would be the development of institutions and programs aimed to stimulate civic engagement among marginalized communities. Learning from the experiences of other immigrant cities and gaining a clearer understanding of the stages and dynamics of diverse community participation would help. Toronto is eager to promote itself as home to the world -- as a cosmopolis containing the world's peoples and cultures. The city is indeed unrecognizable now from its heavily mono-cultural past; yet its relatively recent immigrant, ethnic and racial diversity remains to be equitably engaged and reflected in Toronto's body politic.

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
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The New City of Toronto
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Figure 1: The Study Area


Oshawa, Toronto and Hamilton
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Source: Statistics Canada, Census 1996

Figure 2: Immigrants as a Proportion of Population, 1996

City of Toronto
1996 Population by Ethnic Origin

Single Responses

Chinese	209,395
Italian	158,810
Canadian	133,735
English	133,505
East Indian	107,220
Portuguese	79,875
Jamaican	65,495
Jewish	64,985
Filipino	58,295
Polish	49,145
Other	661,545
Total	1,722,005

Multiple Responses

English	285,125
Scottish	209,155
Irish	195,970
Canadian	178,585
French	95,940
German	78,550
Italian	44,405
Jewish	39,280
Polish	39,240
East Indian	29,360

Total Responses

English	418,630
Canadian	312,315
Scottish	255,655
Chinese	235,285
Irish	235,170
Italian	203,220
East Indian	136,580
French	114,420
German	106,345
Jewish	104,260

source: Statistics Canada, 1996 Census

TABLE 3: ORIGIN OF TORONTO'S IMMIGRANTS

Place of Birth	GTA	Toronto	% in Toronto
Total Population	4,628,700	2,385,400	52
Total Immigrants	1,837,035	1,124,410	61
United Kingdom	180,720	74,250	41
Italy	149,240	85,105	57
Hong Kong	111,605	62,315	56
India	101,535	47,215	47
Jamaica	88,790	56,670	64
China	88,165	65,960	75
Portugal	82,280	53,470	65
Philippines	81,810	55,440	68
Poland	78,180	46,850	60
Guyana	62,050	41,320	67
Sri Lanka	54,255	45,760	84
Viet Nam	50,510	38,990	77
Other Countries	707,895	451,065	64

TABLE 4: ORIGIN OF TORONTO'S RECENT IMMIGRANTS (1991-1996)

Place of Birth	GTA	Toronto	% in Toronto
Total Recent Immigrants	446,515	315,470	71
Hong Kong	48,730	25,355	52
Sri Lanka	36,835	32,175	87
China	35,460	26,260	74
India	33,575	17,215	51
Philippines	33,560	25,780	77
Poland	19,120	11,485	60
Jamaica	17,050	12,500	73
Guyana	13,310	10,145	76
Viet Nam	12,425	10,045	81
Trinidad & Tobago	11,695	7,500	64
Iran	11,060	8,930	81
Pakistan	10,760	6,750	63
Other Countries	162,935	121,330	74

Metropolis Conference, Zichron Jacov

Zurich

Political participation and exclusion of immigrants in a direct democracy

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Neuchâtel, November 1998

I BASIC DATA

1.1 Size

The city of Zurich is a municipality of 92 km2 and as such the largest of the 261 communes of the canton of Zurich (1728 km2). The city is divided in 12 boroughs (*Kreise*) - with a surface ranging from 1,8 km2 (*Kreis 1*) to 15 km2 (*Kreis 7*) - and 34 neighbourhoods (*Quartiere*). In 1997, 335.943 persons were living in Zurich.

Table I-I : Surface and population of the city of Zurich and its boroughs (1996)

	Surface (km2)	Population
Total of the city	91,94	335.943
Kreis 1	1,83	5.856
Kreis 2	11,1	28.552
Kreis 3	8,7	46.095
Kreis 4	2,8	27.634
Kreis 5	2,1	11.341
Kreis 6	5,1	30.428
Kreis 7	15	33.876
Kreis 8	4,8	15.692
Kreis 9	12,1	44.365
Kreis 10	9,1	35.735
Kreis 11	13,4	52.559
Kreis 12	6	27.515

Source: (Statistisches Amt 1997, 63, 110)

The whole metropolitan area of Zurich is far larger than the municipality alone and stretches over the limits of the canton. In 1996 the agglomeration of Zurich defined as an area consisting of 100 municipalities - 84 from the canton of Zurich, 15 from the canton of Aargau and one from the canton of Schwyz - included 948.537 persons (Statistisches Amt 1997, 349). Certain authors even start from the assumption that the metropolitan area of Zurich consists of 1,5 million habitants (Hitz, Schmid, Wolff 1995, 225).

1.2 Relative significance of the city in region and country:

Although small from an international comparative perspective, Zurich is the largest town of Switzerland and the centre of its economically most important region. In spite of this, Zurich is by reasons of the country's political culture - Switzerland is a federalist State with a strong opposition to centralism - not the political capital.

Table I-II: The city of Zurich compared to other

Swiss cities (1990)

	Population
Zurich	365.043
Basel	178.428
Geneva	171.042
Lausanne	136.338
Bern	128.112

Source: (Taschenstatistik 1997)

Once the seat of machine and textile industry, Zurich's economy is today largely dominated by tertiary sector activities. From 1965 to 1991 the part of working places in the secondary sector of the economy of the city felt from 43,0% to 18,5%, the part of the working places in the financial sector increased from 9,6% to 26,1% (Hitz, Schmid, Wolff 1995, 220). Main activities are banking, consulting and insurance, communication, informatics and research, but also wholesale trade and real-estate business. Zurich is the most important centre for producer services in Switzerland (BFS 1997b, 163).

In 1995 the metropolitan area of Zurich (here defined in the limits of the canton) contributed for more than a fifth to the national income of Switzerland (BFS 1997a, 180). Its importance as financial centre is stressed by the fact that in 1990 30% of the 500 biggest Swiss companies had their head office in Zurich as well as three of the four biggest Swiss banks and four of the six largest insurance-firms. 59% of all foreign banks were located in Zurich. That is why certain authors consider that Zurich has the characteristics of a "global city" (Hitz, Schmid, Wolff 1995, 219-220).

1.3 Cycles of migration for the country

For a long time Switzerland was an emigration country: certain authors estimate that between the end of the 15th and the end of the 18th century about one million of Swiss left the country. In the same time however different waves of migrants arrived in Switzerland: the most important groups were the protestant refugees from France, Southern Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, who looked for shelter in the cantons with a protestant majority. The largest wave consisted of the French Huguenots: about 140.000 of them arrived after the *Edit de Nantes* in 1685 (Vuilleumier 1987, 12-14).

The political changes in Europe during the 19th century resulted in new migration flows to Switzerland: between 1815 and 1848 members of the royal family and former *conventionels* came from France, patriots opposing Austrian domination and former civil servants of Napoleon's government arrived from Italy, liberal professors and students immigrated from Germany. To this political immigration has to be added a first wave of economic migration of German craftsmen which took place in the first half of the 19th century. However, compared to the emigration flows during this time, immigration was still of minor importance (Vuilleumier 1987, 16-19).

The transformation of Switzerland from an emigration to an immigration country took place in the last decades of the 19th century. In 1848 the new constitution, victory of the liberal movement against the Conservatives, founded the Swiss federalist State. Switzerland became a liberal island on the European continent and attracted new political refugees. But it was after all the economic take off of Switzerland during the second part of the 19th century which led to an important immigration: the part of the foreigners on the total population increased from 3% in 1850 to 14,7% in 1910. In 1890 the migration balance turned: immigration was from now on more important than emigration. At the eve of World War I about 600.000 foreigners were living in the country, which is 15,4% of the total population. Switzerland was at this time, with the exception of Luxembourg, the European country with the highest percentage of foreigners (Schlaepfer 1969, 13, 17, 82).

At this time, the large majority of foreigners came from the neighbouring countries of Switzerland, in 1910 for example 95,6% of them: 39,8% of the foreign population were Germans, 36,7% Italians, 11,5% French and 7,1% Austrians. The majority of the immigrants were living in the big cities and the industrial centres (in 1910 82% of them), but also in the frontier areas (Schlaepfer 1969, 13, 17).

During the First and the Second World War the foreign population in Switzerland significantly decreased: in 1920 their part on the total population has fallen to 10,4%, and in 1941 to 5,2%.

Shortly after World War II, the second migration cycle began. Because Switzerland's production equipment had not suffered any damages during the war, the country profited very rapidly from the economic demands of its neighbouring countries. This important demand led to a rapid growth of the economy and soon Switzerland lacked manpower. Already in 1948, the first recruitment treaty was signed with Italy. Since the 1950s, there was a steady and massive flow of foreign workers to Switzerland: their number increased from 285,000 in 1950 (6,1% of the total population) to 495,000 (10,8%) in 1960 and to 983,000 (17,2%) in 1970. From predominantly Italian, their composition became more diverse until 1970: a bit more than the half of them were still Italians, the other neighbouring countries Germany, France and Austria represented about one fifth; Spaniards were at 10% and Yugoslavs, Portuguese and Turks together at around 4%.

The international economic crisis of 1973/74 had an important impact on the number of immigrants living in Switzerland. Between 1974 and 1977 the Swiss economy lost 10% of its jobs. According to the statistics of the Federal Administration, this loss primarily concerned foreign workers: 228.000 from 340.000 dismissed persons, that is 67%, were foreigners. One estimates that about 35% of the unemployed foreign workers went back to their country of origin between 1974 and 1976 (Haug 1980, 7-8). This had an important impact on the total percentage of the foreign population: from 17,2% in 1970 it felt to 14,8% in 1980.

Thus, Switzerland succeeded through its regulation system to make use of foreign labour as an "economic buffer". It seems that this is one of the most important reasons for its low unemployment rate during the 1970s and 1980s (Schmidt 1982, 255).

After the years of the crisis, the Swiss economy recovered and during the 1980s a renewed demand for foreign labour appeared which made the number of foreigners rise steadily. Their part in the total population increased from 14,8% in 1980 to 16,4% in 1990 and 19% in 1997. During the 1990s a large part of the increase must however be explained by family reunification.

It is also during the 1980s that the immigration of asylum seekers - as everywhere in Western Europe - became more and more important: from 9700 in 1985 their number rose to 16.700 in 1988 and 41.600 in 1991. After this highpoint the numbers felt to around 20.000 a year during the first half of the 1990s. In 1997 there has been a renewed increase of asylum-seekers: compared to 1996 their number rose for about one third, from 18.001 to 23.982 and it seems probable that in 1998 the record of 1991 (41.000) will be broken.

The diversification of the countries of origin from labour-migrants - former Yugoslavia, Portugal and Turkey got increasingly important during the 1980s - as well as from asylum-seekers - who come mainly from Sri Lanka, former Yugoslavia and Turkey - led in the last years to an increasing heterogeneity of the cultural background of migrants.

However, in 1997 the most important foreign groups were still the Italians (25,8%), followed by the people from former Yugoslavia (23,2%), the Portuguese (10,2%) and the Spaniards (7,1%). So the "traditional recruitment countries" are still the most important countries of origin of migrants in Switzerland.

As a conclusion on can say that at present, the proportion of foreign born in Switzerland is about one fifth of the overall resident population; a figure twice as high as that of the USA, and considerably higher than the one of Canada, two classical countries of immigration. Taking members of the first and second generation together, approximately one third of the Swiss population has an immigration background.

1.4 Cycles of migration for the city

Immigration to Zurich has also a long history and reflects more or less the migration pattern on the national level. The first waves at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century were also mainly of French, Italian and German origin. The big part of the immigrants were workers employed in construction and textile manufactories. In 1900 the part of the foreigners on the total population of Zurich was 28.8%; it increased to a highpoint of 33.4% in 1910 (see Table I-X). The most of the Italians lived in this time in *Aussersihl*, a neighbourhood which, in 1896, became the place of a violent outburst of anger and xenophobic resentments of the autochthonous against them, the so called "Italian riots" (*Italienerkrawalle*) (Looser 1986).

As on the national level the number of migrants decreased rapidly during World War I and World War II. Many of the migrants returned to their countries of origin and their part on the total population felt to 21.2% in 1920, 17.1% in 1930 and 8.5% in 1940. The lowest number and also the lowest percentage of foreigners in Zurich during this century were registered in 1945: 24.306 or 6.8%. However not all of the migrants left the country during this period: some of them had acquired Swiss citizenship and remained. These first generations of immigrants have today completely assimilated and are no longer distinguishable as immigrant communities.

The next cycle of immigration in Zurich followed also closely the pattern on the national level. After the already mentioned minimum in 1945, the numbers of migrants rose steadily until 1960, between 1950 and 1960 even in a very rapid way. The large part of them came from Italy and Spain and responded to the demand for unqualified workers in the sector of construction and in restaurants and hotels.

Between 1960 and 1985 the increase of the number of migrants slowed down and was between 1975 and 1980 even negative, reflecting once again the logic of the developments on the national level.

Since the beginning of the 1980s there is a new increase of the number of migrants from 67.000 in 1980 to 101.000 in 1995 and in the same time their part on the total population grew from 18.1% to 28.1%. However, the mounting part of foreigners on the total population of Zurich since World War II, can only partly be explained by the increase of their number, which rose between 1950 and 1995 by 69.766 persons. Another important reason is the out-migration of Swiss population from the city to the suburbs which results in a decrease of their number by 98.513 persons in the same period. The reason that since 1980 the percentage of foreigners is increasing faster in Zurich than on the national level (which is also true for other Swiss cities) is thus the social polarisation between the big urban centres and the rest of the country (Leitbild 1998b, 51, 65).

Table I-III: Stock of foreign residents in Zurich (1900 - 1995)

	Foreigners	Swiss Population	Total Population	% foreign population
1900	43.457	107.090	150.547	28.87%
1905	51.700	116.800	168.500	30.68%
1910	63.622	126.470	190.092	33.47%

1915	58.569	141.662	200.231	29.25%
1920	44.996	161.303	206.299	21.28%
1925	37.882	172.892	210.774	17.97%
1930	43.809	211.185	254.994	17.18%
1935	35.310	281.847	317.157	11.13%
1940	28.609	305.417	334.026	8.56%
1945	24.309	333.075	357.381	6.80%
1950	31.699	357.874	389.573	8.14%
1955	36.659	380.692	417.351	8.78%
1960	52.791	384.482	437.273	12.07%
1965	67.242	366.623	433.865	15.50%
1970	69.944	348.028	417.972	16.73%
1975	70.542	319.071	389.613	18.11%
1980	66.956	303.662	370.618	18.07%
1985	72.712	286.372	359.084	20.25%
1990	84.773	271.579	356.352	23.79%
1995	101.465	259.361	360.826	28.12%

Source: (Leibild 1996b, 57)

1.5 Composition of immigrant / ethnic minority populations in Zürich

The Swiss statistics on the national level only distinguish foreigners and nationals. The same is true for the city of Zurich. There is no registration of ethnic origin as for example in the Netherlands and in the UK which would permit the measuring of the number of ethnic minorities. However, because the law on citizenship (see 2.3) is very restrictive compared to other European countries (in some respect it is even more restrictive than the nationality law in Germany) looking the number of foreigners gives quite a good picture of the amount of migrants living in the city.

Table I-IV: Composition of foreign residents in Zurich by country of origin and percentage of the total foreign population (1996)

	Number	% of total foreign population
Italy	19.413	19,0
Republic of Yugoslavia*	16.172	15,8
Germany	9.806	9,6
Spain	8.026	7,9
Portugal	6.048	5,9
Turkey	5.825	5,7
Sri Lanka	3.905	3,8
Croatia	3.528	3,5
Austria	2.883	2,8
Macedonia	2.702	2,6
Bosnia	2.148	2,1
Greece	1.844	1,8

UK	1.222	1,2
USA	1.117	1,1
Total of foreigners	102.048	100

Source: (Statistisches Amt 1997, 70)

*Serbia and Montenegro

In 1996, from the 102.048 foreigners living in Zurich, 85.767 persons (84,0%) were European, 9493 (9,3%) Asian, 3977 (3,9%) American (South and Northern America), 2579 (2,5%) African and 162 Australian. The most important groups are the Italians (19%), the people from the Republic of Yugoslavia (15,8%), the Germans (9,6%), Spaniards (7,9%) and Portuguese (5,9%) (see table I-XI).

1.6 Generational make-up and differences within immigrant / ethnic minority populations

If one looks at gender make up and the age structure one finds a first striking feature. In 1996 from the 257.600 Swiss living in Zurich, 116.663 were men and 140.937 women, a ratio in favour of the latter: 54,7% to 45,3%. Looking at the foreigner population one finds exactly the contrary: from the 102.048 foreigners 55.845 were men and 46.203 women, this is a ratio of 54,7% to 45,3% in favour of men (Statistisches Amt 1997, 60).

Table I-V: Foreigners living in Zurich according to age and sex (1996)

Age group	All foreigners	male	female
0-4	6.725	3.419	3.306
5-9	5.631	2.931	2.700
10-14	5.205	2.728	2.477
15-19	5.934	3.121	2.813
20-24	8.898	4.587	4.311
25-29	12.628	6.741	5.887
30-34	13.144	7.473	5.671
35-39	10.063	5.912	4.151
40-44	8.317	4.749	3.568
45-49	7.007	4.112	2.895
50-54	5.800	3.410	2.390
55-59	5.121	2.927	2.194
60-64	3.383	1.917	1.466
65-69	1.895	950	945
70-74	1.067	435	632
75-79	498	206	292
80-84	350	124	226
85-89	248	71	177
90 and more	134	32	102

Total of foreigners	**102.048**	**55.845**	**46.203**

Source: (Statistisches Amt 1997, 70)

Foreigners are more strongly represented in the lower age groups than in the higher ones, which is the result of the their higher fertility rate compared to Swiss. Looking at children in the age group of up to 4 years the proportion of foreigners is 43%; in the group of youngsters (15-19 years) their part is 40,9%. The percentage only decreases in the higher age groups: it is 23,1% for people between 60 and 64 (see table I-XIII).

Table I-VI: Foreigners living in Zurich by age group and percentage of the total population (1996)

Age group	Total population	Swiss	Foreigners	% foreigners
0-4	15.631	8.906	6.725	43,0%
15-19	14.504	8.570	5.934	40,9%
30-34	35.275	22.131	13.144	37,3%
45-49	23.372	16.365	7.007	42,8%
60-64	18.038	14.655	3.383	23,1%
Total	359.648	257.600	102.048	28,4%

Source: (Statistisches Amt 1997, 60-61)

1.7 Concentration

Residential concentration:

Until the 1980s the residential concentration of foreigners in Zurich was relatively low. On the level of the boroughs the highest percentage of foreigners could be found in 1960 in the 1st borough with 28%, in 1970 in the 5th borough with 31% and in 1980 still in the 5th borough with 36% followed by the 4th borough with 33% (Arend 1982, 326). In the same period the percentages on the level of neighbourhoods in the 3rd, 4th and 5th borough were between 20% and 30%. There could also be found a few streets with up to 100% foreigners (Arend 1985, 180-183). Compared to the USA or other European cities the segregation indices are low and the spatial distribution has until a few years ago never been an issue of politics (Arend 1991).

There are several reasons for this: as Arend (1982, 361-372) explains, Zurich is a relatively small city and the possibility that specialised and homogeneous areas can form is therefore quite limited. A second reason seems to be the relatively tight control of the housing sector in Switzerland which reduces the opportunities for landlords to rent apartments of bad quality at extensive prices to migrants. A last reasons, according to Arend, is the fact that autochthonous habitants have quite a low mobility and do not move even if the percentage of foreigners is going up.

Table I-VII: Distribution of foreigners and Swiss in the 12 boroughs of Zurich (1990)

	total population	foreigners	Swiss	% foreigners
Kreis 1	6.717	1.557	5.160	23.2
Kreis 2	28.946	5.020	23.926	17,3
Kreis 3	45.391	12.468	32.923	27.5
Kreis 4	28.729	11.847	16.882	41.2
Kreis 5	11.714	5.245	6.469	44.8
Kreis 6	31.480	6.417	25.063	20.4
Kreis 7	34.747	5.856	28.891	16.9
Kreis 8	16.110	3.890	12.220	24.1
Kreis 9	44.936	10.257	34.679	22.8
Kreis 10	35.397	7.185	28.212	20.3
Kreis 11	52.870	12.265	40.605	23.2
Kreis 12	27.770	6.513	21.257	23.5
Entire city	**365.043**	**88.547**	**276.496**	**23.4**

Source: (Statistisches Amt 1997, 35)

However, these findings concern only the post-war period up to 1980. The analysis of the federal census of 1990 shows that the concentrations have increased during the decade 1980-1990 (see table XIV). The 5th and the 4th boroughs are still the one with the highest percentage of foreigners: 44.8% respectively 41.2%. On the level of neighbourhoods the highest foreigner-concentrations can be found in *Langstrasse* (47,7%), *Gewerbeschule* (45.2%) and *Escher Wyss* (42,2%). All of these neighbourhoods are quite near to the city centre but do not have - with the exception of *Langstrasse* where the red light district is situated - the character of an inner city.

There aren't any mono-ethnic neighbourhoods neither: the highest proportion of one nationality can be found in *Escher-Wyss*, where the Italians make 16,2% of the whole population (Leitbild 1998b, 79-80).

Economic concentration:

If one looks at the economic concentration of foreigners in Zurich's labour market one has to distinguish two groups: on the one hand people from the German speaking neighbour-countries (Germany, Austria), from North-West-Europe and from other OECD-countries who are mostly well-qualified and working in good positions. On the other hand migrants from the traditional recruitment-countries - Spain, Portugal, former Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey and other non-European-countries - who are concentrated at more than 90% in branches which require only low qualifications (Ochsner 1998, 272-326).

The different groups have nevertheless diverse occupation-profiles (see table I-XV): a fifth of the Italians work in sale and office jobs which require only low qualifications and about a forth of them are occupied in metal-working, machine building as well as construction and painting. Almost 20% of the Spaniards and 25% of the people from former Yugoslavia are working in the hotel and restaurant industry and almost 30% respectively 37% of them in construction/painting and cleaning. The Portuguese are concentrated in the same three sectors but even stronger: 33% in the hotel and restaurant industry, 20% in construction and painting and 17% in cleaning. Turks and Greeks are only concentrated in the service and not in the industrial sector: the three main occupation branches of the Turks are hotel and restaurant industry (21%), sale and office jobs and other occupations whereas Greeks are distributed more evenly about the different branches.

Table I-VIII: Distribution of employed foreigners according to nationality and branches in Zurich in % (1995)

	Italians	Spaniards	Portu-guese	Ex-Yugo-slavian	Turks	Greek
Low-qualification jobs in the industrial sector						
Construction / painting	11	13	20	16	3	2
Metal-working / machine-building	13	7	3	8	8	11
Textile	2	1	-	-	2	1
Low-qualification jobs in the service sector						
Hotel and restaurant industry	8	19	33	25	21	11
Sale/Office jobs	20	10	4	9	15	18
Other occupations*	11	10	7	12	19	15
Cleaning	10	16	17	10	9	17
Hospital care	1	1	1	4	2	3
Public transports	6	11	5	6	8	5
Total	**82**	**88**	**90**	**90**	**87**	**83**

Source: (Ochsner 1998, 308-309)

* unskilled workers and workers without indications on their profession

Women coming from the same countries of origin are working up to 90% in the hotel and restaurant industry, in sale and office jobs requiring low qualifications (for example cashiers) as nurses or hairdresser and in the cleaning-sector (Ochsner 1998, 44).

1.8 Mobilisation, organisation

Many students of immigration in Switzerland attribute an important place to migrant organisations for the explanation of the integration process (for example Schmitter 1980, Fibbi 1985, Bolzmann, Fibbi, Valente 1992), a fact which is also acknowledged by the administrations dealing with migration issues (EKA 1996, 14). The Swiss law does not - unlike the law in other European countries (for example France) - require the registration of associations. Whoever likes - Swiss citizen as well as foreigners - can found an association. This liberty of organisation makes it however very difficult to have an exact idea of the number of migrant-associations and to know what are their aims and their influence. Although Italian associations like the *Federazione Colonie Libere Italiane* - but also political parties like the Italian Communist Party - had an important impact on the integration of migrants in Switzerland, there is only scarce scientific information on their history, organisation and development.

The impact of the mobilisation of migrants on the Swiss immigrant policy, however, has always been weak. In the second part of the 1970s for example a lot of migrant associations participated on the committee "Mitenand" ("Together") which launched a popular initiative aiming at the reform of the Aliens law of 1931. This committee consisting of representatives of labour unions, Christian groups and left-wing organisations - migrants as well as Swiss - wanted to improve the situation of immigrants in Switzerland by giving them the same social and civil rights as Swiss have (Haug 1980, 90). Although some authors consider the initiative as "a large mobilisation process of migrants" (D'Amato, 1997: 145) and as a real "'coming out' of the immigrant" in the sense of a "radical change of the political perception of foreigners as not only economic-functional but also cultural and social " (Cattacin, 1996: 72), it did not have a decisive impact: on April, the 5th 1981, the initiative was rejected by a very strong majority of 84% of the voters and by all the cantons.

Since then there has not been any new comparable movement and the agenda setting concerning the immigration issue is almost exclusively dominated by the confrontation of different Swiss groups and their interests. It seems that after the failure of the struggle for political rights a lot of immigrant organisations changed their aim and became progressively oriented towards cultural issues (Bolzmann, Fibbi, Garcia 1988, Bolzman and Fibbi 1991, Fibbi 1995).

The same seems to be true for Zurich, but migrants keep nevertheless politically active. In February 1989, for example, a petition signed by 5400 foreigners, asking the right to vote on the local level, was transmitted to the authorities. The same mobilisation took also place in other municipalities of the canton, but all of them received negative answers (Marquis, Grossi 1990, 24-25). At the end of 1988 representatives from labour unions, left-wing parties and the churches mobilised for a popular initiative on the cantonal level, which aimed at the introduction of local voting rights for foreigners who had a permanent residence permit for at least five years. The vote took place on September, the 26th 1993: 75% of the voters rejected the initiative. In several other Swiss cantons similar initiatives received in the same period also negative answers by strong majorities (Cueni, Fleury 1994, 15-17).

Recently, a week before the municipal elections of march 1998, the new formed group " Political rights for migrants " (*Politische Rechte für Migrant(-innen)*) announced in a press conference that it will once again try to struggle for the political rights of migrants. The principal aim of the group, which consists of members from labour unions and representatives of migrant organisations, was to support Swiss candidates with a migrant background. Once elected they should push for local political rights and for a facilitated naturalisation (NZZ 1998c). Migrant organisation were also criticising very strongly the fact that they could not participate on the setting up of the new *Integration Design* (*Integrationsleitbild*) which was published by the municipality in May 1998 (see 2.3). However, in November 1998 the municipality informed, that there will be a new version of this text and that migrants will be integrated in the group charged to rewrite it.

Migrant organisations

In 1996 the Co-ordination Office for the Questions of Foreigners (*Städtische Koordinationstelle für Ausländerfragen)* published a brochure (was updated in 1997) with about 350 immigrant associations established in Zurich (Koordinationsstelle 1997). Because there is no possibility to evaluate their relevance and influence we indicate here all the associations of the major groups of labour migrants and refugees listed in the brochure. This means that we look at the association of the people from Italy, the Republic of Yugoslavia, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Sri Lanka, Croatia, Bosnia and Greece.

Bosnia

1. Dzemat der islamischen Gemeinschaft Bosniens in Zürich
2. Bosniaken Institut
3. Matica Bosne I Hercegowine
4. Verein der Flüchtlinge aus Bosnien und Herzegowina in der Schweiz

Croatia

1. Kroatische Katholische Mission
2. Almae Matris Alumni Croaticae
3. Kroatische Kulturgemeinschaft
4. Kroatischer Ingenieur-Verein
5. Kroatisches Humanitäres Forum

6 Kroatisch-Herzegowina Gemeinschaft
7 Nogometni klub Croatia
8 Nogometni klub Hadjuk

Greece

1 "Ewros" Arbeitnehmer-Vereinigung
2 Föderation Griechischer Vereine und Gemeinden in der Schweiz
3 Fussballclub S.V.Asteras
4 Fussballclub S.V.Hellas
5 Fussballclub Megas Alexandros
6 Griechische Gemeinde Zürich
7 Griechischer Kulturverein Demokritos
8 Griechischer Lehrerverein
9 Griechischer Verein "Parthenon"
10 Griechischer Verein Pentalofiton
11 Griechischer Verein der Kozaniten
12 Verband Griechischer Elternvereine im Kanton Zürich - Aristoteles
13 Vereinigung der Kreter in der Schweiz
14 Vereinigung Pontion in der Schweiz

Italy

1 Comitato degli Italiani all'Estero
2 Assistenza Italiana
3 Associazione Abbruzzese
4 Associazione Bellunesi nel Mundo
5 Associazione Regionale Emigrati Molisani
6 AssociazioneTriveneto
7 Associazione ULEV
8 Associazione Campana
9 Associazione Culturale Italiana
10 Associazione Emigrati Lucani
11 Associazione Emiliani Romagnoli
12 Associazione Ex Combattenti
13 Associazione Friulana Fogolar Furlan
14 Associazione Gente Camuna
15 Associazione Giovani Siciliani
16 Associazione Lavoratori Emigrati Friulani
17 Associazione Lavoratori Montellesi
18 Associazione Marchigiani
19 Associazione Naz. Alpini
20 Associazione Pugliese
21 Associazione Trevisani nei Mondo
22 Associazione Toscana di Zurigo
23 A.I.D.O. - Associazione Italiana Donatori Organi
24 A.V.I.S. - Associazione Italiana Volontari del Sangue

25 CASLI - Comitato Assistenza Scolastica Lavoratori Italiani
26 Centro di Studi Italiani
27 Circolo Lucano
28 Circolo San Martino
29 Circolo Trentini nel Mondo
30 Circolo Culturale Realtà Nuova
31 Comitato Genitori Limmattal
32 Comitato Nazionale Patronati
33 Comitato Tricolore
34 Comitato Nazionale d'Intesa
35 Comitato Genitori Scuola Elementare Italiana
36 Conferenza "San Vincenzo"
37 Coord. Federazione
38 Corale Santa Cecilia
39 C.A.V.E.S.
40 Dame di Carità
41 Ente Bergamaschi nel Mondo, Circolo di Zurigo
42 Famiglia Padovani di Zurigo
43 Famiglia Siciliana
44 Federazione Associazioni Sarde in Svizzera
45 Federazione Associazioni Calabresi
46 Federazione Associazioni Campane
47 Federazione Associazioni Lucane
48 Federazione Regionale Associazioni Emigrati Lombardi in Svizzera F.R.A.E.L.
49 Federazione Colonie Libere F.C.L.I.
50 Gruppo Italiano Oerlikon
51 Gruppo Valtellinesi
52 Lecce Club Zürich
53 Lega Uomini Cattolicci
54 P.C.I
55 P.S.I.
56 Società Dante Allighieri
57 Società Donne Cattoliche
58 Udinese Club Zurigo
59 Società Donne Italiane
60 Unione Emigrati Siciliani
61 Unione Emigrati Sardi E. Racis
62 Veronesi nel Mondo
63 Vicentini nel Mondo

Portugal

1 Associaçião Portuguesa
2 Centro Lusitano
3 Comissão de Pais de Zürich

4 Federação das Associações Portuguesas
5 Foro Cultural
6 Sporting Club de Zurich

Republic of Yugoslavia

1 Basketballclub Korac Zürich
2 Humanitärer Verein SAR
3 Jugoslawischer Verein
4 Kulturelle Vereinigung der Serben in der Schweiz
5 Serbischer Kulturverein
6 Sportclub Jugoslavija

Spain

1 Agrupación de Padres de Zürich e alrededores
2 As Xeitosiñas
3 Asociación Juvenil autónoma
4 Asociación Popular Española
5 ATEES
6 Ateneo Popular Español
7 Centro de Amistad PTT
8 Centro de Formación Goldbrunnen
9 Centro Gallego
10 Centro Hispánico Cultural
11 Centro Hispano Cultural Recreativo
12 Circulo Cultural "Miguel de Unamuno"
13 Consejo Escolar de Padres de Familia
14 C.R.E.
15 Federación de Sociedades Galegas na Suiza
16 Foro Cultural
17 Grup Cultural Valencia
18 Izquierda Unida
19 Katalanischer Verein Cosa Nostra
20 PCE
21 Promoción Cultural
22 Promoción da Cultura Galega
23 P.S.O.E.
24 Unión Deportiva "Orense"
25 Union General de Trabajadores, Sección de Zürich UGT

Sri Lanka

Tamils

1 Beratungsstelle Pathai
2 Katpakam - Treffpunk für tamilische Frauen
3 Mütternberatung für tamilische Eltern

4 Tamil Welfare Organisation W.T.T.C.
5 Tamilischer Elternverein
6 Tamilisches Kulturzentrum
7 Tamils Rehabilitation Organisation
8 Thirukoneswara Nadanalayam Tanzgruppe
9 Hindu Mananram

Sighalese

1 Swiss Sri Lankan Association
2 Sri Lanka Cricket Club Zürich

Turkey

1 Isviçre Islam Cemaati Vakfl
2 Türkisch-Islamische Stiftung für die Schweiz
3 Zentrale der islamischen Vereine in der Schweiz
4 Zürich Türk-Islam - Kültür Ocagi
5 Islam Kültür Merkezleri Birligi
6 Anatolisches-Alevitisches Kulturzentrum in Zürich
7 Avrupa Türk Akademisyenler Birligi
8 FC Galatasaray
9 Isviçre Türk Kadinlan Yardimlasma Dernegi
10 Horgen Türk-islam Birligi
11 Schweiz. Türkischer Verein
12 Société Turco-Suisse
13 Solidaritätsverband der türkischen Vereine in der Schweiz
14 Tüfem - Ausbildungszentrum für türkische Folklore
15 Türkischer Elternverein für Vorschulkinder
16 Türkische Elternvereinigung Zürich
17 Türk Sanat Kültür Toplulugu
18 Türkspor
19 Verband der türkischen demokratischen Vereine in der Schweiz
20 Türkischer und kurdischer Kulturverein
21 Türkischer Klub für kulturelle Kontakte (Dostlar Kulübü)
22 Verein Kulturelle Übersetzung
23 Verein Mozaik

Kurds

1 Föderation der Patriotischen Arbeiter- und Kulturvereine aus Kurdistan in der Schweiz - FEKAR
2 Kurdischer Arbeiter- und Kulturverein
3 Kurdischer Lehrer- und Elternverein

As already stated, there is only scarce information on the precise aims and actions of these different associations. There exists nevertheless a recent study included in the second part of the *Integrationleitbild of Zurich* which is based on interviews with 60 immigrant associations of the city (Von Ah, Dobler 1998). As the principal reason to set up an association, the authors of this study consider the wish to have one's own place to meet and to foster one's own culture. A second reason is the desire to help other migrants in a difficult situation, to constitute a network of solidarity. Only a small number of migrant organisations have an explicit political or religious commitment. The basis of the organisations are often the same national or regional origin, in case of Asians, Africans or Latin-Americans the organisations transcend ethnic or national boundaries (Von Ah, Dobler 1998, 224-225). The resources of the associations come mainly from within: about 60% of the associations have only the fees of their members as a financial basis, 16% of them receive financial support from the countries of origin and 22% from the Swiss administration (Von Ah, Dobler 1998, 227-228). It seems that the majority of these associations address themselves after all to first generation migrants and have some difficulties to attract the second generation.

Political affiliation

There is almost no scientific information about the political affiliation of migrants in Zurich. An important number of the first generation of Italians were members of the Italian Communist party. The same is true for the Spaniards: a lot of them were committed to political parties of their home countries, primarily left wing parties. In principle a foreigner can become a member of a Swiss party - the Social Democrat Party even indicates that it wants to favour membership of foreigners - but this case is rare. Even if the above mentioned initiative by the group "Political rights for migrants" tries to mobilise Swiss with a migrant background to struggle for the interests of immigrants, one cannot speak of "ethnic politicians" in the sense of political entrepreneurs neither in Zurich nor in general in Switzerland.

Syndicalist affiliation

Official information about syndicalist affiliation of migrants in Zurich is scarce. According to the information given by the local branch of the *Union of the Workers in the Metal- and Watch-Industry* (Schweizerischer Metall- und Uhrenarbeiterverband, SMUV) 40% of its members are foreigners, the most important national group are still the Italians. According to the information given by the local branch of the *Union of Construction and Industrie* (Gewerkschaft Bau und Industrie, GBI) the composition of its members in Zurich is the following:

Table I-IX: Composition of the members of the GBI by nationality and percentage of the total number of members in 1998 (estmations)

	Total number	% of total number of members
Former Yugoslavia	3100	28
Italy	2300	21
Spain	1100	10
Portugal	1300	12
Turkey	200	2
Swiss	3.000	27
Total	11.000	100

Religious affiliation

According to the census of 1990, 138.000 (50%) of the 276.000 Swiss living in Zurich were Protestant, 92.000 (33%) Catholics, 4000 (1,5%) Jewish and 41.000 (15%) had another religious affiliation or were without any. For the 89.000 foreigners the proportions were quite different: 7000 (8%) were Protestant, 49.000 (55%) Catholics, 650 (0,7%) Jewish and 32.000 (36%) had another religious affiliation or were without any (Statistisches Amt 1997, 28). It is clear that all the Muslims are counted in this latter group.

The total number of the Muslim population in Zurich amounted in 1990 to 9296 persons, which is 2,5% of the total population (365.043). One can reasonably guess that the majority of them are foreigners, which would signify that their part on the total foreigner population was 10,4% in 1990. However, it is evident that since then the Muslim population has strongly increased, a lot of migrants coming in the last years from former Yugoslavia or Turkey. But there are not any more recent data on religious affiliation.

II RELEVANT POLITICAL STRUCTURES

2.1 National level

The basic features of the Swiss political system have all an important impact on the politics of migration. First, Switzerland is a so-called "direct democracy" (see for example Hertig 1984, Kriesi 1995, 80-125). The most important component of this system is the popular initiative (*Volksinitiative*) which permits the launching of a political idea in the form of a project for a constitutional article, which is submitted to the Swiss people. In order to succeed, a popular initiative must gather the signatures of at least 100.000 voters in a period of 18 months. It is then followed by a popular vote (*Volksabstimmung*). The popular initiative played - and still plays - a very important role for populist and anti-immigrant movements. These groups have never become important forces in the form of political parties (their scores in elections always kept low) but they succeeded in gaining support from important parts of the population through the popular initiative. Since the middle of the 1960s, several times so-called "Overforeignization initiatives" (*Überfremdungsinitiativen*) were launched which aimed at limiting the number of foreigners living in Switzerland. Even if so far they have always been rejected, they had an important impact on the Swiss migration policy (Mahnig 1998). The second component of Swiss direct democracy is the referendum: it permits to submit each law adopted in parliament to a popular vote, if 50.000 signatures are collected in the three months following its adoption. The referendum is also used by populist parties either as a way to challenge a decision made by parliament or as an instrument to threaten the other parties to make concessions in the parliamentary debates on a new law. The last component of the system of direct democracy is finally the rule that each new constitutional article has to be submitted to a popular vote.

The second important feature of the Swiss polity is *federalism*: the twenty-three cantons composing Switzerland (three of them are divided in two half-cantons) have a large autonomy in several fields. The education system, for example, is organised on a cantonal level. According to the federalist principles, the Swiss parliament is divided in two chambers, the *Nationalrat* (the representatives of the people) and the *Ständerat* (the representatives of the cantons). In order to pass parliament, a law has to be voted by a majority in each chamber. The principle of the "double majority" - of the population and the cantons - concerns also the popular vote. Today this principle is more and more criticised: the balance between interests of the cantons and interests of the whole population gives progressively more weight to the small - and often conservative - cantons which have lost a lot of their population through migration to the urban centres, but keep still the same political influence through the principle of the "double majority". In 1994 for example, a constitutional change proposed by the government to ease the naturalisation procedure was adopted by a majority of Swiss people but rejected by a majority of cantons. An important role for the politics of migration plays also the third level of territorial organisation in Switzerland: the municipalities. The naturalisation procedure, for example, is to a large extent a municipal decision (see part on naturalisation).

A third and last important feature to be mentioned is the so called consociational democracy (*Konkordanz-Demokratie*) (see for example Lijphart 1977, Kriesi 1995, 311-333). The Swiss government, the Federal Council (*Bundesrat*), composed of seven ministers, is chosen by the deputies for four years and reflects the distribution of forces between the different parties in parliament. There is no system of majority and opposition, the four most important parties, representing about three quarters of the electorate, - Social Democrats (*Sozialdemokratische Partei* - SP), Liberals (*Freisinnig-demokratische Partei* - FDP), Christian-Democrats (*Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei* - CVP) and the Conservatives (*Schweizerische Volkspartei* - SVP) - participate all in the government. The proportional representation of parties and other interest groups is a general feature of the Swiss political system and can be found on many other levels. This means that the decision-making process is often very lengthy because the different forces must negotiate a compromise. Concerning the politics of migration the system leads to long periods of "non-decision" because the interests concerning migration are so divergent that a compromise can often not be found (Mahnig 1997, 4-5).

Table II-I Distribution of seats in the *Nationalrat* and *Ständerat* (1991 / 1995)

	Elections of 1991		Elections of 1995	
	NR	StR	NR	StR
SP - Social Democrats	43	58	3	5
FDP - Liberals	44	45	18	17
CVP - Christian Democrats	37	34	4	5
SVP- Conservatives	25	29	4	5
GP - Green Party	14	10	-	-
Liberals	10	7	3	2
FPS (Populist Conservatives)	8	8	-	-
LdU and EVP - Centrist	9	5	1	1
SD (Extreme Right)	7	3	1	-
PdA (Extreme Left)	2	-	-	-
Others	1	1	-	-
Total of seats	200	200	46	46

Source: (Schweizerische Bundeskanzlei 1996, 5)

2.2 Local level

The political structure of the city of Zurich corresponds in many respects to the one on the federal level: there are not many cities in Europe where one can find such a democratic institutional framework for policy-making as in Zurich (Neidhart 1998). The habitants of the city elect the 125 deputies of the parliament (*Gemeinderat*) as well as the 9 members of the executive (*Stadtrat*) including the mayor. The gathering of 4000 signatures allows to launch a popular initiative on the city-level, and if 4000 signatures are collected against a decision taken in parliament during the twenty following days, a referendum must be hold (Gemeindeordnung 1997). These instruments of direct democracy play a very important role for the policy making in the city: often ad-hoc coalitions and interest groups succeed to influence policies using the initiative or the referendum (Hitz, Schmid, Wolff 1995, 210-211).

However, in the field of migration the instruments of direct democracy have been used the most frequently by populist parties and the extreme right. They succeeded in the last years to block several policies aimed at an improvement of the situation of migrants in Zurich as for example the simplification of naturalisation and the setting up of a solidarity network for refugees from Kosovo (see 2.3).

The deputies of the *Gemeinderat* meet almost every week and their action is largely commented by the local press. Even if they are "spare time-politicians" they represent an important counterweight to the executive. Because the chance to be reelected depends on the municipal level a great deal on personal notoriety, politics are very personalized (Neidhart 1998). The most important parties in the *Gemeinderat* are:

- **SP**: *Sozialdemokratische Partei* (Social Democrats)
- **FDP**: *Freisinnig-demokratische Partei* (Liberals)
- **SVP**: *Schweizerische Volkspartei* (Conservatives)
- **CVP**: *Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei* (Christian Democrats)
- **LdU**: *Landesring der Unabhängigen* (Centrists)
- **EVP**: *Evangelische Volkspartei* (Centrists)
- **GP**: *Grüne Partei* (Green Party)
- **FraP**: *Frauen macht Politik* (Women's party)
- **SD**: *Schweizer Demokraten* (Extreme Right)
- **AL90**: *Alternative Liste Züri 1990* (Alternatives)

In the last municipal elections of march 1998, the parties of the political centre (FDP, CVP, LdU, EVP) as well as the parties on the margins (FraP, SD) lost votes while the left-wing parties (SP, GP) and the Conservatives (SVP) won some new seats in parliament. This means that neither the left (SP, GP, FraP, AL90) with 59 seats nor the right with 60 seats (SVP, FDP, CVP) have a majority in parliament (NZZ 1998a).

Table II - II Distribution of seats in the *Gemeinderat* (parliament) of Zurich (1970 -1998)

	1970	1974	1978	1982	1986	1990	1994	1998
SP	41	44	50	42	39	47	43	49
FDP	26	23	26	36	27	25	28	26
CVP	15	19	19	19	17	12	10	8
SVP	5	4	5	7	6	7	19	26
LdU	26	16	16	9	11	8	7	4
EVP	12	8	6	6	6	4	2	1
GP	-	-	-	-	5	10	5	7
SD	-	9	-	2	11	5	4	1
FraP	-	-	-	-	-	3	5	1
AL90	-	-				4	2	2
Other	-	2	3	4	3	-	-	-
Total	125	125	125	125	125	125	125	125

Source: (Statistisches Jahrbuch 1994, 307; NZZ 1998a)

In the executive, however, the left has a majority of six members against three for the right. The actual members of the executive are the following (NZZ 1998b):

- Josef Estermann (SP): Mayor
- Esther Maurer (SP): Police
- Elmar Ledergerber (SP) : Building construction
- Monika Weber (LdU): Education and Sport
- Willy Küng (CSP): Finance
- Rober Neukomm (SP): Public Health and Environment
- Kathrin Martelli (FDP): Underground workings
- Thomas Wagner (FDP): Industrial Enterprise
- Monika Stocker (GP): Social Affairs

Table II - III Representation of parties in the *Stadtrat* (executive) of Zurich (1970 -1998)

	1970	1974	1978	1982	1986	1990	1994	1998
SP	4	3	4	-	1	3	3	4
FDP	1	2	1	2	1	1	3	2
CVP	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	-
SVP	1	1	-	1	1	-	-	-
LdU	2	2	2	1	1	-	-	1
EVP	-	-	1	1	1	1	-	-
Other	-	-	-	3*	2*	2**	2***	2***
Total	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9

Source: (Statistisches Jahrbuch 1994, 307; NZZ 1998a)

* representatives of the labour unions

** without party affiliation

*** GP and CSP (Cristian-social Party)

The fact that the SVP does not participate in the executive although it is the second largest party (together with the FDP) in the municipal parliament, will certainly be source of tensions. The party tried in the last years to establish itself as a protest-party using the instruments of direct democracy in a very populist way. This had already an important impact on the politics of migration (see 2.3).

2.3 Immigrant and ethnic minorities related political structure

National level

The principal reason for the fact that immigration developed in a political issue in Switzerland was the mounting xenophobia of the Swiss population since the beginning of the 1960s. As soon as 1964 a report on "The problem of the foreign workers" (*Das Problem der ausländischen Arbeitskräfte*) had been published by the Swiss administration, which recommended several measures for the integration of migrants. But during the sixties it was not taken into account by politicians. In 1970 the government created the Federal commission for the problem of foreigners (*Eidgenössische Kommission für das Ausländerproblem*) - which is called today the Federal commission for foreigners (*Eidgenössische Auländerkommission - EKA*) - as an answer to the "overforeignization initiative" (Cattacin 1987, 69-70). Up to now the EKA is still the most important institution for the integration of migrants in Switzerland. Its function is essentially consultative: the EKA brings together the representatives of different institutions and organisations (for example those of cantonal administrations, employer-organisations, labour-unions and immigrant organisations) in order to discuss immigration problems and to give recommendations.

The task of the EKA is also a policy of information and communication in order to "explain Swiss people the difference of the foreigner and its problems" on the one hand, to "improve the information of the foreigners" on the other (EKA 1989, 101). The EKA considers also that concerning the foreign population "conforming to our democratic customs, it is necessary to look for solutions which are adapted to local conditions. Each municipality has to find its own way." (EKA 1989, 7) That is why an important part of the action of the EKA is the support of cantonal or municipal commissions which implement the same policy of information and communication on a local level.

Since the middle of the seventies several attempts have been made to change the policy towards migrants, but all have been rejected by popular votes. The first was a popular initiative which aimed at an improvement of the legal status of migrants, the so called "Mitenand" (*Together*)-initiative. It was rejected in 1981 by a strong majority of voters. The second attempt was a reform of the law on foreigners of 1931 (*Ausländer Aufenthalts- und Niederlassungsgesetz - ANAG*), which tried also to improve (even in a less ambitious way) the legal status of foreigners. Accepted by the parliament, it was rejected in a referendum in 1982. In 1983 and in 1994 two constitutional changes proposed by the government to ease the naturalisation procedure for second generation immigrants were rejected in popular votes (see part on access to national citizenship).

In the last years the issue of integration has become more salient, because of the declining integration of migrants in the Swiss economy which is largely due to a general increase of unemployment hitting the migrant population much harder than the Swiss. This is a new problem for Switzerland: at he end of the 1980s for example, scholars could still write: "The settled unemployed foreigner is an exceptional phenomenon, its social figure does not exist" (Bolzmann, Fibbi, Garcia 1987, 62). The problem hits strongly the cities and put therefore the question of integration on their agendas. In the last years some big cities - such as Basle, Bern and Zurich - have elaborated so called "integration policy-designs" (*Integrationsleitbilder*) in order to create a new comprehensive approach to the question. But the question became also more important on the federal agenda. In 1996 the EKA published a report in which it claimed an clear strengthening of Swiss integration policy and a stronger intervention of the Federal State as before (EKA 1996). A year later, a commission of experts, charged to think about the reshaping of the whole Swiss migration policy, recommended also a new comprehensive approach to integration, putting the stress on the social problems of migrants (Expertengruppe 1997).

A first concrete step in direction of a reinforcement of the federal immigrant policy is the setting up of an article on integration in the Aliens law of 1931. Voted by the parliament in June 1998, the article gives the Confederation the possibility to subsidise local integration projects.

As a conclusion one can say, that in Switzerland it is today hardly possible to speak of a real integration policy for migrants on the *federal* level. Integration structures can primarily be found on the level of non-official organisations (association, labour-unions etc.) as well as on the level of local administration (cantons and municipalities). That is the reason that some scholars speak of the " integrationist federalism " in Switzerland (Cattacin 1996). The vote for an integration article - although a very modest measure - can be interpreted as a fist step towards a different policy.

Local level

For a long time there has been no clear policy towards migrants in Zurich. In 1968 the " Municipal Commission for the assimilation question " (*Städtische Kommission für Assimilierungsfragen*) was set up which changed its name later to " Municipal Commission for the questions of foreigners " (*Städtische Kommission für Ausländerfragen*). This Commission is composed of 24 members, who are chosen every four years by the *Gemeinderat* and who are representing the " interested circles " (parties, employer organisations, labour unions, churches, associations) according to the specific way of interest organisation in Switzerland (Germann et al. 1985). The commission, which holds regularly reunions, is charged to make recommendations to the *Gemeinderat* and *Stadtrat*.

In 1969 the " Co-ordination Office for the Questions of Foreigners " (*Koordinationsstelle für Ausländerfragen - KSA*) was set up. It is charged to serve on the one hand as secretariat for the commission and on the other hand to co-ordinate the action of different administrative services concerning migrants. However the action of this organism was blocked several times and only in 1982 it got more active with the arrival of a new director. In 1987 the KSA enlarged its action and in 1988 the number of the employees was multiplied by five because of the setting up of a consultation service for migrants. Because the unemployment of migrants (for the first as well as for the second generation) is until the 1990s not really an issue on the political agenda, the policy of the KSA can be characterised - as the one made on the federal level by the EKA - as a policy of mediation and information. The KSA has recently been renamed in " Office for intercultural questions " (*Fachstelle für Interkulturelle Fragen*).

During the same period different administrative branches developed their own actions in regard to migrants. This is particularly true in the field of education: at the beginning of the 1980s the proportion of migrant children increases up to 90% in some schools and the authorities fear that Swiss parents would put their children in other schools and that this could lead to the development of school segregation (Schulsynode 1983). Because the public school in Switzerland is organised on the level of the cantons, the cantonal authorities tried to respond to the problem and which took a number of initiatives: in 1980 the " Direction for Education of the Canton of Zurich " (*Erziehungsdirektion des Kantons Zürich*) sets up a special service called " Pedagogy for Foreigners " (*Ausländerpädagogik*). During the following years, however the concept of " Pedagogy for Foreigners " is progressively replaced by the idea of " Intercultural Pedagogy" and in 1987 a comprehensive approach for intercultural education is adopted by the cantonal authorities (Truniger 1995).

At the beginning of the 1990s the issue of " integrating migrants " changes completely because of the increasing unemployment. Migrants are particularly suffering from this development because of their strong representation in the lowest segments of the labour market which are struck primarily by the restructuring of the Swiss economy. If the same problem can be observed everywhere in Switzerland, another one is more specific to Zurich as a big city: the question of segregation. Segregation in Zurich can objectively not be considered as a serious problem up to now if one compares the ongoing processes to other European cities. Nevertheless, the high proportion of migrants in some neighbourhoods has been politicised and defined as a threat to law and order by the Conservative party (SVP) which use to speak of " ghettos " and " slums ".

At the beginning of the 1990s the authorities make two attempts to respond to this harsher climate. In 1993, after the racist murder of a young Tamil, the *Gemeinderat* votes a credit of 40.000 Swiss francs and charges the KSA to organise actions for the better mutual understanding of migrants and Swiss. The KSA sets up the project " z'Züri dehei? " (*at home in Zurich?*) which tries to support different cultural actions on which migrants and Swiss participate together. The central event of the project is a week of intercultural meetings in May 1994, involving sixty associations of migrants and Swiss under the title *Piazza Mondiale* (NZZ 1994).

Another attempt for a better integration of the migrants living in Zurich has been a failure: in January 1996 the municipal parliament (*Gemeinderat*) decides to ease some of the criteria for naturalisation of foreigners. According to the federal Constitution a foreigner has to become first the citizen of a municipality and then of a canton in order to get the Swiss nationality (see party on access to citizenship). The changes adopted are modest: the parliament tries only to adapt the rules of the naturalisation procedure to the changes which took place in the years before on the cantonal and federal level (the demand that a candidate must have lived 6 of the total of 12 years required in Zurich, is lowered to 4 years and the demand to speak the local dialect is abandoned). Because of the still restrictive rules the Green party and the Alternatives vote against the changes, which are supported by all the big parties. The members of the extreme right party *Swiss Democrats* (*Schweizer Demokraten*) vote also against the changes and after their adoption launch a referendum which succeeds (NZZ 1996a). In a aggressive campaign the *Swiss Democrats* argue that the changes adopted in the *Gemeinderat* would lead to a " squandering of Swiss nationality " whereas the other parties do not really commit themselves to the issue. The Conservative Party (SVP) even changes its position because its leaders fear to loose their traditional electorate. The vote takes place on June the 9th, 1996: 62% of the voters reject the changes, only two boroughs (*Kreis* 1 and *Kreis* 7) vote in favour of them (NZZ 1996b).

In the following years the political climate concerning migrants in Zurich gets even harsher because the Conservative party (SVP) tries to win votes by making migrants responsible for general social problems of the city. During the campaign for the municipal elections of March 1998 it publishes several advertisements in local newspapers which have a clearly xenophobic meaning: " Zurich becomes a ghetto ", " Against a multicultural Zurich ", " Criminal foreigners: Throw them out! ", " We want that Zurich keeps a city for the Swiss ", " Stop the discrimination of Swiss children " (Mahnig 1998b, 128). However, if the SVP wins in the elections some seats in the *Gemeinderat*, it does not get any in the *Stadtrat*, where the left strengthens its position.

Nevertheless, the SVP continues its politicisation of the migrant issue, using the referendum. In spring 1998 the *Gemeinderat* decides to subsidise a " contact network " for migrants from Kosovo with 50.000 SFr. The SVP launches the referendum against this decision, which is considered by the other parties as a reasonable project concerning a excluded group (NZZ 1998d). In the popular vote of June, the 7th 1998, 56% of the voters follow the SVP and reject the project.

One month before this event, in May 1998, the Mayor of Zurich presented a *Design for integration* (*Integrationsleitbild*) which is the result of a study made by the Institute of

Ethnology of the University of Zurich and aims at a new comprehensive approach for an integration policy in Zurich. The *Leitbild* considers the exclusion of an increasing number of migrants from the labour market as the central problem of the city and demands a policy facing this issue by programs of education and vocational training (Leitbild 1998a, 28-32). It considers also that housing segregation and the concentration of migrants in certain neighbourhoods will become a serious topic and asks for the implementation of a dispersal policy (Leitbild 1998a, 35-36). The authors analyse the concentration of social problems in Zurich as the outcome of the federal admission policy, which, according to them, allowed for a long time the immigration of unqualified foreign workers in the interest of certain economic branches. Therefore they demand a more restrictive admission policy in the future (Leitbild 1998a, 39-40).

During the summer 1998, the *Leitbild* leads to a large and very controversial debate. The SVP, on the one side, considers that there is no " integration problem " in Zurich, but a " foreigner problem ". The party asks thus for a policy which stops further migration to the city. The multicultural left, on the other side, represented by the Green party and alternative organisations, criticises the *Leibild* because it demands the " assimilation " of migrants in some central areas of Swiss society and insists, according to them, only on the "social deficits" of migrants but not on their important socio-economic contribution to Swiss society. Some observers even accuse the *Leitbild* to be based on " cultural racism " (Steiner-Khamsi 1998). Migrant organisation make similar claims and criticise the fact that they have not been associated to the setting up of the *Leitbild*.

Faced with these critical reactions, the Mayor of Zurich decided in November 1998 to rewrite the *Integrationsleitbild* and to include also members of migrant organisations in the new working group (NZZ 1998e).

Access to national citizenship

The access to national citizenship is in Switzerland even less open than in Gemany, reputed to have the most restrictive law on nationality in Europe (Centlivres, Schnapper 1991, 152). Children of foreigners born in Switzerland keep the nationality of their parents, because there is no *ius soli* as for example in France or in the traditional immigration countries. The naturalisation procedures are also very complicated. In general, a foreigner who wants to apply for Swiss citizenship has to prove that he lived during 12 years legally in Switzerland (Gutzwiller, Baumgartner 1997, 3).

However, the specificity of the access to citizenship in Switzerland is its " federalist character ". The naturalisation procedure consists in Switzerland in fact of three stages. The federal Constitution stipulates that in order to get the Swiss nationality one has to become first the citizen of a municipality and then of a canton. The candidate for naturalisation has first to ask a federal authorisation for naturalisation from the federal Office of Police. Once he is in possession of this document, he has to ask the right of citizenship (*droit de cité*) of a municipality. The federal authorities intervene only at the first and the last stage when they are informed on the decision of the municipality. The most difficult stage to pass is the one on the municipal level, because its logic is an ethnic and cultural one: in certain municipalities the applicant has to prove his knowledge of Swiss traditions and that he is assimilated to the values of the local community. Additionally the naturalisation procedure is often very costly (Centlivres 1990).

The implementation of these principles is however quite different according to the local communities: in big municipalities exists normally a commission which decides on the naturalisation demands by foreigners, whereas in small municipalities all the citizens of the municipality decide on the request of the foreigner. This leads often to refusals by local communities on the ground of unjustified criteria (see for example Dütschler 1998).

Two attempts were made in the last decades to change this restrictive rules. In 1983 the government proposed a constitutional reform whose aim was to increase the weight of the Confederation in the naturalisation procedure of the second generation. It justified this project by the huge number of foreigners who were born and had attended school in Switzerland but who were still not Swiss citizens because of the very restrictive Swiss citizenship law. Therefore the government wanted to integrate an article in the Constitution giving the power to the State to eas the naturalisation of all foreigners born and grown up in Switzerland. However, in December 1983, the project was rejected in a popular vote by 54,3% of the voters.

In June 1994 a new popular vote on a project trying to ease the naturalisation of the second generation took place. The reform was once more rejected, in spite of the support by all the parties (except the populist parties of the right): whereas 52,8% of the Swiss population voted for the reform, a majority of cantons voted against it. The double nationality, however, is admitted in Switzerland since 1992.

III CASE GROUP: THE ITALIAN COMMUNITY

Italians were after 1945 the most important group of migrants which came to Switzerland: in 1960 almost two thirds of the foreigners living in Switzerland came from Italy, in 1990 still almost one third of them (see table I-VIII). The same is true for Zurich. Even if the part of Italians on the total number of foreigners is today decreasing faster than on the national level - it felt from 26% in 1990 to 19% in 1996 - they are still the biggest migrant group.

As a specificity of the situation of the Italian migrants in Switzerland can be considered the fact that there existed already a large number of well established Italian institutions when they arrived in 1945. Already in 1898 the *Missione Cattolica Italiana di Zurigo* was founded for the large Italian community living at the end of the 19th century in Zurich (Ciapparella, Gatani 1997). After World War II the *Missione* continued its religious and social support of the Italian migrants. In 1930, Italian antifascists set up the *Scuola Libera Italiana di emancipazione proletaria* in Zurich in order to give their children an education free from fascist ideology. The founder of this school was also one of the founding members of the *Colonie Libere Italiane* (CLI) which were set up in September 1943 in Zurich. In the same year nine further colonies were created in other Swiss cities and in November 1943 was set up *the Fedrazione delle Colonie Libere Italiane in Svizzera* (FCLIS) (Grossi 1985 203-204).

After World War II the *Colonie Libere Italiane* become one of the most important migrant organisations in Switzerland. They try on the one hand side to struggle for a better support by the Italian government of its emigrated citizens, on the other hand to struggle for a better treatment of the Italian Immigrants in Switzerland. However they need some time to find an autonomous political position and are often accused to be manipulated by the Italian Communist Party (Bottinelli et al. 1973, 38-40).

In a big congress - the *Convegno dell'emigrazione* - held in Zurich in 1959, the representatives of the organisation claim better social rights for immigrants in Switzerland. In the same time the CLI begin also to develop evening schools for their members and alphabetisation courses for adults. In 1964 la FCLIS is composed of 100 associations and has 10.300 members. It organises about 100 courses (Grossi 1985, 206).

The political commitment of the FCLIS will lead to the expulsion of some of its members from Switzerland in the first half of the 1960s. Confronted with the mounting xenophobia in Switzerland, the organisation tries to explain to Swiss population the problems of Italian immigrants. In the 1970s the FCLIS becomes more and more involved in the question of education because the second generation enters school. In many CLI parent committees (*Comitati di genitori*) are set up.

In 1974 the organisation participates on the founding of the movement "Mitenand" which launches some years later the initiative with the same name. It is very active to promote the initiative's aims for more civil and social rights of migrants in Switzerland (see 2.3), but the clear failure of the initiative in the vote of 1981 shows the limits of this kind of political struggle in Switzerland. The FCLIS keeps still politically active during the 1980s and continues to be one of the major migrant organisations. But its importance and impact has clearly decreased compared to the 1970s.

IV Zurich as a case for comparative Analysis

The specific characteristics of Zurich which make it an interesting case for comparison are threefold. First, Zurich is one of the European cities with the highest rates of habitants with an immigrant background. Until very recently this phenomenon has never been considered as a problem, but there have not been important political efforts for integrating migrants neither. The reason for this has to be searched in the well functioning integration of migrants through the labour market. Since this process is not so smoothly working anymore, immigration has become a political issue.

The second important characteristic of Zurich - as of every other Swiss municipality - is its large margin for policy making compared to other European cities, which is based on the strong federalist culture of Switzerland. This means that Zurich would have more possibilities than other European cities to implement an autonomous immigrant policy.

The last characteristic of Zurich could be called the "paradox of direct democracy". The failures of a more open immigrant policy happened almost all through the instruments of direct democracy: the referendum and the popular vote. The same phenomenon can also be observed on the national level. The case of Zurich offers thus a unique possibility to think about the link between democracy and the opening up of rights for new members of society.

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